by John Isaacs Prepared remarks delivered by John Isaacs to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs on December 1, 2009 I would like to talk about one of science’s greatest, and most deadly, inventions – the nuclear bomb. While interest in nuclear weapons issues has faded since the end of the Cold War […]
Toxic T
To bolster the security of our critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) yesterday announced its plan to simulate chemical attacks on Boston’s subway system, known as The T. But, Bostonians, do not despair: your activities will not be disrupted, subway schedules will not be altered, and you might not even realize the study is happening…unless you notice the presence of white coats and research gadgets, which could always be mistaken for MIT shenanigans…
Using a harmless tracer gas, the DHS Science & Technology Directorate will team up with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to study airflow characteristics of chemical smoke and gas in dozens of T stations and subway cars. This will take place from December 5 to 11. According to the DHS release, the study will yield “data that will help guide the design of next generation detection systems and enable transportation systems to strengthen evacuation, ventilation and other incident response strategies.”
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s agenda since 9/11 has included expanding its network of chemical sensors, though its bid last year for funding to install more sensors was denied by the Transportation Security Administration, an arm of DHS. Underlying the rejection was skepticism about the effectiveness of sensors in an actual emergency. As TSA spokesman Christopher White explained: “Current chemical detection systems do not warn the traveling public or system operators in a real-time environment that would deter or prevent a catastrophic event or attack…We’re very focused on active items, funding active activities and projects that would deter a terrorist attack.”
But that was back in 2008, and chemical sensor technology has presumably advanced since then. This month’s study will further augment the usefulness of sensors by helping to shape ideas for new designs, to determine ideal placement locations, and to increase understanding of chemical attack dynamics in general.
The potential for chemical terrorism is not simply the stuff of TV thrillers. In 1995, members of the millennial Japanese mystical cult Aum Shinrikyo (now called Aleph) released sarin nerve agent into the Tokyo subway system. Failure to develop an effective delivery system limited its impact, but the attack still claimed twelve lives and injured over a thousand. Scientists recruited by Aum Shinrikyo had previously experimented with biological agents, including anthrax. Thankfully they were unable to get over the technical hurdles involved in weaponizing the pathogens.
Although Aum did not achieve its goal of mass casualties, its 1995 attack revealed frightening possibilities common to all major cities. The vulnerability of Russia’s old chemical weapon stockpiles as well as advances in dual-use technology, such as microreactors, compound those risks. Let’s hope some valuable discoveries will be made in Boston this month.
Rummy on Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Verification: Who Cares!
Via Heather Hulburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network, comes still more evidence that despite what Jon Kyl would have you believe, there was a time not so long ago when some Republicans deemed it ok not to freak out about the configuration of Russia’s nuclear forces or the absence of provisions to verify the size and location of those forces.
In prepared testimony for a July 2002 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Moscow Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chided those who viewed START I as a model of effective arms control:
There are those who do not see the difference in the size of these treaties as a sign of progress. To the contrary, they would have preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions and intrusive verification measures.
These critics operate from a flawed premise: that, absent such an agreement, our two countries would both try to break out of the constraints of this treaty and increase our deployed nuclear forces. Nothing could be further from the truth.
During the Cold War, the stated rationale for arms control was to constrain an arms race. But the idea of an arms race between the United States and Russia today is ludicrous. The relationship between our two countries today is such that U.S. determined—unilaterally—that deep reductions in our deployed nuclear forces are in the U.S. interest.
We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed a treaty in Moscow, but because the fundamental transformation in our relationship with Russia means we do not need so many deployed weapons. Russia has made a similar calculation. The agreement we reached in Moscow is the result of those determinations—not the cause of them.
That is also why we saw no need for including detailed verification measures in the treaty. First, there simply isn’t any way on earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Second, we don’t need to. Neither side has an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since it simply codifies unilaterally announced reductions—and gives both sides broad flexibility in implementing them. Third, we saw no benefit in creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where U.S. and Russian officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity—not to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century.
None of which is to suggest that Rummy was right. Legally-binding, verifiable limits on the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals greatly enhance U.S. security by bringing predictability and stability to U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, giving each side confidence that neither side is attempting to retain a significant strategic advantage, and reducing the chances for misunderstanding and worst-case scenario planning. While neither side wants to retain all of START I’s verification provisions, New START is likely to include an updated system of procedures so that each side can continue to have confidence that it knows what the other is doing.
Nor should we be cavalier about Russian missile development. As Daryl Kimball noted in response to news that the U.S. will soon lose its ability to continuously monitor Russian missile production at Votkinsk, “How significant [the loss of Votkinsk] is depends on what other monitoring mechanisms will be worked out.”
Rather, the point is to highlight yet again how remarkably unserious and disingenuous the attacks on New START from the likes of Jon Kyl, Paula DeSutter, etc. have been.
Iran’s Nuclear Ability: Do They or Don’t They?
On Sunday, an angry Iran refused to comply with a demand by the IAEA to cease work on its Qom nuclear fuel enrichment plant. The resolution, which President Ahmadinejad now calls, “illegal,” criticized Iran for defying its obligations under multiple UN Security Council requirements and rebuked the country for its secret uranium enrichment activities near the city of Qom. Iran further escalated the confrontation by declaring it would construct 10 more such plants.
This threat has created speculation in the blogosphere, but is it bluster or a realistic possibility?
Although the ability of Iran to deliver on all 10 sites seems questionable at best, Joshua Pollack at Arms Control Wonk speculates that secret plans to build new facilities may have been in place for some time, with construction already underway:
One way to see it, then, is that the Iranian side has seized the opportunity to get tough by coming clean, or to come clean by getting tough. In the two-level game of international diplomacy and Iranian domestic politics, this sort of Janus-faced response may be as close to a win-win outcome as ever happens.
Adding fuel to this fire, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in 2007 “listed more than a dozen suspect locations” for nuclear weapons facilities in Iran.
While the Washington Times and the Wall Street Journal ready themselves for military strikes, Max Bergmann at the Wonk Room notes that the Bush administration’s previous refusal to engage Iran prevented an international consensus from emerging.
The IAEA’s vote to censure Iran was not only “symbolic,” it represents a rare measure of unity within the group. Moscow and Beijing have not previously been on board with efforts to punish Iran for its nuclear defiance, either acting to prevent new Security Council measures or pushing for lighter sanctions. Bergmann notes that:
While Obama has been engaging Iran, he has also been working to significantly strengthen the international community’s stance on sanctions should the Iranians walk away. The US and Europe, which were frequently at odds during the Bush administration, are now largely in sync.
The resolution was endorsed by six world powers — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany. Only Cuba, Venezuela and Malaysia voted against the document.
A vote on the resolution is expected to take place Friday. If the resolution is adopted, it will be transmitted to the Security Council for further action, a move that has not taken place since 2006. The IAEA’s 2006 censure of Iran increased initial public speculation as to the nature of the country’s nuclear program and prompted another four UN Security Council resolutions, three of them with sanctions. This second referral may likewise signal the beginning of more serious action toward Iran.
Putting Afghanistan Troop Increase Costs in Perspective
by Travis Sharp COST OF TROOP INCREASE & IMPACT ON OVERALL DEFENSE BUDGET Adding 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will cost $30 billion during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. (12/1 speech) This $30 billion comes in addition to the previously requested FY 2010 defense budget of $68 billion for Afghanistan, $62 billion for Iraq, […]