By Sarah Kirchner-Barney
Alignment between Russia and North Korea has grown with Russian President Vladimir Putin visiting Pyongyang on June 19 for the first time in 24 years to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
The Putin-Kim Summit was supposed to be a two-day affair but was cut short, as Putin was held up in Yakutsk before arriving in Pyongyang. Despite this delay, Kim rolled out the red carpet to welcome Putin with a banquet, a performance showing the ties between the two nations, and awarding Putin with the Order of Kim Il Sung medal before signing a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two nations.
The most important part of the treaty is Article 4, given the translation by KCNA Watch as “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”
The renewal of ties between Russia and North Korea in a military context is likely to hold major consequences for Northeast Asian and Eastern European regional security. Despite the denial by Pyongyang and Moscow, evidence continues to mount that North Korea is supplying armaments and military equipment to aid in Russia’s war in Ukraine with estimates ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 containers since 2023. What is less clear is what Kim is getting from Putin in exchange. We know Kim is getting some funds transferred through mutual trade despite harsh international sanctions, but the larger concern is what technological advancements Moscow may provide Pyongyang. Given North Korea’s repeated failures in testing nuclear capable missiles, Kim may turn to Putin for assistance in making its nuclear delivery systems more effective.
While Putin and Kim may tout a friendship of “no limits” China will not look favorably upon Russia assisting North Korean nuclear ambitions. China’s silence on this matter speaks volumes about its displeasure with the growing rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang. Beijing has remained adamant against the return of Cold War alliances, frequently accusing the United States and its allies of exacerbating tensions. The Comprehensive Security Partnership introduces an additional security arrangement to the region without Beijing’s inclusion. China’s recent participation in the 2+2 Dialogue with Seoul and the Japan-China-Korea Summit signals that Chinese President Xi Jinping still wishes to remain part of the international order. However, with Russia usurping China’s traditional role as North Korea’s patron, it is now Moscow that holds more sway over Pyongyang than Beijing.
For Putin and Kim to align speaks of Putin’s desperation in his war and further changes in Kim’s calculus for the Korean Peninsula. The entanglement of Russian and North Korean security has led to an increased threat for Ukraine and endangers South Korean, and by extension Japanese and American, security. Tensions in the region are likely to rise as Seoul has floated the idea of sending arms to Ukraine. However, neither authoritarian regime is known for keeping its promises, and the added media sensationalism surrounding Putin and Kim’s “bromance” should not obscure the reality that both Russia and North Korea face crises, though it remains difficult to imagine how far either nation would go in defense of the other.
At present, there is little the United States can do other than continue to assist Ukraine and tighten its ongoing trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan. As Xi is likely to look for ways to curb the Russia-DPRK partnership, this could provide an opening for Washington to engage with Beijing as neither China, the United States, South Korea, nor Japan want to see Pyongyang attain further nuclear or missile capabilities.
