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You are here: Home / Iran Diplomacy / Are Sanctions on Iran Working?

June 4, 2013

Are Sanctions on Iran Working?

Yesterday, Center Scoville Fellow Usha Sahay and I released a report that examines the impact of sanctions on Iran and the effect those sanctions are having on nuclear negotiations.  Some excerpts are below…

Sanctions have served as a useful tool for exerting pressure on Iran and demonstrating resolve against its proliferation activities. The signs of progress seen in negotiations in February indicated that sanctions can be an effective tool of leverage, but only when sanctioners exhibit a corresponding willingness to lift sanctions. However, the promise of sanctions relief becomes increasingly difficult to deliver on when sanctions begin to overlap and their objectives become unclear.

[snip]

A key way in which sanctions have succeeded is as a signaling mechanism: sanctions show that the international community is united against Iran’s continued defiance, and that it is willing to take significant action to facilitate a negotiated solution. The unprecedented degree of international unity against Iran’s nuclear program can be seen in the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions, which require approval by Russia and China, nations which have previously been reluctant to sanction Iran.

[snip]

Sanctions have increased in both scope and number, and the sanctioners’ willingness to lift the measures has appeared dubious, with the recent limited exception of the first round of Almaty talks in February. In this way, the complexity of the set of sanctions may be impeding negotiations by creating doubts in Iran about whether negotiations in fact will lead to significant reductions.

See the full report here.

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

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