By John Erath
On May 6, India retaliated for the killings of Indian tourists in Kashmir by striking what it identified as terrorist-linked facilities in Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. International reaction initially focused on the possibility of nuclear war, an understandable concern when violence between nuclear-armed states worsens. During the following days, both sides have continued bellicose rhetoric, and there have been further reports of shooting and drone attacks across the de facto border, even after a ceasefire was announced May 10. Pakistan even announced its National Command Authority, the body controlling its nuclear weapons, had met. Thus far, however, the ceasefire seems to be generally holding.
Thus far, however, both sides are steering away from direct threats of nuclear weapons use while blaming each other for the violence. One possible reason why the escalating conflict has not turned toward nuclear use is that the presence of nuclear weapons in each country deters the other. Armed with more than 150 nuclear weapons each, neither government would risk an exchange that could leave both sides in ruins. Therefore, we can rest easy that deterrence will prevent a nuclear war, right?
Wrong.
It is true that deterrence works. NATO countries have been deterred from going too far in support of Ukraine by fear that successful resistance to Russian aggression could potentially lower the nuclear threshold. During the current crisis in South Asia, both sides have thus far taken care to step around the possible use of nuclear weapons. When Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif reminded the world of his country’s capabilities, he carefully set the conditions for their use as “a direct threat to our existence.” It is clearly in the interests of the South Asian rivals not to trigger the other to use its nuclear capability, a clear example of working deterrence. More concern about a possible nuclear exchange appears in western news, focused on the massive scope of effects of even a “limited” use. Other commentators support the idea that deterrence equals less danger.
Apart from the fact that it has already failed to prevent dozens of deaths during the current round of conflict, there are two important reasons why relying on nuclear deterrence as a security policy can be highly dangerous.
Apart from the fact that it has already failed to prevent dozens of deaths during the current round of conflict, there are two important reasons why relying on nuclear deterrence as a security policy can be highly dangerous. The first of these is that such reliance can lead to the idea that if nuclear weapons produce security, more would be better. In reality, a small number of nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries as the use of even a single one would cause destruction on a scale that should be unacceptable to any government. The “more is better” case, however, often drives policy decisions as can be currently seen in China, which easily has sufficient nuclear weapons to deter Russia and the United States (and India), but is rapidly building more.
The other danger lies in possible reliance on deterrence to the point where it becomes the only element of security policy. Deterrence raises the perceived cost to using nuclear weapons to an unacceptable level, but it does not address the causes of conflict or the possibility that hostilities can spiral and change a perception of what may be acceptable. Diplomacy is required to ameliorate security crises and offer an alternative to violence. Deterrence may be effective in promoting restraint where nuclear weapons use is possible, but a complacent assumption that it is sufficient for all circumstances, or that adversaries’ calculus of risk will not change, is unwise. The best that can be relied upon from deterrence is that it can create additional space for diplomacy, not replace it.
Pakistan and India maintain that their nuclear capabilities are for deterrence. At this point, both governments are using rhetoric indicating their willingness to continue exchanging airstrikes and artillery fire; in other words, showing confidence that the other side is, and will remain, deterred. This is likely the case in the short term, but it will also be important that the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad make use of the opportunity afforded by deterrence to begin dialogue on how to stop the cycle of violence. There is also a possibility for outside actors, particularly the United States, now that it seems to have gotten over the Vice President’s initial opinion that “it’s none of our business,” to use the common interest in avoiding nuclear destruction to facilitate a peace process.
Much of the world is rightly focused on the dreadful consequences a nuclear war between Pakistan and India might have. The next step is to seek common ground in which such mutual concerns lead to a path away from conflict.
