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You are here: Home / Iran Diplomacy / Factsheets on Iran Diplomacy / Fact Sheet: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Deal) Implementation and Provisions

June 12, 2016

Fact Sheet: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Deal) Implementation and Provisions

On July 14, 2015, the United States and its international negotiating partners (P5+1: United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) announced the Iran Deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  

Iran’s Obligations

Before Implementation Day on January 16, 2016, after which the United States and other world powers would waive nuclear-related sanctions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certified that Iran: 

  • Eliminated 98% of its uranium stockpile. 
  • Removed and destroyed the core from its Arak reactor, blocking the production of weapons-grade plutonium. 
  • Removed more than 13,000 centrifuges (two-thirds of total). Those removed in the process must be placed under continuous IAEA monitoring. 
  • Halted all uranium enrichment activities at the underground Fordow site. 
  • Allowed the IAEA to implement the safeguards necessary to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and implemented transparency measures, such as the Additional Protocol, to permit greater access to inspectors. 
  • Gave the IAEA the information it needed to assess the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear past. 

Going forward, Iran must:

  • Possess no more than 300 kg of uranium enriched up to 3.67% (approximately 90% is weapons-grade) 
  • Operate no more than 6,104 centrifuges  
  • Cease uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility 
  • Ship out all spent fuel from reactors 
  • Allow the IAEA continuous monitoring and inspections its key nuclear facilities 
  • Abide by limits on centrifuges research and development

Preventing a Uranium Bomb

  • Iran will maintain a stockpile of less than 300 kg of uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in other chemical forms) for 15 years. (Down from 10,000 kg) 
  • Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67% for 15 years. (approximately 90% is weapons-grade) 
  • Iran will reduce its installed centrifuges by two-thirds and only operate its most primitive centrifuges for 10 years. 
  • Iran will not have nuclear material or conduct enrichment at the underground Fordow facility for 15 years. 
  • Iran will not build any new nuclear enrichment facilities for 15 years.

Preventing a Plutonium Bomb

  • Iran will never have any weapons-grade plutonium at Arak (Permanent). 
  • Iran will not reprocess spent fuel for at least 15 years. 
  • Iran will ship all spent fuel from the Arak reactor (Permanent). 
  • Iran will not develop any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Monitoring, Verification and Transparency

  • Iran will implement the Additional Protocol to allow increased access to inspectors, including to military installations where nuclear activity is suspected. (Permanent).  
  • Iran will implement the Modified Code 3.1, which requires Iran to provide notification and details regarding future plans to build nuclear facilities (Permanent). 
  • The IAEA will monitor Iran’s uranium supply chain for 25 years and centrifuge production chain for 20 years. 
  • Iran will purchase nuclear material and equipment through a designated and monitored procurement channel. 
  • All parties will fulfill their requirements incrementally, verifying mutual compliance at each step. 
  • A dispute resolution mechanism is in place to resolve conflicts in a timely and effective manner. 

Sanctions and the P5+1’s Role:

  • Iran receives no “signing bonus” for agreeing to a deal. Instead, Iran must take verified steps toward implementing the deal before receiving any sanctions relief from the U.S., the European Unions, and United Nations. 
  • U.S. sanctions related to Iran’s use of the U.S. commercial markets and banking system, sponsorship of terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities, will remain in place. 
  • Sanction infrastructure will be left in place to reimplement sanctions if Iran violates the deal. The snapback mechanism through the UN to reimpose nuclear sanctions on Iran expires after 10 years in October 2025. 
  • Regarding arms embargoes, the UN sanctions on conventional weapons and Iran’s missile program that were tied to Iran’s nuclear program will not be lifted for five years and eight years respectively. National sanctions on Iran’s conventional weapons and missile capabilities will remain in place. 

Posted in: Factsheets on Iran Diplomacy, Factsheets on Non-Proliferation, Iran Diplomacy, Middle East, Non-Proliferation

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