By Abby Wagner, Policy Intern, Summer 2025
Nearly 20 years ago, Switzerland let a family of nuclear smugglers off the hook. That choice revealed how a narrow concept of neutrality, weak export laws and greed can fuel nuclear proliferation and threaten global security.
After recent Israeli and American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, there has been a renewed spotlight on Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan — the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program and man behind one of the most prolific nuclear smuggling rings in history. His operation notably aided Iran’s capabilities as well as sold key bomb-making components to Libya and North Korea. The former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed Elbaradei, called the ring “the Walmart of private sector proliferation.” One of its key suppliers? A family from Switzerland.
For decades, Swiss nuclear engineer Friedrich Tinner and his sons Urs and Marco provided Khan with gas centrifuge components — a critical step in enriching weapons grade uranium. By the early 2000s, the Khan network and Tinners were under international scrutiny. In 2003, the family was recruited by the CIA as part of a larger scheme to dismantle the Khan smuggling ring, handing over millions of dollars’ worth of blueprints and parts. This created a paradox: The CIA investigations brought to light that the Tinners had broken Swiss export rules for years prior by aiding Khan, but under neutrality laws, it is illegal for Swiss citizens to cooperate with foreign intelligence agencies.
When the case came to light, Swiss prosecutors had an opportunity to support the global effort against nuclear proliferation. Instead, in 2007, the Swiss Federal Council used emergency powers to destroy nearly 900,000 files tied to the case. These files didn’t just include technical data, but revealed the CIA’s long involvement with the Tinners, theoretically violating Swiss neutrality and risking controversy if exposed. By eliminating critical evidence, Switzerland weakened future attempts to close enforcement gaps, combat illicit nuclear trade and protect global security.
Swiss courts sentenced the family to between 24-50 months in prison but much of that time had already been served while awaiting trial, meaning they were released almost immediately. Given the severity and scope of their crimes, this was a mild punishment. The case revealed serious gaps in Switzerland’s handling of nuclear smuggling and offered key lessons in the fight against nuclear proliferation.
- Neutrality is no excuse: Switzerland’s strict adherence to neutrality and commitment to free trade made it a permissive exporter of lucrative nuclear technologies. But passiveness in the face of nuclear proliferation is dangerous. It creates a safe haven for nuclear smugglers to exploit weak laws. When paired with strict interpretations of neutrality, it undermines global non-proliferation efforts.
- Universal export rules are essential: Switzerland’s weak export controls left gaps that smugglers could exploit. One supplier, VAT, provided components required for uranium enrichment after getting approval from the Swiss government. The reasoning was that only complete centrifuges were banned, despite the final purpose of the equipment being obvious. Weak export laws encourage proliferation, and a universal standard is needed to ensure no country becomes a haven for nuclear proliferators looking to exploit weak regulations.
- Greed drives proliferation: Swiss companies’ role in the Khan network exposed how commercial greed enables nuclear proliferation. Rather than asking questions, these companies prioritized profit, accepting large payments from Khan in exchange for their specialized equipment including valves, vacuum systems and centrifuge materials. Even though many orders showed glaring red flags for proliferation intent, they were ignored — profit came first. Driven by lucrative deals and weak regulation, financial motivations can easily outweigh security concerns. For Switzerland and other countries, it is essential to adopt regulations and strict export controls to confront this greed and ensure future security.
The international community must learn from the Swiss case. Protections against nuclear proliferation cannot be compromised by weak export controls, commercial greed or even by overly scrupulous adherence to principles such as neutrality. Without universal binding export controls and firm enforcement, the international community risks enabling future nuclear proliferators to operate freely, threatening global security.
