• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

  • Policy Issues
    • Fact Sheets
    • Countries
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Non-Proliferation
    • Nuclear Security
    • Biological & Chemical Weapons
    • Defense Spending
    • Missile Defense
    • No First Use
  • Nukes of Hazard
    • Podcast
    • Blog
      • Next Up In Arms Control
    • Videos
  • Join Us
  • Press
  • About
    • Staff
    • Boards & Experts
    • Jobs & Internships
    • Financials and Annual Reports
    • Contact Us
  • Donate
  • Search
You are here: Home / Nukes of Hazard blog / What Might an End to the Violence in the Middle East Look Like? 

June 22, 2025

What Might an End to the Violence in the Middle East Look Like? 

By John Erath  (updated June 22 from an original post June 20)

After more than a week of strikes and counter strikes, the latest round of conflict between Iran and Israel, and now involving the United States, shows little sign that it will end quickly. Israel has stated that its goal is degrading Iran’s extensive nuclear infrastructure that could support a weapons program, while Iran promises to respond in kind to every Israeli attack. As of June 21, U.S. aircraft joined in supporting Israeli efforts, potentially widening the conflict. There have been previous incidences of air and missile strikes between the antagonists, but these ended after a reprisal or two when one side or the other made a political point. This round, however, has a somewhat different aspect, with the parties committing to heavier strikes and causing extensive civilian casualties, particularly near military facilities.  Given the wide geographic distribution and shielded nature of Iranian nuclear sites, there would seem little reason to suggest an early cessation of hostilities.  

It is possible, however, to suggest what a peace deal might ideally look like. Despite the apparent determination on both sides to fight it out, there are reasons not to do so. Even if the United States and Israel are able to cripple Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it can be rebuilt, necessitating yet more military action. A way out of this cycle would be in Israel’s interest. On the other side, even following U.S. intervention, Iran would also benefit from breaking the chain of attack and reprisal, rebuilding and destruction.    

This has not gone unnoticed. On June 16, a group of prominent Iranians, including Nobel Prize winners, published a letter in Le Monde calling for an immediate stop to uranium enrichment with the clear understanding that that, at the root of things, is what led to the conflict. The authors are opponents of the Iranian regime and do not necessarily speak for the Iranian public, but the letter shows there is support for alternatives to continuing violence.  

What could a peace agreement look like? To begin with, it should be based on the understanding that the problem to be solved is uranium enrichment, not Israeli aggression. Israel certainly did not have to attack as it did and should have tried to resolve the issue peacefully, but there was an issue to resolve only because Iran has been enriching uranium to levels only usable for nuclear weapons. In the past, Iran has resisted any abridgment of what it considers its “right” to enrich uranium.  The weakness of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was that Iran only agreed to pause enrichment for 10 years, after which time it could resume under certain conditions. A durable arrangement, therefore, should settle the issue of enrichment permanently. There is only a narrow space for possible agreement, and even that is dependent on Iran deciding that it would prefer to avoid repeated cycles of Israeli attacks. 

Such a deal could have three pillars:

  1. An immediate halt to military action, including air strikes and missile launches.
  2. Iran agrees to an immediate halt to enrichment activity and returns to implementation of JCPOA verification measures.
  3. Negotiations begin on a new international agreement that would prohibit anyone from enriching uranium beyond levels necessary for energy generation and medicine.

These steps would halt the violence in a reciprocal manner while blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons.  The key point, however, is the third. By committing to a process that would prevent other states from producing highly enriched uranium the international community would provide assurance to Iran that it is no longer singled out for special restrictions. The new agreement would also have the benefit of fixing a major weakness of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically that it remains silent on enrichment, the key step in developing nuclear weapons, banning only the possession of such weapons. Negotiation of an agreement will be a challenge as most governments will prefer to leave the matter to the United States and not take part, but the clear benefit to regional stability and non-proliferation should make a strong case for participation.

Iran’s persistent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and Israel’s aggressive response have led the world to a crossroads. Down one path lies a repeating cycle of attacks and responses with increasing chances for nuclear weapons use. The other is more peaceful but requires taking painful choices to opt out of military responses that both sides feel “entitled” to.  It should be the policy of the United States and other world governments to encourage taking this difficult road.

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Israel, John Erath, Middle East, Nukes of Hazard blog, United States

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Fiscal Year 2026 Defense Budget Request Briefing Book July 3, 2025
  • After US and Israeli strikes, some nuclear experts say Iran could be more dangerous July 2, 2025
  • Despite DOGE, Pentagon escapes Donald Trump’s budget cuts unscathed July 2, 2025
  • How Iran could build a bomb in secret – despite Trump’s $30bn offer June 27, 2025
  • Dall’attacco all’Iran ai record a Wall Street June 26, 2025

Footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

820 1st Street NE, Suite LL-180
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202.546.0795

Issues

  • Fact Sheets
  • Countries
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Non-Proliferation
  • Nuclear Security
  • Defense Spending
  • Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Missile Defense
  • No First Use

Countries

  • China
  • France
  • India and Pakistan
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • United Kingdom

Explore

  • Nukes of Hazard blog
  • Nukes of Hazard podcast
  • Nukes of Hazard videos
  • Front and Center
  • Fact Sheets

About

  • About
  • Meet the Staff
  • Boards & Experts
  • Press
  • Jobs & Internships
  • Financials and Annual Reports
  • Contact Us
  • Council for a Livable World
  • Twitter
  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook

© 2025 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator GuideStar Seal of Transparency