By John Erath
It is 2025, and with the New Year, we will see a change in government in the United States, with the return of the Trump administration. Nuclear issues seem to have taken greater urgency since 2021, particularly given the war in Ukraine and China’s buildup, but they did not feature much in the Presidential campaign, despite our best efforts. It will fall to the incoming administration to deal with a world where the threat of nuclear war seems higher than any time since the end of the Cold War and where U.S. leadership remains of critical importance. This will not be easy. There are, however, several areas in which the U.S. government can help set conditions for a safer world, including three modest suggestions for policies that could be enacted or reemphasized promptly. Each is consistent with policies followed during the previous Trump administration and shows that an “America First” security policy can lead to lower nuclear risks globally.
1) Maintain Limits on Nuclear Weapons
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is set to expire in just over a year. In 2020, then-President Trump hesitated to extend the treaty because it did not include China. As a bilateral treaty, there was no way to include China in 2020, but with New START expiring, there is an opportunity to replace it with a more inclusive arrangement. Negotiating one will not be easy, given Chinese resistance, and any progress will be slow. As an interim measure, the United States should propose that all nuclear states refrain from building and testing new weapons pending the completion of a new arms control framework. In other words, the United States and Russia will abide by New START limits, while everyone else stays where they are. Again, this will prove difficult for China, but Beijing will have to choose between curtailing its buildup or standing out as the one country favoring continuing arms race policies. The two following steps will provide confidence that the arms race is not being run without America.
2) Reinforce the Moratorium on Nuclear Testing
There is no benefit to the United States from resuming nuclear weapons tests. In fact, the opposite is true as the de facto global moratorium on testing effectively preserves the large U.S. advantage in test data from the Cold War era. An “America First” policy should look to preserve this edge. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was designed not to require testing to be completed, as certified by the Department of Energy during each of the last three administrations. Should the United States resume testing, Russia and China will likely follow suit, allowing them, presumably, to improve exotic weapons designs for potential use against the United States. Instead, the administration should reiterate the U.S. commitment not to test, particularly in the context of nuclear states not building the arsenals. It should also submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for ratification and support and expand the Treaty’s monitoring system to expose any potential circumvention.
3) Advocate for Rapid Conclusion of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Negotiation of a FMCT has been stalled since the 1990s by China (often with a Pakistani front) because China requires more fissile material to build more nuclear weapons. This proposed treaty is in the U.S. interest because it would prohibit states from producing the most important ingredients of nuclear weapons, substances of which the United States has a large quantity from dismantled Cold War-era weapons. A FMCT would, when implemented and verified, effectively stop China’s buildup, cap Iran’s ambitions and impose a critical barrier to other states building nuclear weapons in the future. FMCT has broad international support but little momentum; a U.S. push for negotiation would renew energy toward a practical non-proliferation step that should be a necessary prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. By backing it, the Trump administration would divide China and Russia and put the former in an awkward position of either going against the mainstream, or accepting a de facto cap on its nuclear arsenal.
The opportunities are there for the incoming administration to make a strong start on nuclear issues. These three suggestions build on policies that have been supported, actively or passively, by previous administrations, and, taken together, would leave the United States safer and in a stronger position to manage nuclear risks going forward.
