By Julia Cooper, Fall 2025 Policy Intern
Vague threats of the use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones, have been a critical tool of Russia’s rhetoric around its invasion of Ukraine. Russian drills practicing the use of these weapons have been numerous since the invasion and were further exemplified last month with the Zapad-2025 military exercise, during which Russia undertook a series of “training exercises” including a simulated nuclear strike. A top Belarusian military official said Russia and Belarus are, “examining the potential use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Though Russia has repeatedly employed threats of using tactical nuclear weapons, its military fortunes in Ukraine have not changed. Why, then, if they do not have military or political value, does Russia continue to have and imply a willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons?
Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons are widely understood as being for battlefield use. Legally, they are any kind of nuclear weapon not covered by strategic arms control treaties. Tactical nuclear weapons, despite being physically smaller than their strategic counterparts, pose a unique threat deriving from perceptions that such weapons may be more “usable” than those comprising strategic deterrents. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons have not been subject to arms control treaties between the United States and Russia — a key Russian demand during negotiations for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) — meaning Russia has been left to develop them unconstrained and the numbers and doctrines governing potential use of their tactical nuclear weapons are unknown.
It is critical to remember that while they are physically smaller than strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons would still mean wide-scale death and long-term human suffering. There is no exact agreed-upon definition of what size constitutes a tactical nuclear weapon, but they typically range anywhere from 0.1 to 50 kilotons. For reference, the nuclear bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was about 15 kilotons — the effects of which continue to be felt to this day.
The name “tactical” or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons is thus misleading. Even if used for tactical objectives, such weapons would produce effects with strategic complications. It is only in relation to the enormously devastating strategic weapons that any nuclear weapon (which may cause marginally less suffering) can be considered tactical.
Discussions of tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons often come hand in hand with the idea of “limited nuclear war.” The concept of limited nuclear war posits that one or only a few low-yield tactical nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict without necessarily triggering an escalation into an all-out global nuclear war — which many experts critique. A tactical nuclear weapon has never been used, and it is impossible to know exactly how the breaking of this nuclear taboo would play out — but there are indications. The 1983 war game Proud Prophet, which included high-ranking members of President Ronald Reagan’s cabinet, began with the intention of carrying out a limited nuclear war and ultimately ended up in an all-out massive nuclear attack. President Joe Biden reportedly claimed he could not conceive of the use of a tactical nuclear weapon that would “not end up with nuclear Armageddon.”
Clearly, despite the fact that they are physically smaller than their strategic counterparts and may do relatively less damage, the use of a tactical nuclear weapon would carry many of the same global implications as the use of a strategic one. This begs the question: if tactical nuclear weapons pose such a distinct threat and Russia is still losing its war with Ukraine despite having hundreds and constantly threatening their use, what is the potential role of these weapons for Russia?
Nuclear signaling and rhetoric has been a focal element of Russia’s strategy regarding its war in Ukraine — as a political tool. Fears of nuclear escalation, stoked by Russia’s actions, remain present in the minds of Ukraine’s Western allies when they consider what aid and military support to provide. The existence of hundreds of supposedly more usable nuclear weapons serves to provide greater immediacy to such threats. Though Russia appears to have used tactical nuclear weapons only as a political tool thus far, the trajectory of its war in Ukraine has not changed in its favor and, though Ukrainian allies appear to be considering Russia’s nuclear dimension, their support for Ukraine has remained significant.
If both the military and political values of these weapons are largely inconsequential, why have them? Should there be any role for non-strategic, tactical nuclear weapons moving forward?
It certainly should not be causing death and suffering, breaking the nuclear taboo, and starting an all-out global nuclear war — but tactical nuclear weapons are not only dangerous if they are actively being deployed. Russia should not be perceived as benefitting from implied threats from “usable” nuclear weapons by constraint of assistance to Ukraine or rewarding Russian aggression with Ukrainian territory.
The global community must work to delegitimize these threats and ensure that they never grow into the actual use of such a weapon or normalization of “usable” weapons for diplomatic leverage. Should the threat of “usable” non-strategic weapons be perceived as having had an impact on the outcome of the war, their value will be validated, leading not only to Russia maintaining its stockpile but potentially other governments seeking access to this tool of coercion. It will only be when non-strategic weapons are clearly demonstrated to have no utility that they can be eliminated.
