By John Erath
Something’s wrong. Perhaps more than one thing, but there is something specifically amiss with the recently published U.S. Defense Budget Request. The Center has, as usual, prepared a breakdown of the numbers, and they show a lack of focus on the actual threats to American security. In particular, the request for FY27 includes $98 billion (up $11 billion from FY26) for nuclear weapons. This does not make America safer.
We inhabit a world in which threats to U.S. security seem to be rising. While some of the sense of insecurity can be attributed to U.S. missteps, many serious developments, including Russian aggression and China’s military buildup, stem from decisions made by U.S. rivals and lead to perceptions that a robust defense is needed, including nuclear deterrence, to protect the nation. National security is affected by many factors, and governments have different means of providing it, beyond military strength. The U.S. government, however, has chosen to put heavy emphasis on the military, so this essay looks at how the military budget is to be spent and asks if it is geared toward the threats facing the country.
It is not.
The NDAA’s heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons runs contrary to the lessons we should be learning from 21st century conflicts. The clearest example comes from Russia, which despite having the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, including almost all the world’s non-strategic nuclear weapons, has been unable to defeat Ukraine. While Russia’s nuclear capabilities have served as a deterrent that caused western governments to limit military assistance to Ukraine, they have not been used as yet on the battlefield. This is significant. Russia has shown no hesitation in targeting civilians or civilian infrastructure, or in causing widespread destruction. Its hesitation to employ nuclear forces comes, at least in part, from an understanding that there is no military advantage to be gained by doing so.
Instead, newer technologies are changing the way wars are fought. Ukraine is making use of drone technology, improved communications and most importantly, networked command structures to shift the course of the war. By employing increasing numbers of low-cost, high-tech systems, Kyiv has started to strike deep into Russia, calling into question the Putin narrative that Russian victory is inevitable. For more than three years, some experts confidently predicted Russia would be able to outlast Ukraine due to its larger size and superior numbers of tanks, missiles and aircraft. Ukraine has taken advantage of emerging technologies, not just drones but more importantly ways to integrate them with ground forces and missile defense, to fight back effectively.
While Russia traditionally has relied on tanks and superior numbers of troops to fight wars, the United States has emphasized high-cost, high-tech systems for a so-called “qualitative military advantage.” U.S. systems cost more but work better than everyone else’s. Programs such as the F-35 have experienced billions in cost overruns and years of delays, but have generally been quite effective once they saw combat after a series of missteps. The problem is that U.S. adversaries know better than to engage in a qualitative arms race. The recent conflict with Iran illustrated this point. U.S. forces were able to strike wherever and whenever they wanted in Iran. U.S. theater missile defenses defeated the majority of incoming threats, but Iran retained the capacity to strike back because it had large stocks of rather inexpensive weaponry. Using multi-million dollar interceptors to take out drones with price tags in thousands is not sustainable.
Iran was successful in the conflict not because it was able to damage U.S. forces, but because, despite the best efforts of the U.S. military, it retained the capacity to threaten the world economy by menacing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran did not require nuclear weapons for this; it was accomplished by deploying relatively low-tech means. The primary motivation for the Trump administration pursuing a peace settlement was economic distress, caused by high oil prices. Iran was able to trigger this distress by applying emerging technology in a cost-effective way.
This is a lesson that would be well-applied to U.S. military spending. Yes, the United States can always outspend anyone, but that may not always guarantee success. We have seen U.S. forces deplete their stocks of interceptors shooting down incoming missiles, with the adversary, in this case a country without a strong economy, able to build more projectiles faster than defenses can be produced. Using technological innovation for economic advantage has proved effective. Instead, U.S. budgeting remains fixed on high-cost systems. Nuclear capabilities, weapons that everyone hopes never will be used, that officially exist as deterrents, feature prominently, more so than capabilities to protect American lives from threats they currently face.
Something is wrong.
