Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates hosted a meeting with top defense company executives for the first time since 2008, where he stressed the need for a closer partnership and pledged to work with the White House to “secure steady growth in the Pentagon’s budgets over time.”

Steady growth seems likely, since recent reports indicate that the President’s upcoming defense budget request will increase from $636.3 billion to a record $708 billion in FY 2011. This number does not include an additional $33 billion in supplemental appropriations, set to fund the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  But although Gates has called for ‘steady’ growth, he has also vowed to kill many unneeded and troubled programs.  

Last week, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn reiterated the criteria that senior Pentagon leaders have used to determine which weapon programs will be cut or curtailed in FY 2011: “Our criteria for exercising program discipline are clear: programs that are performing poorly, either over budget or behind schedule or delivering less capability than promised, open themselves up to reconsideration.”

In addition, Reuters reports that, “it looks like mounting public concern about federal spending and the sharply widening budget deficit are likely to curb the ability of lawmakers to pump money back into programs targeted for termination as they have in the past.”

Draft budget documents obtained this week show Gates is seeking to end seven weapons programs in FY 2011, including two that were rescued from the eight-item kill list last year — Boeing Co’s C-17 transport plane and a second engine for Lockheed Martin Corp’s F-35 fighter jet.

Other new terminations are less surprising, including a new Navy cruiser and a program to replace the Navy’s EP-3 surveillance plane, while some programs, such as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, an amphibious vehicle being developed for the Marine Corps by General Dynamics Corp that has experienced problems in the past, have apparently escaped the axe, at least for now.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review and FY 2011 budget request will be released one week from today.  Until then, the speculation continues.

Pavel Podvig flags a quote from a Russian Ministry of Defense source that the RS-24, a multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27, could begin to be deployed in 2011, after one or two more flight tests.  Russia had originally planned to deploy the missile in December 2009 to coincide with the expiration of START.  Are development/testing problems slowing things down?  It wouldn’t be the first time.  Another theory is that the delay might have something to do with the New START negotiations.  In a recent article published on the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ website (and written before the Ministry of Defense source announced the delay),  Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, Director of the Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow opined that:

[W]hen in November 2009 the Ministry of Defense disclosed new deployments of the Topol M, it did not mention the RS-24. Nor did the ministry announce any plans to deploy them in 2010.

The decision could be explained by various reasons, from economic to purely technical. But it might also be possible that the inaction reflects the Kremlin’s desire not to complicate the situation further at a time that the self-imposed deadline for completing the new [START] agreement had already been missed. If this supposition is accurate, it would demonstrate Moscow’s continuing interest in concluding a follow-on treaty.

Continuing on the topic of delays, Global Security Newswire’s Elaine Grossman reports that further refurbishment of the B-61 air-delivered gravity bomb is being delayed by Congress, at least for the time-being.  NoH was all over this back in October when the conference report on the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill was completed.  Recall that NNSA’s initial funding request last February was only enough to study a non-nuclear refurbishment of the B61.  However, if Gen. Chilton’s now (in)famous briefing slides on the B61 are any indication, STRATCOM definitely wants to tinker around with the weapon’s nuclear explosive package, specifically to enhance Surety.  If the Nuclear Posture Review rules in favor of the B61, we can probably expect funding to be requested and approved to look at the explosive package.

Finally, a couple of duck hunters caused quite a stir last Friday as they tried to set up some decoys on a piece of land near the Pantex Plant, which assembles and disassembles our nuclear weapons.  On a sorta related note, Duck Hunt is hands down the greatest Nintendo game of all time.              

In a recent op-ed attacking the New START negotiations, The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen argues, among other things, that the U.S. should not reduce its nuclear arsenal unless Russia agrees to reduce it’s enormous stockpile of nonstrategic (i.e. tactical) nuclear weapons.  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that Russia deploys approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, while another 3,300 are kept in reserve or are awaiting dismantlement. The U.S. deploys approximately 500 tactical nuclear weapons, 200 of which are believed to be deployed in Europe.

The emphasis Cohen puts on tactical weapons is unfounded for several reasons…

1. The Bush administration did not include tactical nuclear weapons in its 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia.

2. The bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States did not make the first round of arms reduction talks with Russia contingent upon reductions in Russia’s substantial arsenal of tactical weapons.  

3. Tactical nukes are an important issue deserving of attention (and concern), as they are particularly vulnerable to attack or theft by terrorists.  However, there is not enough time to address them during this round of arms reduction talks.  Doing so would only complicate the negotiations.  There is no reason to deal with tactical nuclear weapons now, unless, of course, your goal is to significantly delay the completion of the START follow-on agreement.

4. Holding off on dealing with tactical nuclear weapons at this time will not endanger U.S. security. Russian strategic weapons clearly pose the greater danger to the United States.  Moreover, a closer look at the arsenals of tactical weapons possessed by the U.S. and Russia reveals that the huge Russian advantage cited by Cohen may not be that much of an advantage at all.

5. Tactical nukes are certainly a substantial hurdle to achieving Obama’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.  However, the issue should be addressed in the next round of arms reductions talks.  Completion and ratification of the START follow-on agreement in a timely fashion will ensure that the U.S. and Russian can begin negotiations on deeper arms reductions, which should include verifiable reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.  Significant progress on disarmament is difficult to achieve, but approaching the matter in a phased manner can achieve meaningful results.  

For more on Russian tactical nuclear weapons, see here, here, and here.

The Four Horsemen (a.k.a. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn) are back with another Wall Street Journal op-ed on the importance of eliminating the “threat to the world” posed by nuclear weapons.  The bipartisan group of four senior statesmen notes that “as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety, security and reliability of our own weapons.”

Below are some comments in reaction…

The Good

• The op-ed is a reminder that steps to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, including reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, have strong bipartisan support and are consistent with U.S. national security interests.  In an earlier op-ed the Four Horsemen called for further, verifiable reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles “as soon as possible” and the adoption of “a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect.”

• The op-ed notes that “advances in the scientific understanding of nuclear explosions and obviated the need for underground nuclear explosive tests.”  

• The op-ed reinforces the conclusions of the September 2009 JASON scientific advisory group report on the status of U.S. efforts to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  The report concluded that “Lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs [Life Extension Programs] to date.”

The Questionable

• The op-ed states that “Departures from our existing stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent.” The Four Horsemen might have added that what we have learned about our nuclear weapons to date suggests that existing stewardship and life extension programs offer a technically sound procedure for the U.S. to maintain the reliability of the stockpile without changing the military characteristics of existing weapons or designing new nuclear warheads. The September 2009 JASON report and other independent estimates support this conclusion.

• The op-ed claims that new investments in the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, particularly in science, technology, and engineering programs, are “urgently needed.”  Many Republicans have argued for major investments in new nuclear weapons production facilities. Yet absent a compelling explanation for why existing capabilities are insufficient for U.S. needs, which the Four Horsemen (noticeably) do not provide, it doesn’t make sense to pursue new production facilities that could have enormous financial and environmental costs and undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

What it Means

Early indications are that the Obama administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request will likely include increased funding for the type of investments in science, technology, and engineering programs called for by the Four Horsemen.  A significant investment will also be made in the newly created Stockpile Management Program. There may also be funding for new production facilities.  The Albuquerque Journal’s John Fleck reported last weekend that the National Nuclear Security Administration’s budget for nuclear weapons programs will rise to $7 billion, up from $6.4 billion last year.

The Four Horsemen and the Obama administration have likely concluded that the price for 67 Senate votes for the START follow-on treaty and eventually the CTBT is increased funding to maintain our nuclear weapons (recall also that this is generally in keeping with the requirements of the FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act, which calls for a plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, modernize the nuclear weapons complex, and maintain the delivery vehicles, and an estimate of budget requirements to do so over a 10-year period). Yesterday’s election result in Massachusetts has probably only strengthened that view.  

The key question (apart from whether this funding is necessary to sustain our deterrent) is whether in offering so much right now for New START the administration will have anything left to bargain with to gain the support of Republicans and the nuclear lab directors for the CTBT down the road.