Updated September 2026
Under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, the United States cannot make any significant transfers of nuclear material, equipment or components to another nation without a congressionally-approved agreement. The United States has so-called “123 agreements” with 26 countries. The Trump administration recently transmitted a finalized 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress for review which would bring the total to 27. The agreement does not include “gold standard” non-proliferation provisions supported by the Center nor does it require Saudi Arabia to negotiate an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to allow the most intrusive inspections of nuclear sites.
Certain materials, equipment and components used for civil nuclear energy programs can also be used for nuclear weapons programs. To reduce the risk of weaponization, countries seeking a 123 agreement with the United States must commit to nine non-proliferation criteria included in the Atomic Energy Act. These criteria require the partner country to obtain U.S. consent before taking certain actions, including any enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement. However, the required non-proliferation conditions for a 123 agreement do not prohibit the partner country from engaging in enrichment and reprocessing, provided that none of the nuclear material or facilities involved were acquired, produced, or constructed as a result of the 123 agreement.
The Departments of State and Energy lead the 123 agreement negotiating process and submit a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement to Congress, which explains how the particular proposed agreement will meet these required non-proliferation criteria.
The Gold Standard
Technologies used to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel can also be used to produce material for nuclear weapons, and so present the greatest threat for proliferation. As part of its 123 agreement signed in 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed not to seek enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to instead rely on the international market for its reactor fuel supply. That commitment, in combination with the non–proliferation criteria required for all 123 agreements, has come to be known as the non–proliferation “gold standard” for civil nuclear cooperation agreements. The UAE also agreed to bring into force an IAEA Additional Protocol as a part of its 123 agreement to give inspectors the highest level of access to all of their nuclear sites to monitor for potential diversion of nuclear fuel or technology to develop weapons.
Congressional Approval Process for 123 Agreements
After the Executive Branch submits a signed 123 agreement to Congress, current U.S. law allows Congress to review the agreement for 90 days of continuous session. If Congress does not pass a resolution disapproving of the agreement during this period, the agreement may enter into force. In recent years, non-proliferation experts have recommended that Congressional oversight be strengthened over nuclear cooperation agreements to better protect against nuclear proliferation.
Currently, Congress is in the process of conducting a review of the 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Its lack of “gold standard” non-proliferation provisions and the potential for uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia could lead to nuclear proliferation in a volatile region already struggling with allegations of clandestine nuclear weapons development.
