• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

  • Policy Issues
    • 25 Years Since September 11
    • Fact Sheets
    • Biological & Chemical Weapons
    • Countries
    • Pentagon and Weapons Spending
    • No First Use
    • Non-Proliferation
    • Nuclear Security
    • Nuclear Testing
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Missile Defense
  • Nukes of Hazard
    • Podcast
    • Blog
      • Next Up In Arms Control
    • Videos
  • Join Us
  • Press
  • About
    • Staff
    • Boards & Experts
    • Jobs & Internships
    • Financials and Annual Reports
    • Contact Us
  • Donate
  • Search
You are here: Home / Nukes of Hazard blog / Before the Warning Becomes a Crisis: AI and Nuclear Decision-Making

November 16, 2026

Before the Warning Becomes a Crisis: AI and Nuclear Decision-Making

By Rana Agahi

The United States is modernizing its nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems, making the question of how to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly relevant. While existing early-warning systems use semi-automated technologies to detect and track potential missile launches, advances in AI could improve how information is processed, verified and presented to decision-makers.

During crises, officials must assess potential threats under significant time pressure with limited intelligence. AI could help operators make better-informed decisions by bringing together information from multiple sources, giving them a clearer understanding of a potential threat.

However, having more information available does not necessarily mean making better decisions. While AI may be effective at detecting missile launches, determining whether a launch constitutes a genuine threat requires an understanding of the broader political and military context that AI systems may lack. As a result, AI-generated assessments could influence decisions without accounting for important information or uncertainties.

Artificial intelligence could reduce these risks by improving intelligence analysis, threat detection and verification, but inaccurate assessments and excessive reliance on automated systems could also create opportunities for error and escalation. Whether AI strengthens or undermines nuclear security will depend on its reliability and the safeguards established to ensure it supports, rather than replaces, human judgment.

How AI Could Help Make Better-Informed Decisions

As the United States modernizes its NC3 systems, there is an opportunity to consider how AI could be integrated into existing early-warning technology. These systems already use semi-automated technologies to detect and track potential missile launches, but they still rely on human operators to interpret incoming information and assess potential threats.

As early-warning systems collect increasing amounts of satellite, radar and other intelligence data, human analysts may struggle to process it quickly enough to identify potential threats during a crisis. AI could help address this challenge by analyzing large amounts of information more efficiently.

The U.S. military is exploring these capabilities. The Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit has been examining how AI could help analyze information from satellites, radar and other intelligence sources to identify protentional threats. They announced plans to develop technology that could bring this information together and identify connections that human analysts might otherwise miss.

How AI Could Improve Accuracy of Early Warning Systems and Verification

Beyond processing intelligence faster, AI could improve the accuracy of nuclear early-warning systems by helping distinguish genuine missile launches from false alarms.

In 2024, Northrop Grumman was developing machine-learning software for the U.S. Space Force intended to reduce false missile tracks. The software uses information such as an object’s speed, shape and altitude to determine whether it is likely to be a missile. If successful, this technology could help operators rule out false alarms and focus their attention on credible threats.

Another way AI could strengthen verification is by comparing incoming signals with information from previous missile launches. For example, a system could examine the infrared signature of a suspected launch and compare it with known missile signatures to help determine whether the warning is credible. Combining this analysis with additional sensor and intelligence data could provide operators with stronger information for distinguishing actual attacks from false alarms.

Beyond verifying potential launches, AI could help identify problems within the warning systems themselves by examining sensor readings for unusual patterns that indicate equipment malfunctions or unreliable data. Operators can use AI to recognize when a warning is caused by a faulty sensor rather than an actual threat, which is especially useful considering that technical failures have been responsible for several nuclear false alarms in the past.

When AI Gets It Wrong

The dangers of relying on AI-generated assessments without adequately verifying the underlying intelligence have already emerged in conventional military operations. During the 2026 U.S.-Israeli war against Iran the U.S. military used AI to analyze intelligence and identify potential targets, significantly reducing the time required for targeting.

The February 28 strike on an elementary school in Minab, which killed more than 150 people, including at least 123 children, demonstrated the consequences of flawed intelligence and inadequate verification. Outdated intelligence still classified the school as a military facility, allowing it to enter Palantir’s AI-assisted Maven Smart System and emerge as a recommended target. Some military personnel reportedly relied on Maven to identify outdated or inconsistent information, even though the system was not responsible for verifying the underlying intelligence.

Although the investigation did not establish that Maven malfunctioned, it identified excessive reliance on AI alongside outdated intelligence and failures in human review. The lesson for nuclear early warning is that AI cannot guarantee the accuracy of the information it processes. Without independent verification, it could accelerate flawed threat assessments rather than correct them.

Even when AI systems are generally reliable, they can create automation bias, the tendency for operators to place excessive trust in automated assessments. Research has demonstrated that people sometimes follow incorrect AI recommendations despite having opportunities to question them. In nuclear early warning, this could lead operators to accept a false warning without adequately examining the evidence.

This risk becomes particularly significant when operators cannot understand how AI reaches its conclusions. Without clear evidence supporting an AI-generated threat assessment, operators may accept its conclusions without recognizing potential errors or inconsistencies. Repeatedly accurate assessments can further reinforce this trust, making operators less likely to question an incorrect warning and potentially increasing the risk of nuclear escalation.

Next Steps

The Department of Defense has established requirements for appropriate human judgment in autonomous weapon systems, but human involvement alone does not guarantee the oversight is meaningful. Without sufficient time and information to independently evaluate AI-generated assessments, decision-makers risk accepting flawed conclusions and reinforcing the very errors AI is intended to prevent.

The United States should establish mandatory, nuclear-specific testing standards that AI systems must meet before being used in operations. These standards should measure whether AI improves the accuracy of threat assessments compared with current systems, particularly when identifying false alarms, faulty sensors and conflicting intelligence.

These standards should also set a clearer definition of what it means to keep a human involved in nuclear decision-making. Simply requiring human approval is not enough if operators cannot understand or independently question AI-generated assessments. More specific guidelines should require operators to have access to the evidence behind each warning, enough time to review it, and the authority to reject an AI assessment.

The goal should be to ensure that AI reduces the risk of nuclear escalation by improving the accuracy of threat assessments and strengthening human judgment. Its effectiveness should be measured by whether operators can identify false warnings and make more reliable decisions with AI than without it, ultimately reducing the risk of nuclear use.

Posted in: Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, Interns, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, United States

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Before the Warning Becomes a Crisis: AI and Nuclear Decision-Making November 16, 2026
  • Reviewing The U.S.-Saudi Civilian Nuclear Deal: Concessions, Safeguards and What’s at Stake November 11, 2026
  • A Costly Silence: BONUS Moderator and Audience Q&A November 5, 2026
  • A Costly Silence: Wasteful Spending and Improper Influence November 4, 2026
  • A Costly Silence: The Choice Is Ours October 29, 2026

Footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

820 1st Street NE, Suite LL-180
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202.546.0795

Issues

  • 25 Years Since September 11
  • Fact Sheets
  • Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Countries
  • Pentagon and Weapons Spending
  • No First Use
  • Non-Proliferation
  • Nuclear Security
  • Nuclear Testing
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Missile Defense

Countries

  • China
  • France
  • India and Pakistan
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • United Kingdom

Explore

  • Nukes of Hazard blog
  • Nukes of Hazard podcast
  • Nukes of Hazard videos
  • Front and Center
  • Fact Sheets

About

  • About
  • Meet the Staff
  • Boards & Experts
  • Press
  • Jobs & Internships
  • Financials and Annual Reports
  • Contact Us
  • Council for a Livable World
  • Twitter
  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook

© 2026 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator GuideStar Seal of Transparency