By Rana Agahi
Before Natanz became a name associated with Iran’s nuclear program, it was my grandmother’s hometown. A city in central Iran, Natanz is known for its historic architecture, surrounding mountains and, more recently, one of the country’s most important uranium enrichment facilities. Growing up in California as an Iranian-American, I knew Natanz through my family’s history, but I also heard its name seemingly everywhere, from news broadcasts to classroom discussions, often spoken about by people who knew it only in the context of Iran’s nuclear program. It was strange to watch a place so closely connected to my family become the subject of international security debates, where discussions of enrichment facilities and military targets often overshadowed the people who call it home. That contrast between how I knew Natanz and how the rest of the world discussed it helped shape my academic interest in nuclear weapons and their role in international security. This fall, my internship at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation allowed me to examine the policy decisions behind the debates I had grown up hearing.
My internship came at a time of significant developments in nuclear policy. Following the strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities, questions remain about the future of Iran’s nuclear program and the possibility of renewed diplomacy. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement has renewed debates over uranium enrichment and the risk of further proliferation in the Middle East. Beyond the region, growing tensions between nuclear powers have placed further pressure on an already weakening system of international arms control. With the 2026 midterm elections taking place as my internship draws to a close, I have also been thinking about how the political landscape in Washington could shape the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the next two years. Following these developments throughout my time at the Center gave me a closer look at how nuclear policy responds to changing political circumstances and the decisions that will shape its future.
During my first few days at the Center, I had the opportunity to attend a briefing on the risks of integrating artificial intelligence into nuclear operations. One point that stayed with me was that the greatest risks of AI may not come from allowing a machine to launch a nuclear weapon, but from how AI shapes the information that human decision-makers rely on. Even when humans retain final authority, their judgment may be influenced by systems they do not fully understand or know when to question. As the discussion continued, I became increasingly overwhelmed by how many opportunities for error could arise before anyone even made the decision to use a nuclear weapon. I had studied nuclear deterrence and the dangers of proliferation, but the briefing showed me how easily a crisis could escalate without anyone intending it to. I left wondering how policymakers could possibly anticipate every risk.
Over the course of the semester, my perspective on the risks that had initially overwhelmed me began to change. I realized that the consequences of nuclear weapons are too serious to approach without concern, but recognizing the scale of those risks does not mean accepting them as inevitable. Rather than leaving me discouraged, the concern I felt after the briefing gradually became a reminder of why the work of reducing nuclear risks matters.
My research at the Center also helped me understand that distinction. I examined the challenges of preventing the spread of nuclear knowledge, particularly after attacks on nuclear facilities. Through this research, I learned that military strikes may damage a country’s nuclear infrastructure without eliminating its ability to rebuild, because the scientific knowledge needed to develop nuclear weapons cannot be destroyed. I also returned to the questions raised during the event I attended in my first few days at the Center, examining how AI could improve nuclear early-warning systems while introducing new opportunities for miscalculation. Researching both topics forced me to consider the limits of seemingly straightforward solutions. Destroying a facility does not necessarily eliminate a nuclear threat, just as improving the speed of intelligence analysis does not necessarily lead to better decisions. In both cases, reducing risk requires understanding what a policy or technology cannot accomplish, not just what it promises to do.
One of the most valuable parts of my internship was the opportunity to learn from the people around me. When I began researching my first blog post, John Erath introduced me to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which gave me a new perspective on how to address the risks of nuclear proliferation after a program is dismantled. Beyond that initial conversation, I had the opportunity to learn from John over lunch on days we were both in the office. More broadly, some of the most interesting things I learned throughout the semester came from conversations over lunch with other staff members. I often walked away with a new perspective on something I was researching or an issue I hadn’t considered before. That openness to sharing knowledge, even outside of formal meetings, was something I hadn’t experienced to the same extent in my previous internships and made my time at the Center especially valuable.
What I hope to carry with me from this internship is a greater appreciation for how much responsibility comes with trying to reduce risks. I learned that reducing nuclear risks requires more than recognizing what could go wrong. It requires understanding why those risks exist and making careful decisions to prevent them. I am grateful to everyone at the Center for their guidance and the opportunity to learn from their experience. When I think about Natanz, I still think of my grandmother and my family’s history, but I also now think about the decisions being made thousands of miles away that could shape the future of places like it.
