In the commotion of European missile defense, UN speeches, Security Council resolutions, and Iranian and Korean developments, it is possible that you missed Nicholas Thompson’s chilling gift to the world on September 21st in Wired: a public unveiling of an alleged Soviet nuclear doomsday system that remains in operation today.

According to Thompson’s sources, the system, named “The Perimeter” but also known as “Dead Hand,” was built to ensure a nuclear retaliatory capability in the case of a successful American first strike.  Even in the direst of circumstances—if the entire command-and-control structure had been eliminated—Dead Hand would bypass all layers of command and put retaliatory authority in the hands of a single man inside of a hidden bunker with a launch button.

The title of the article, “Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine”, may cause more alarm than appropriate; the architecture of the existing system does not entail quite the apocalyptic automaticity as the machine in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove.  Various safeguards have been built into the existing system.  Nonetheless, the existence of such a system, if true, is unnerving on the most fundamental and instinctual levels.  It is truly bewildering that hardly anyone knows about it, and Thompson and his sources hope to expose it.  A fully integrated retaliation system like Dead Hand could be capable of turning a single accident into nuclear holocaust.

Here are a few excerpts from the article to tickle your fancy:

When I recently told former CIA director James Woolsey that the USSR had built a doomsday device, his eyes grew cold. “I hope to God the Soviets were more sensible than that.” They weren’t.

One Soviet official who spoke with Americans about the system died in a mysterious fall down a staircase.

Once initiated, the counterattack would be controlled by so-called command missiles. Hidden in hardened silos designed to withstand the massive blast and electromagnetic pulses of a nuclear explosion, these missiles would launch first and then radio down coded orders to whatever Soviet weapons had survived the first strike. At that point, the machines will have taken over the war. Soaring over the smoldering, radioactive ruins of the motherland, and with all ground communications destroyed, the command missiles would lead the destruction of the US.

In fact, the Soviet military didn’t even inform its own civilian arms negotiators. “I was never told about Perimeter,” says Yuli Kvitsinsky, lead Soviet negotiator at the time the device was created. And the brass still won’t talk about it today.

In his first address to the UN General Assembly, President Obama called for “a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”  Greater international cooperation is necessary, he argued, to achieve four key pillars: non-prolife…

Many op-eds have been published in the last few days that berate the Obama administration’s proposed changes to the U.S. missile defense system in Europe. Most of the articles omit a basic statistic that is critical to understand.

According to this Missile Defense Agency fact sheet, the three-stage ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, a variant of which was to be built in Europe, has recorded a testing success rate of 62%. When they occurred, these successes tended to exclude realistic countermeasures (decoys) and to be heavily scripted (the defenders knew beforehand both the timing and location of the target missile).

Of course, since the Pentagon Director for Operational Test & Evaluation concluded that the effectiveness of the two-stage European variant “cannot be assumed” simply because it would have been derived from the three-stage variant in Alaska and California, the testing record of the three-stage variant is largely irrelevant. The European interceptors lacked an authentic testing record, and the technology from which they were to be derived had a problematic testing record. This was no basis for technological confidence.

In contrast…

…the SM-3 system proposed by Obama boasts a 83% success rate. This still leaves much room for improvement – particularly when it comes to combat realism – but certainly is superior to the GMD success rate. If you want to get even more statistical, a quick Fischer’s exact test yields a 2-tailed P-value of 0.2347, roughly meaning that there is only a 23.47% chance that the disparity in the two systems’ testing record has to do with bad luck. Instead, it is reasonable to attribute this disparity to the Aegis/SM-3 system’s technical superiority over GMD.

Max Weber once explained that “The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize ‘inconvenient’ facts – I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions.” Unfortunately, this lesson does not seem to have been learned by the syndicate of op-ed writers who have ignored the central logic of technical prudence and depicted the missile defense decision, first and foremost, as a U.S. betrayal of European allies and an inability to stave off Russian pressure.

On a different but also important note, many pundits have criticized the administration’s delivery of the decision. They have faulted Obama for not officially alerting Poland and the Czech Republic far in advance of the announcement. However, Obama’s delivery had little to do with discourtesy and much to do with the modern reality of international diplomacy, politics, and media. Obama could not have told Poland and the Czech Republic earlier because this information would have been immediately leaked and, thus, effectively announced. Given this reality, the announcement had to be made abruptly in a fashion that might seem reckless to some.  

In fairness, announcing the changes on the 70-year anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland was a political oversight that unnecessarily gave administration critics an emotionally-charged talking point.

Some strong comments today from Obama administration officials in response to the many bogus attacks being leveled against yesterday’s decision to refocus U.S. missile defense efforts in Europe.

First, via Spencer Ackerman, Hillary Clinton came out swinging in an appearance this morning at the Brookings Institution.  The key paragraph:

So make no mistake: if you support missile defense — which I did, as a senator, for eight years — then this is a stronger and smarter approach than the previous program. It does what missile defense is actually supposed to do: it defends America and our allies. Now, I know we’ve heard criticism of this plan from some quarters. But much of that criticism is not yet connected to the facts. We are not, quote, shelving missile defense. We are deploying missile defense sooner than the Bush administration planned to do so. And we are deploying a more comprehensive system. We are not reducing our capacity to protect our interests and our allies from Iran. By contrast, we are increasing that capacity, and focusing it on our best understanding of Iran’s current capabilities.

That’s diplo-speak for, well, you know what.  Clinton does an excellent job of portraying opponents of the change as out of touch with the real security threats we face and painting their specific objections as the function of misplaced ideology rather than sound and pragmatic strategic thinking.

Second, also via Spencer, in a laughable display earlier today at something called the Value Voters Summit former Gov. Mike Huckabee accused Gates, Cartwright, etc. of secretly opposing yesterday’s decision on missile defense (their vigorous public support notwithstanding):

I heard Ambassador John Bolton, I heard many other people who are really at a point of liberty where they can speak their minds — unlike those in the Pentagon who do answer to the commander in chief and have to answer for his policy decisions — who believe that it was a very significant strategic mistake.

Forget for the moment that Huckabee considers Bolton a voice of reason on national security matters.  Does Huckabee also believe that Gates was not being sincere in his opposition to the F-22? And the Airborne Laser?  And the Kinetic Energy Interceptor?  And the second engine for the F-35? Really?  Please.  

Asked if he thought the Secretary of Defense was not being forthcoming about his views, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell stated: “That is not the inference I would draw from Mr. Huckabee’s comments…but if that is what he was trying to imply I would say that Secretary Gates’ support is completely genuine…as is that of Joint Chiefs.”    

By Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp

Big news on the missile defense front today.  The Obama administration announced that it is abandoning the Bush administration’s plan to deploy a radar and ten long-range interceptors in Eastern Europe, which were designed to protect Europe and the United States from long-range missile threats from Iran that do not currently exist.  Instead, the Obama administration plans to deploy technically proven SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis destroyers and later based from ground-based sites, which are designed to counter the more immediate threat posed by Iranian short- and medium-range missiles.

We’ve pasted our full response below the jump.  It can also be found at the Center’s website here.  A few highlights:

“The decision to revamp the missile defense plan in Europe is based on technological reality rather than rigid ideology,” said John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The Obama administration’s proposal is a better choice for U.S. and European security.”

…

“The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program, and replacing it with a more technologically-promising system,” remarked Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

…

“The U.S. security commitment to Poland and the Czech Republican remains as steadfast as ever,” added Isaacs. “Framing this decision, which was based on technical factors, as a litmus test of whether the United States is committed to Eastern Europe or willing to stand up to Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.”

I’m sure we’ll have more to say on this news in the coming hours and days, particularly as the push-back against the President’s decision becomes more and more unhinged.  For now let’s quickly address one attack that is gaining some steam in the conservative blogosphere.

Both Rich Lowry over at the Corner and Michael Goldfarb over at the Weekly Standard are quoting the following passage from Obama’s Prague speech as if it’s evidence that today’s decision represents a major “flip flop” on Obama’s part:

So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

We don’t see how today’s announcement betrays what Obama said in Prague.  At no point did he commit to moving forward with the Bush administration’s proposal.  He pledged to move forward with “a system that is cost-effective and proven.”  The Bush administration’s proposed system was neither.

For Immediate Release: September 17, 2009
Contact: Travis Sharp

Arms Control Group: Obama’s Revamped European Missile Defense Offers Better Security

Washington, D.C. – In response to the Pentagon’s announcement today that it intends to modify plans for the U.S. missile defense system in Europe, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation concluded that the decision is technically and politically wise.

The Obama administration intends to use SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis destroyers and later based from ground-based sites, instead of going forward with the Bush administration’s plan for ten ground-based interceptors in Poland along with a radar system in the Czech Republic.

“The decision to revamp the missile defense plan in Europe is based on technological reality rather than rigid ideology,” said John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The Obama administration’s proposal is a better choice for U.S. and European security.”

The Bush administration’s proposed Poland-based interceptor, which would have been a two-stage variant of the three-stage U.S. interceptor already deployed in Alaska and California, has not yet been built and would not even undergo its first test until 2010. The Bush administration’s proposed configuration would not have protected NATO members Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania from current Iranian missile threats because the system was not designed to cover this area. On the other hand, the Obama administration’s SM-3 configuration is designed to protect all of Europe by approximately 2018.

“The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program, and replacing it with a more technologically-promising system,” remarked Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Aegis destroyers are already deployed worldwide and the SM-3 interceptor has proven successful in 19 of 23 tests since 2002. The SM-3 interceptor is also specifically designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, which are the most dangerous near-term threat posed by Iran. As Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly said earlier this year, “ninety-nine percent of the threat today” is from short- and medium-range missiles.

Iran is years away from possessing the type of long-range ballistic missile that could threaten most of Europe and the continental United States. Though intelligence estimates vary, the broad consensus is that Iran, without substantial foreign assistance (which Western intelligence would likely detect), is not likely to possess a ballistic missile topped with a nuclear weapon capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States until 2015 at the very earliest. Under the Obama administration’s plan, upgraded SM-3 interceptors that are more capable of defending against intermediate- and long-range missiles will be deployed as they become available over the next decade. Thus, as the Iranian threat potentially evolves, the U.S. missile defense system will evolve along with it.

While supporters of the European proposal are attempting to characterize the Obama administration’s decision as a sign of a slackening U.S. commitment to Eastern European allies or NATO, this is false. First, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen labeled the Obama administration’s decision “a positive first step.” The U.S. relationship with its NATO allies is crucial for European security, restraining Russian aggressiveness, and retaining support for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States is not abandoning missile defense in Europe; it is restructuring capabilities to better counter threats that currently exist.

Second, while Poland and the Czech Republic sought the system in order to secure U.S. support in the face of recent Russian assertiveness, the system was not designed, and the Bush administration reiterated over and over again that it was not intended, to defend these countries against Russia. The United States pledged earlier this year to provide Poland with a Patriot missile battery that will help defend against Russia. The United States also has agreed in recent years to provide Poland and the Czech Republic with F-16 fighters and unmanned aerial vehicles, a sign of Washington’s commitment to their security.  

“The U.S. security commitment to Poland and the Czech Republican remains as steadfast as ever,” added Isaacs. “Framing this decision, which was based on technical factors, as a litmus test of whether the United States is committed to Eastern Europe or willing to stand up to Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.”