Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

To How Many Countries Does the U.S. Extend Deterrence?

In an Op-Ed in the October 5th edition of Defense News, Keith Payne writes “that global nuclear disarmament is infeasible in the world as we now know it.”  According to Payne, the main reason this goal is unattainable is the fact that “more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe seek protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter emerging weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) threats in their region.”

Which got me to thinking: Who are these anonymous “more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe”?  It turns out that not even nuclear umbrella-philes seem to know:

“Our ‘extended deterrence’ umbrella, initially formalized with NATO in the 1950s, has subsequently expanded to cover 30-plus nations.”
—Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, chaired by James Schlesinger (December 2008)

“More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn echoed that sentiment in The Wall Street Journal, but all have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”
—Robert Gates (October 28, 2008)

“That’s simply unacceptable for a nation whose nuclear protective umbrella covers some 40 nations.”
–Defense News Editorial (August 17, 2009)

“…the United States must be prepared to defend both itself and over a dozen other countries from nuclear attack.”
—Andrew Krepinevich (October 2, 2009)

To recap, the U.S. extends deterrence to more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe.  Except when it extends deterrence to 30-plus nations.  Or maybe it’s over two dozen allies and partners?  Some 40 nations?  What’s this I hear about over a dozen other countries?

Clearly I wouldn’t want to accuse the above of being flippant in highlighting the importance of the assurance (or is it reassurance?) function of U.S. nuclear weapons, but, well, you get the point.

For some additional thoughts on this issue, see here and here.

Smoke North Korea Out

On September 21, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak proposed a “grand bargain” with North Korea. Tired of counterproductive step-by-step negotiations with Pyongyang, Lee’s deal was a one-shot process: complete and irreversible denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid.

On September 30, the North responded to the offer, calling it “ridiculous.” Given this response, we should not expect a similar American proposal. Or should we?

The Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter believes we should, and his reasoning is clever. In a September 30 briefing, Carpenter and Doug Bandow argued that while there are no good options, the best chance of persuading North Korea to adopt policies acceptable to the United States (i.e. denuclearization) is through coordinated effort with China.  

Carpenter proposed that the United States offer its own one-shot grand bargain not as a diplomatic end-game with North Korea, but as a shrewd gambit to persuade Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang. (It’s worth noting that Carpenter is fond of the grand bargain concept; he has proposed a similar approach for dealing with Iran). Carpenter referred to the strategy as “smoking North Korea out,” by which he means forcing North Korea’s hand and making them reveal their true intentions to the United States and, more importantly, to China.  

It is unclear whether or not Pyongyang is truly considering denuclearization, though it has pledged to work for a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula. This uncertainty (or hope) is enough to prevent China from confronting North Korea; after all, China has some legitimate concerns that include North Korean destabilization leading to a chaotic refugee flow and the potential geopolitical threat from a united Korea. China also knows, however, that an established nuclear weapon power on the peninsula is not in its interests.  

Carpenter’s presentation suggested that he does not expect Pyongyang to accept the grand bargain, which would include a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for denuclearization. For Carpenter, Pyongyang’s rejection of the deal would clarify their intentions and reveal their determination to become an established nuclear weapon power. In such a situation, China would be left with no choice but to bring out its stick.

One problem, however, is that such diplomatic litmus tests tend to be of questionable utility, particularly when it comes to North Korea. Carpenter said that rejection of the grand bargain would mean North Korea had determined to go nuclear, but this assumes Pyongyang: a) knows what it wants; b) has decided upon a course of action that will get it what it wants; and c) attributes as much importance to the grand bargain offer as Carpenter does. As Travis ranted awhile ago, imperfect information makes conjectures about North Korean intentions suspect by default.

Another potential problem in Carpenter’s approach is that if the United States expects the grand bargain to fail, it might act accordingly. This pitfall has been prevalent in U.S. policy toward Iran. Skeptical that negotiations will bear fruit, a few Obama administration officials reportedly believe that direct talks with Iran are important mainly because they provide political cover for more coercive actions down the road. If articulated publicly – like when placating congressional hawks with tough talk on Iran, for example – such sentiments not only cause Iranian leaders to doubt American sincerity, but also assume future coercive steps to be a foregone conclusion. Such assumptions could quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies in both Iran and North Korea.  

Implementing Carpenter’s strategy becomes dangerous if it succeeds when we do not expect (or want) it to. Chester Crocker explained this type of scenario a few weeks ago in the New York Times: “If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own.” Carpenter’s strategy is crafty, but it would be imprudent unless we were actually serious about following through.

Carpenter also appraised U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests. He concluded that it was a mistake by both the Bush and Obama administrations to issue immediate public statements after both tests pledging full nuclear umbrella protection for South Korea and Japan. If it were up to Carpenter, the United States would have issued private statements of assurance to South Korea and Japan but kept China guessing about the U.S. level of commitment to these two countries. If this had occurred, China might more earnestly fear the proliferation implications of Pyongyang’s tests, and the possibility of South Korea and Japan pursuing the bomb would have been an alarming consideration.  This could have been a critical impetus for China to get tough on North Korea.

The Gulf States are concerned about Iran; but how concerned?

So the Arab states are worried about the prospects of a nuclear Iran.  I don’t doubt that some of those worries are genuine (see the marked growth in U.S. arms sales to the Gulf states in recent years, for instance) but as the Brookings Institution’s Suzanne Maloney noted in a July 2009 Senate Finance Committee hearing,

I recognize that the Gulf states spend a lot of time talking about the Iranian threat; they don’t spend a lot of time doing anything about it….[T]hey’ve been very averse to doing anything that would curtail their business relationships with Iran and their political relationships, both of which are quite substantial. So I will take that rhetoric much more seriously when I see them behaving in a way that suggests that they believe that threat is as real as they say.

Take, for example, the pending U.S.-U.A.E. civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.  Opposition to the agreement has hinged in part on concerns about the U.A.E.’s export controls, as the U.A.E. has served as an alleged transit point for military and dual-use exports to Iran.   Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn used the U.A.E. as a transit point to illegally transfer uranium and other sensitive materials to Libya and Iran in the 1990’s.  The U.A.E. claims that it has enacted a stronger national export control law, though according to a July 2009 Congressional Research Service report, “the government had yet to issue implementing regulations for the law or to fully staff a national export control body to enforce it.”  The U.A.E. ambassador to the U.S. characterized the law as a “work in progress” during a June 2009 briefing.

Likewise, one of the key problems with the growing calls emanating from Congress for tougher sanctions on Iran’s gas and petroleum sector is that their success will hinge upon the support of key actors such as Russia, China, and yes, the U.A.E.  But would the U.A.E. support sanctions on firms and states that export gasoline to Iran or help it refine oil, given that roughly $12 billion in foreign goods destined for Iran pass through Dubai, including nearly all of Iran’s refined petroleum imports?  Doing so would require the U.A.E. to breach the fine line it appears to be trying to walk between maintaining its close economic/political relations with Tehran and expressing its worries about a nuclear Iran.

Congress and the B61

Yesterday the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations released their conference report on the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.  The bill summary can be found here and the complete bill text here.  

Of particular interest is the Conference Committee’s action on the proposed refurbishment of the B61 gravity bomb.  NNSA initially requested $65 million to complete the Phase 6.2/6.2A Refurbishment Study authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to address “end of life components, aging and reliability.”  Though the request did not explicitly say so, the $65 million was only enough to study a non-nuclear refurbishment of the B61.  

In July the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee zeroed out the request for the 6.2A study.  The bill summary stated that “Until the Administration finalizes its plans for the nation’s nuclear strategy, stockpile, and complex plans, the Committee does not support the effort to develop what is essentially a new nuclear weapon.”  In contrast, the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee fully funded the B61 request.

Apparently Gen. Chilton’s shiny briefing slides weren’t enough to convince the members of the Conference Committee to fully fund the proposed refurbishment (at least for now)…  

The Committee appropriated $32.5 million, half the initial request, for the Phase 6.2A study, adding that NNSA is authorized to reallocate an additional $15 million for the study “upon completion of the Nuclear Posture Review and confirmation of the requirement for the B61-12.”  The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference placed additional conditions on the study:

No request was made for funds for Phase 2/2A study of the nuclear components of the B61-12, and the conference agreement provides that no funds may be obligated or expended for this purpose without prior approval by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. The conference agreement directs the Nuclear Weapons Council in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy to, within 60 days of release of the Nuclear Posture Review, enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences to execute a study addressing the national security and extended deterrence value of the B61 for both strategic and tactical purposes in light of nuclear terrorism risks and military threats. The conference agreement directs the Nuclear Weapons Council in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy to, within 90 days of release of the Nuclear Posture Review, commission a further study by the JASON Defense Advisory Group examining whether the planned B61-12 can be expected, without nuclear testing, to offer sufficient margin and other advantages as to constitute a long-term 21st Century weapon, or whether it is more likely to be an interim weapon leading to near-term replacement or retirement, and to recommend any additional research that may be needed to make an informed decision on this matter. The conference agreement directs the Secretary of Energy to submit each study to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations not later than 180 days after commissioning the study.[emphasis mine].

The requested NAS and JASON studies are especially interesting, given that the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is undoubtedly evaluating these very same issues.  In fact, if recent remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates are any indication, the NPR may already have issued a verdict on the necessity of maintaining the B61:

Well, the Nuclear Posture Review is well under way, and I would say we’re beginning to see what some of the likely conclusions are. I would say that it is clear, at least to me, that it is important for us to continue to make investments, and I think larger investments, in modernizing our nuclear infrastructure, the labs and so on, the expertise in those places, to have the resources for life-extension programs, and in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer and more reliable.[emphasis mine]

During the heady days of the RRW, the two prime candidates for replacement were generally understood to be the W76 and the B61.  Depending on the outcome of the NPR, the $32.5 million appropriation may just end up being a placeholder that ultimately gives way to a massive appropriation for a wholesale nuclear and non-nuclear refurbishment or perhaps even replacement.  It of course will be verrry intriguing to see how this all plays out.  

On final note: While Congress is already referring to the proposed refurbishment as the “B61-12”, my understanding is that a new modification number implies a degree of change to the weapon that ultimately depends on the level of nuclear and non-nuclear refurbishment approved.  Its not clear that the funding approved by the Conference Committee will be enough to support even a full non-nuclear refurbishment of the B61.  While NNSA and STRATCOM appear to want to push the envelope on the B61 as far as they can (and the NPR might ultimately agree), those decisions have yet to be made, rendering the “mod 12” designation a bit premature.

And one more final note: Notice how I managed to get through an entire post on the B61 without mentioning vacuum tubes!

Did the Republican Policy Committee Read the Strategic Posture Commission Report?

Today the Senate Republican Policy Committee (RPC) released a policy paper titled “START: Do Time Extension Instead of a Bad Treaty.”    

According to the paper, the Senate is unlikely more likely to ratify a START follow-on treaty unless if it includes at least six conditions and restrictions, including a requirement that the follow-on deal with Russian tactical nuclear weapons, that would essentially make it impossible to complete an agreement by the time START I expires on December 5.  Naturally, these limitations fit quite comfortably with the RPC’s preferred outcome, which is that START should simply be extended more or less indefinitely without any further reductions in the U.S. arsenal.

Where to start (and end, since it’s getting late in the day).  By my count, the paper cites the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 25 times.  Of course, it omits the one Commission statement that is most relevant:

“The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control with Russia, and this bodes well for a continued reduction in the nuclear arsenal. The United States and Russia should pursue a step-by-step approach and take a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I when it expires at the end of 2009.  Beyond a modest incremental reduction in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the arms control process becomes much more complex as new factors are introduced.” [emphasis mine].

As I’ve argued on countless occasions in this space, the Commission makes a clear distinction between a modest first step (as embodied by the Joint Understanding signed in Moscow) and the challenges associated with deeper reductions (such as the asymmetry in U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons).  At no point does the Commission hinge taking a modest first step on a completed NPR (which the RPC begrudgingly concedes has already progressed far enough to account for the limits contained in the Joint Understanding in any event), modernizing the complex, or dealing with tactical nuclear weapons.

Then again, it shouldn’t be surprising that the RPC is purposefully misconstruing the Commission’s findings and recommendations, since two of the Commission’s conservative members, including the vice-chairman, have also conveniently chosen to forget the consensus* they agreed to in the final report (see here and here).  

*Jeffrey’s point about this “consensus” being ephemeral notwithstanding, I still think it should count for something.

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