FOGBANK just won’tgo away. Writing in today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus revisits the now well-known difficulties NNSA has had in reproducing the classified substance as part of the refurbishment of the W76 warhead. According to Pincu…
U.S. and Russia Struggle with Chemical Weapons Convention Deadline
In the latest Arms Control Today, an interesting news piece examines U.S. and Russian obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which requires its 188 ratifying members to destroy their stockpiles of chemical agents and delivery vehicles by April 2012. While both the United States and Russia have made progress, it is unlikely at this juncture that either will meet the deadline.
Though not intentionally flouting an international agreement, the United States could face a diplomatic problem by not meeting its CWC deadline obligation.
Though unlikely, the United States could face sanctions and the stripping of voting rights in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the CWC’s monitoring and membership body. The United States should at the very least expect to face a blast of rhetoric, according to Jonathan Tucker at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Besides the CWC deadline, the United States also faces a 2017 deadline mandated by Congress. This is likely to be missed, too. The United States’ two remaining chemical weapons depots at Blue Grass, KY and Pueblo, CO are expected to have barely commenced destruction by 2017. Complete destruction of their stockpiles is even further off, with current estimates standing at 2020 and 2023, respectively.
Increased funding could help address the problem. The DOD’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program is in line to receive $550 million in fiscal year 2010, an increase of $5 million above the Pentagon’s request. This would be a total increase of almost a third from last year’s budget of $427 million. Global Security Newswire recently reported that the ACWA “could collect $1.2 billion in extra funding over several upcoming budgets.”
Russia’s situation poses a more serious challenge to the CWC. About 28,000 metric tons remain in its chemical stockpile, and there are concerns over Russian disposal methods. In some facilities, destruction of the stockpile has slowed after the first phase (when the toxic chemicals are drained from their munitions and neutralized but before the munitions casings and the remaining chemicals are incinerated). Until the weapons casings are destroyed, the risk exists that they could be appropriated and refilled.
Another risk lies in allowing standards to slide on what counts as disarmament. In order to meet the 2012 deadline, Russia already has negotiated with the OPCW to set modified procedures for disarmament that credit Russia short of full destruction. This half-step to chemical disarmament could provide a dangerous precedent in the nonproliferation regime. If a non-signatory country were to accede to the CWC, what would stop them from following Russia’s example and retaining munitions or chemical agents?
Do the Right Thing
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed the holes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and called for international regulation of the nuclear fuel cycle in his July 19 op-ed in the Guardian. The article is a much-needed comprehensive articulation of where the world is going wrong on non-proliferation. Sadly, ElBaradei’s complaints will probably fall on deaf ears.
He says that the five nuclear weapons states undermine the NPT by not taking seriously their obligation to pursue disarmament. Other deficiencies in non-proliferation include lax export controls that don’t effectively safeguard against the shipment of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons, along with gross underfunding of the IAEA. The international community has been coasting and some states have only been doing the bare minimum to prevent proliferation of non-peaceful nuclear technology.
Rogue states like North Korea and Iran create a new set of problems for the next IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. Amano takes office December 1, 2009 and will inherit the looming threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
The jury is still out on whether enthusiasm for non-proliferation will be sufficient to fuel ElBaradei’s pet project: a global low enriched uranium bank. The bank is meant to replace domestic enrichment programs in non-nuclear weapon states in the long-term. The proposal is still a tough sell to developing nations who view such restrictive initiatives as impinging on their sovereign rights under the NPT.
The world is at a critical impasse where nuclear proliferation is concerned, given the recent explosion of countries seeking nuclear power and domestic enrichment programs. Hopefully, renewed U.S.-Russian commitment to nuclear weapons reductions will spur the rest of the international community to take their non-proliferation responsibilities seriously.
Throwing Caution to the Wind
The Naval War College Review just published an article that discusses the hypothetical conditions that might surround Japan’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo’s nuclear option” is an interesting assessment of Japan’s potential path to weaponization.
The authors consider rational and irrational reasoning that might take place within the Japanese government and in the public arena, reasoning which ultimately might culminate in some change to Japan’s long-standing “nuclear allergy.” They highlight the lapses in rational judgment that occur when national security and domestic political agendas intersect. They also emphasize regional instability and a wavering U.S. extended deterrent as key factors.
In my humble opinion, the latter two arguments don’t hold up very well. Yoshihara and Holmes cite the relative decline of the U.S. Navy by more than half since the 1980s and Chinese naval modernization as nascent concerns that could spur the Japanese government to begin a nuclear weapons program.
Though China has embarked on significant modernization, its logistical support for its fleet is still deficient, and certainly inferior to the United States. China faces shortcomings in the size and scope of its Navy and its institutional capacity for effective regulation. Even when operating remotely, and despite a reduction from 600 to 283 ships, the U.S. Navy is far superior to the Chinese Navy.
Even excluding the threat of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, China has far too much to lose from launching an attack on Japan. Since the United States has shown no sign that its commitment to defend Japan has lessened, the underlying balance of power in East Asia remains intact despite Chinese military development.
The authors also sail off course when they consider regional tensions that might be caused by the U.S. intention to engage in gradual, mutual nuclear weapons reductions. Here, they underestimate the value of a good old fashioned Disney villain. North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and historically erratic behavior have brought Russia, China, Japan, and the United States together under the banner of combating a common threat. None of these powers will sacrifice global stability and security on the altar of global zero.
All of the security arguments outlined in the article are important factors to be aware of in terms of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan. We don’t want to hang one of our closest allies out to dry, and maintaining the credibility of our joint security pact is critical to our relationship.
However, there is no political constituency in Japan with any meaningful public following that supports an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan. Nor is there any doubt in Japan about the relative strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis regional threats like North Korea. Japan is a leading voice in favor of nuclear nonproliferation and has come out in support of a START follow-on agreement and Global Zero campaign. Given these realities, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” looks to remain firmly entrenched for the foreseeable future.
Kyl Forced to Stand Down
On July 23, after two weeks of debate, the Senate passed the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act by a vote of 87-7. While the fight over the F-22 early in the week garnered most of the media attention, there was also an important development on nuclear weapons.
Arms control advocates have worried for months that Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) would use the floor debate as a way to undermine the START follow-on process and further lay the groundwork for opposition to the CTBT. Sure enough, on July 22, Senator Kyl offered an amendment to place limitations on spending to implement a START follow-on treaty unless (1) the treaty is verifiable; (2) places no limitations on missile defense, space capabilities or advanced conventional weapons, and (3) the Obama Administration’s FY 2011 budget will be sufficiently funded to maintain the reliability, safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons and modernize and refurbish the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Kyl’s amendment was basically identical to an amendment Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) offered to the National Defense Authorization Act on the House floor, which eventually passed by voice vote on June 25 as part of a managers amendment offered by House Armed Service Committee Chariman Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO).
But thanks to the due diligence of Sen. Levin, Sen. Kerry, and their staff, Sen. Kyl was forced to offer a considerably weaker amendment to his original amendment, which passed on July 23. The new version calls for a report from the President on the Administration’s plans to enhance the safety, security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, modernize the nuclear weapons complex, and maintain nuclear weapons delivery systems. The revised amendment also includes a sense of the Senate that the START follow-on treaty not include limitations on ballistic missile defense, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons.
Though the new version is far from perfect, it’s a significant upgrade over the original amendment (and the Turner amendment that passed in the House), which included explicit budget limitations and requirements. (Update 7/28: Ky’ls demand for a report on enhancing the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile and modernizing the complex within 30 days is particularly befuddling, since these are issues the Nuclear Posture Review is already analyzing and will present conclusions on later in the year in any event. In previous statements, Kyl has attacked the Obama administration for seeking a START follow-on agreement before the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is fully completed, but now he wants to prejudge the results of the NPR by requiring a report on enhancing the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile and modernizing the complex before the NPR is fully completed! I’m confused.)
Sen. Kyl likely had to retract his original amendment because he couldn’t find 33 additional Republicans (or hawkish Dem’s such as Liebermann, Ben Nelson, or Begich) willing to aid him in his efforts to sabotage the START follow-on negotiations while they’re still ongoing (34 votes will be required to defeat the Treaty). This bodes well for the prospects of a START follow-on treaty when it comes to the Senate floor, likely sometime next spring.
Here’s to hoping the Obama administration took notice of Kyl’s mischief making. So far its efforts to make the case that a new arms control treaty with Russia will enhance U.S. security have been less than stellar. The White House needs to do a better job of knocking down the kind of arguments skeptics of the START follow-on process have been making before they begin to generate serious momentum. For example, below are possible responses to the three conditions Sen. Kyl sought to pre-impose on a START follow-on treaty. The administration needs to be making them forcefully and repeatedly:
(1) Will the treaty provide for sufficient mechanisms to verify compliance with the treaty or agreement? Response: As President Ronald Reagan repeatedly said, “trust but verify.” The United States has long-established techniques and facilities for verifying Russian compliance with its treaty obligations. The existing START agreement provides a comprehensive set of monitoring and verification provisions that have greatly facilitated the efforts of the American intelligence community to verify Russian nuclear actions. The START follow-on treaty will rely heavily on this infrastructure.
(2) Will the treaty place reductions or limitations on the ballistic missile defense, space, or advanced conventional weapon capabilities of the United States? Response: It is clear that the Obama administration is not ready to abandon the proposed European deployment and will keep missile defense on a separate track from reductions in strategic offensive arms. In fact, Obama and Medvedev have previously stated that the START follow-on agreement will deal only with offensive strategic forces (for more on this, see my post from last Thursday).
(3)Will the fiscal year 2011 budget request for programs of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration be sufficiently funded to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the remaining strategic nuclear forces of the United States; and modernize the nuclear weapons complex? Response: First, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States drew a clear dividing line between “tak[ing] a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I when it expires at the end of 2009” and “the challenges of deeper nuclear reductions.” The Commission did not hinge “taking a modest first step” upon modernizing the stockpile. Second, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have annually certified the reliability of the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile even though the United States last tested in 1992. Today, we know more about and have greater confidence in our nuclear warheads than when testing.