On September 24, 2002, Matthew Bunn, Harvard scholar and a Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation board member, testified before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Veteran’s Affairs. His testimony addressed the topic of nuclear terrorism and laid out a series of recommendations for Congress on steps to prevent nuclear or radiological terrorist attack.
- A single leader. Congress should mandate that the White House appoint a single person to lead and coordinate U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the hands of terrorists and hostile states. The official would be responsible for setting priorities, eliminating overlaps, seizing opportunities for synergy, and keeping these efforts on the front burner at senior levels of the White House.
- A global coalition. Congress must urge the President to establish and lead a cooperative effort to secure stockpiles of WMD and their essential ingredients everywhere. The “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” created at the G-8 Summit in August 2002 is an important step towards achieving such a coalition.
- An accelerated, partnership-based approach in Russia. The U.S. and Russia should develop a joint strategic plan to complete all of the “rapid upgrades” for physical security at nuclear storage sites in Russia within two years and comprehensive upgrades within four. The plan should include an exit strategy ensuring that security will be maintained for the long haul, and integrate Russian experts at every stage so that sustainability can ultimately be ensured. Congress should also give the President permanent authority to waive Nunn-Lugar certification conditions.
- “Global Cleanout and Secure.” Congress should establish a flexible program that provides a range of targeted incentives to facilities across the globe to give up their highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and to install rapid security upgrades at the facilities where these materials would remain. Congress should give the President the authority to spend Nunn-Lugar funds outside of the former Soviet Union, wherever threats to U.S. security need to be addressed.
- Stringent global nuclear security standards. Congress should ask the Administration to pursue arrangements to flesh out the Global Partnership created at the G-8 Summit with commitments by participating states to protect their nuclear materials according to an agreed minimum standard, and to provide assistance as needed to any state willing to commit to achieving the minimum standards.
- A beefed-up second line of defense. Congress should require the administration to integrate its several anti-nuclear smuggling efforts into an overall plan to ensure that each relevant country has at least one unit of its national police force assigned, trained, and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling, that border control and customs officials at key crossing points are similarly trained and equipped, and that adequate forensic capabilities to help determine the origin of seized nuclear materials are provided on a regional basis.
- Reformed U.S. nuclear intelligence. Congress should direct the intelligence community to focus intensely on vulnerable nuclear stockpiles worldwide, and request the Administration to file a classified annual report that details information about which facilities in the world hold nuclear warheads, plutonium, and HEU, how well secured they are, and what other factors affect the threat at each facility.
- Agreements to secure, monitor, and dismantle dangerous excess warheads. As a follow-on to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the Administration should pursue a next-phase agreement that places U.S. and Russian excess warheads in storage facilities open to monitoring by the other side, commits the warheads to verifiable dismantling, commits plutonium and HEU from the warheads to secure storage and eventual disposition, and offers U.S. Nunn-Lugar assistance in the implementation of these efforts.
- Data exchange and monitoring—sizing the problem. The U.S. and Russia should regularly exchange information on the number of warheads and the amount of plutonium and HEU that each country possesses, and implement reciprocal monitoring of excess fissile material stockpiles and of warhead dismantlement.
- Accelerated HEU blend-down. Congress should approve the Senate authorization of funds to pay Russia to blend additional HEU to LEU (low-enriched uranium) and to hold it in storage, and should appropriate an additional $50 million to fund accelerated blending in 2003.
- Expanded disposition of excess plutonium, and ending production. The U.S. and Russia should move forward with disposition of excess weapons plutonium, going well beyond the 34 tons covered by the initial disposition agreement. Russia’s plutonium production reactors should also be shut down, and measures should be put in place to confirm that neither Russia nor the U.S. is producing HEU.
- A refocused effort to stabilize and shrink Russia’s nuclear complex. Congress should request that the Administration refocus efforts to reduce the size of the Russian weapons complex with an emphasis on broad regional economic growth.
- Support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Congress should commend and support the Bush administration’s decision to press for increases in the IAEA’s safeguards budget, and should authorize increased funding for both the regular IAEA budget and the U.S. voluntary contribution.
- New revenue streams for nuclear security. Congress should support a “debt for nonproliferation” swap with Russia and seek Russian commitments to devote portions of proceeds from commercial spent fuel imports to finance nuclear security efforts.
- Independent analysis and advice. An independent think-tank, with a portion of its effort devoted to nuclear security, could help shape a more effective U.S. response to proliferation. Major nonproliferation programs could benefit from reviews by independent advisory groups providing oversight and advice.
