Greg Koblentz, member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security, co-authored an article in Think Global Health on using “minilateral” strategies for strengthening global biorisk management. Opened for signature in 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has proven to be remarkably durable. With its deliberately broad scope, the BWC […]
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Greg Koblentz, member of the Scientists Working Group on Chemical and Biological Security, was quoted in Le Monde about emerging experiments to make pathogens more dangerous. The article is behind a subscriber-only paywall.
Greg Koblentz, a member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security, was featured in all three parts of a three-part series by The Intercept on biosafety failures called Experimenting With Disaster. Part One: Student Infected With Debilitating Virus in Undisclosed Biolab Accident Part Two: Accident With 1918 Pandemic Virus Raises Questions About […]
Gregory Koblentz, a member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Chemical and Biological Security, spoke with Grid News about how to think about experimentation on viruses. Pandemic prevention and lab safety rules “only move in fits and starts,” said biodefense professor Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University, pointing to the long list of past […]
Gregory Koblentz and Stefano Costanzi, members of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security, authored a paper in NCT Magazine about controlling Novichok nerve agents in light of recent events. Since Novichok nerve agents came to public attention following a high-profile assassination attempt in 2018, the international chemical weapons nonproliferation regime has […]