By Matthew Fargo A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation? A complicating factor for the referendum is that while the United Kingdom is a permanent member of […]
Fact Sheet: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Preview
By Duyeon Kim DATE March 26-27, 2012 in Seoul, Korea SIGNIFICANCE AND BACKGROUND The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit aims to strengthen and deepen nuclear security commitments made at the 2010 Washington Summit. The objective of the summit process is to prevent vulnerable fissile materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons from […]
[Paper] 2012 Nuclear Security Summit: Opportunities and Challenges
By Duyeon Kim Published by The Nautilus Institute on November 22, 2011 found here. This paper was originally published by the Korea Economic Institute on September 28 2011 and is available here. ——————– CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Report by Duyeon Kim III. References I. Introduction Duyeon Kim, Deputy Director of Non-Proliferation at the Center for […]
Enhancing U.S. Security Through Treaties
Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller spoke to the U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium on August 4, and her comments regarding progress on the New START treaty were encouraging.
Gottemoeller stated that the Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, has been “very successful,” and she likened its implementation to a “fast moving train.”
To date more then 1,000 notifications have been passed between Washington and Moscow, tracking movements and changes in the status of each country’s strategic offensive arms and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller noted that U.S officials and their Russian counterparts have been “constantly in communication,” strengthening mutual understanding and confidence.
On site inspections began as of the first week of April, and Gottemoeller said they have proceeded at an “intense pace.”
When START I expired in December 2009, Russia was no longer required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States was unable to conduct on-site inspections. As George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell wrote in the Washington Post last December: “America’s understanding of Russia’s arsenal (was) degraded, and resources (were) diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps.”
Since April, eight on site inspections have taken place, and the two sides are keeping up with one another. Inspectors are even receiving data about warhead loadings on their counterpart’s missiles, and can confirm these numbers on any randomly selected ballistic missiles – an inspection right achieved only in the new treaty.
Both parties have also displayed their strategic systems to each other, strengthening and validating the verification regime. The U.S. presented its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers to the Russians and the Russian Federation showed its RS-24 Inter Continental Ballistic Missile and associated road mobile launcher to the U.S. This exchange marked the first time U.S. officials have ever had the opportunity to view this new Russian strategic system.
These successes rebut criticisms that New START was just a long list of U.S. concessions made to the Russians. As Gottemoeller noted, “concerns that were raised during the ratification debate are being assuaged now essentially by the process of implementation.” In the last few months, U.S. officials and military planners have regained crucial insight into Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
New START, Gottemoeller said, has been a “bright spot” in U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ of relations. It is a testament to the growing strength of the partnership that since the passage of New START, two additional arms control agreements have been implemented: the 123 Agreement for nuclear cooperation with Russia entered into force in January 2011 shortly after the ratification of New START, and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, meant to eliminate excess weapons-grade plutonium, was brought into force recently on July 13.
Gottemoeller expressed confidence in chances for further arms control agreements with Russia, as well as multilateral dialogue within the P-5 (United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and further bilateral conversations to lay the groundwork for negotiations with other nuclear powers.
Certainly, positive results from the Treaty’s implementation should encourage Washington and Moscow to pursue formal negotiations on a new treaty to further reduce their nuclear arms, which should contain verifiable limits on all types of nuclear warheads, including tactical warheads.
Emma Lecavalier is a Summer 2011 intern with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
French Nuclear Weapons Policy and Black Swans
Last week, President Sarkozy said in a CBS television interview that France would never give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally because they continue to ‘underpin’ France’s security in a ‘dangerous’ world. He argued that his nation of 65 million inhabitants’ has ‘fewer conventional weapons than the US, than Russia, than China’. Although Sarkozy was keen to mention the fact that France has renounced nuclear testing and reduced its nuclear arsenal by one third, he added that he would be ‘jeopardizing’ the security of his country if any further reductions were made. Since his comments were picked up by a large number of news organizations, one might have initially thought there was something unique about Sarkozy’s position, but to the few French nuclear watchers out there, all of this no doubt sounded like old news…
From Sarkozy’s comments it is evident that French thinking remains wedded to the idea that nuclear weapons make a nation ‘free and independent’. It’s an idea that has long driven France’s nuclear weapons program, visible in statements by leaders such as Charles De Gaulle, Lionel Jospin, and Jacques Chirac. France’s defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany in World War II, their subsequent inability to overcome Viet Minh forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (thus ending French-Indochina, a.k.a.Vietnam), and the Sueze Canal crisis and subsequent rift with the U.S., all undoubtedly sowed the seeds of France’s appetite to develop an independent ‘life-insurance policy’ to guarantee its vital interests at home and abroad. But since then, with the era of decolonization, the creation of the European Union, and France’s reentry into NATO, the rationale for the French nuclear deterrent has essentially evaporated.
France relied on a triad of air, land and sea based nuclear weapons for its deterrence until 1996, when President Chirac announced the retirement of France’s land based missile facilities. At the same time, France contradicted this positive step towards disarmament by conducting a series of nuclear tests at the Mururoa Atoll and injecting significant resources into modernizing its nuclear weapons.
Similarly, when Sarkozy stated in April 2008 that France would reduce its nuclear arsenal to 300 warheads, it coincided with the inauguration of the first of France’s new ‘Triumphant’ class nuclear submarines and efforts to perfect the new M51 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile. And despite that reduction, France still remains the third largest nuclear power – surpassing even China, a country with a population some 21 times bigger. Which raises the question: how does France’s large and modern nuclear arsenal contribute to its ‘independence’?
France’s recent White Paper on Defense and National Security states that the ‘sole purpose’ of nuclear weapons is to ‘prevent [likely meaning deter] any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation’ (although there are some questions regarding the accuracy of this official translation). In this context, the section on ‘new security parameters’ implies that French nuclear weapons might potentially have a role in responding to future threats such as the ‘the emergence of new weapons’, ‘cyber warfare’, ‘the offensive use of outerspace’, and even “black swan” events (yes, see page 5!). Given the absence of such threats today, France seems to reason that since it already has nuclear weapons, it might as well keep them as a hedge against future uncertainty.
Looking back, nuclear weapons have so far been useless for France – both in defending vital interests and enabling it to engage in overseas conflicts. Several low level interventions in Africa, a few contributions to multinational forces in international conflicts, and a stabilization force sent to Haiti – that’s pretty much it for French military intervention over the past fifty years.
Recently Sarkozy pointed to Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs to suggest that ‘the future of Europe is at stake’, but it is hard to understand why this actually might be the case. Indeed, to think that Iran would ever be developing these programs with Europe primarily in mind seems an absurd and egotistical notion. Beyond being a key trading partner for Iran, Europe also has vast conventional superiority, is increasingly interconnected (and thus less practical to target), and contains many countries that profit from NATO’s alliance structure. In fact, as long as France remains a member of a nuclear armed NATO, then there seems literally no justification for Paris to possess its own independent nuclear deterrent.
Of all the countries today with nuclear weapons, France is arguably facing the fewest threats, and as a result of increased European integration, exists in one of the most stable regions of the world. In this context, if France still thinks it needs its nuclear weapons to keep it ‘free and independent’, then it’s very hard to imagine any circumstances under which it will ever feel comfortable without them. Realistically, beyond using nuclear weapons to clutch on to an increasingly fading notion of ‘great power’ status, it seems that France has as much justification to own nuclear weapons as its neighbor Switzerland would have.
