The Defense Authorization bill being considered by the Senate this week would buy taxpayers seven shiny new F-22 Raptors for the paltry sum of $1.75 billion. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has shed doubt on the utility of the F-22s in security terms and suggested a cap of 187 stealth jets. Yet Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, who introduced an amendment to strip the F-22 funds, are up against the formidable will of the oldest of American institutions: the Military Industrial Complex.

The appeal of the F-22 lies not in its much-hyped stealth capabilities or its combat-tested credentials. Indeed, it has not been used in Iraq or Afghanistan. The appeal of the F-22 lies in the fact that it is manufactured in 44 states by Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and an army of lesser subcontractors. Senators have lashed out because of their concern that ending F-22 production will mean the loss of skilled manufacturing jobs.

Lo and behold, the Center for Responsive Politics published a list of Boeing and Lockheed’s PAC contributions to members of Congress for the 2009-2010 election cycle. You don’t have to look too closely to see that members representing key production sites for the F-22 – like Georgia Senator Saxby Chambliss – are among the top recipients of campaign dollars. Members who serve on the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations committees are also top beneficiaries of defense contractors’ limitless generosity.

Thanks to CRP for this timely airing of dirty laundry.

Is there a link between the nuclear postures of the nuclear weapons states and nonproliferation?  

In their recent Op-Ed attacking President Obama’s approach toward nuclear weapons, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Richard Perle argued that there is such a link, but only in so far as the nuclear umbrella that the United States extends to protect its allies ensures that these allies do not have to acquire their own nuclear weapons.  They scoffed at another interpretation of this link, which is that in maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states, particularly the U.S. and Russia, increase the incentives other states have to acquire nuclear weapons and make it more difficult to, among other objectives, marshal international support to put added pressure on North Korea and Iran.  As Kyl and Perle put it:

There is a fashionable notion that if only we and the Russians reduced our nuclear forces, other nations would reduce their existing arsenals or abandon plans to acquire nuclear weapons altogether. This idea, an article of faith of the “soft power” approach to halting nuclear proliferation, assumes that the nuclear ambitions of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be curtailed or abandoned in response to reductions in the American and Russian deterrent forces — or that India, Pakistan or China would respond with reductions of their own.

As I noted at the time, this fashionable notion is a straw man.  Over at Democracy Arsenal, David Shorr does a much better job than I did of explaining the relevance of U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.  “I don’t know anyone who believes that nuclear arms cuts will cause a spontaneous change of heart in Iranian or North Korean leaders,” writes Shorr, “but here’s what I do believe:

-that disarmament moves by the nuclear ‘haves’ will serve the ball into their court, lessening US policy as the topic of focus in nonproliferation diplomacy and putting the spotlight squarely on the nuclear wannabes

-that living up to our end of the bargain will give us a strong argument to draw greater international support and increased pressure on Iran and North Korea

-that no regime is immune to outside pressure and that such regimes have countervailing interests that weigh against building nuclear arsenals (otherwise there wouldn’t be such a hot debate in Iran over relations with the West)

-that moral authority must be combined with tough diplomacy and the remote but implicit threat of hard (conventional armed) power

-that we have many times more nuclear weapons than can be reasonably justified

-and that taking a hard line — preserving military strength regardless of strategic rationale, issuing demands rather than bargaining hard over possible solutions — makes even less of an impact and offers zero possibility of inducing cooperation.

 “In other words,” Shorr concludes, “we have no choice.”

The key takeaway here is that we do not know for sure that U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions will set the example or have the impact that we hope.  However, we have very little to lose and everything to gain from testing this hypothesis, not only because it is a promise we made to the non-nuclear weapons states at the 1995 NPT Review Conference in return for their agreement to extend the NPT indefinitely, but also because the status quo has done nothing to alter North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Or to quote the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission:

at a time when the United States is considering how to reduce nuclear dangers globally, it is essential that it pursue cooperative, binding measures with others….The Commission does not believe that unilateral nuclear reductions by the United States would have any positive impact on countries like North Korea and Iran. But some other nations may not show the nuclear restraint the United States desires or support nonproliferation efforts if the nuclear weapon states take no further agreed steps to decrease their reliance on nuclear arms. [emphasis mine].

The Wall Street Journal’s Melanie Kirkpatrick traveled to Maclean to interview former Secretary of Defense Dr. James Schlesinger.  The result was, well: For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the master of their universe. I know.  …

Stanford’s Philip Taubman has an excellent piece in today’s New York Times on the START follow-on process and the rough waters Obama will likely have to navigate to implement the rest of his ambitious nuclear agenda.  I found this graf to be particularly important:

If the White House does not assert itself, the Nuclear Posture Review could easily spin off in unhelpful directions. The review that was produced when Bill Clinton was president in 1994 offered a rehash of cold war policies. The one that was done when George W. Bush took office in 2001 was more unconventional, but was quickly overshadowed by the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq.[emphasis mine]

Exactly.  As Janne Nolan and Robert Holmes noted in an article last year in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (unfortunately subscriber only):

Leadership is the art of superintending change. Presidents need to demonstrate their commitment to specific, high-priority strategic outcomes, state that these outcomes are nonnegotiable, and be prepared to intervene personally when the process encounters trouble. Tactics for implementation can be left to subordinates who can count on the president’s full backing.

I hope President Obama (and his key civilian appointees for nuclear policy) understand what is at stake here.  The U.S. nuclear weapons establishment has a well-known “status quo bias”.  If the President is unhappy with the direction of the NPR, it will be up to him to insist that it be reoriented in a direction more in keeping with his bold nuclear policy vision.

Will the real Keith Payne please stand up?  In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, Payne, a member of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, attacked the U.S.-Russia Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty, claiming that it “has the potential to compromise U.S. security.”

To be fair, Payne does not say he would necessarily oppose a START follow-on agreement within the limits outlined in the Joint Understanding (1,500-1,675 warheads and 500-1,100 delivery vehicles by 2017).  However, he raises issues and concerns about the START follow-on process that fly in the face of the language he agreed to in the Strategic Posture Commission’s final report.  

First, recall what the Commission had to say about arms control with Russia.  The Commission drew a clear dividing line between “tak[ing] a modest first step to ensure that there is a successor to START I when it expires at the end of 2009” and “the challenges of deeper nuclear reductions.”  According to the final report:

A mutual reduction of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons in some increment should be achievable. This first reduction could be a modest one, but the objective should be to do what can be done in the short term to rejuvenate the process and ensure that strategic arms control survives the end of START I at the end of 2009. Recalling that reductions in nuclear forces should proceed only through bilateral agreements, the United States and Russia should address limits on both launchers and warheads and discuss how to adapt the comprehensive START verification measures to any new commitments. Success in taking this first step would help create the political will to proceed to follow-on steps on the basis of effective verification.

Though Payne signed his name to this language, it seems he now wants to renounce it.  First, Payne argues that “locking in specific reductions for U.S. forces prior to the conclusion of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is putting the cart before the horse.”  But the Strategic Posture Commission does not hinge “taking a modest first step” upon a fully completed NPR.  In any event, several Obama administration officials have hinted that the first phase of the NPR has already been completed to inform the START follow-on negotiations.  

Second, Payne claims that Russia plans to draw down its delivery vehicles “with or without a new arms control agreement.”  Consequently, the Obama administration will be forced to move toward the lower bound of the Joint Understanding’s proposed 500-1,100 limit on delivery vehicles “in order to match Russian reductions.” Payne contends that such a reduction “would make the U.S. more vulnerable to destabilizing first-strike dangers.”

This is absurd for numerous reasons.  While the U.S. possesses approximately 1198 START-accountable delivery vehicles, in reality it possesses approximately 800 (Russia possesses approximately 814 and 620 delivery vehicles, respectively).  The U.S. will easily be able to reach the upper bound of the 500-1,100 limit, and assuming the two sides can reach some additional compromises on counting rules, could go even lower without making any significant changes to its current force structure. Furthermore, as Hans Kristensen notes, “It is precisely because Russia is reducing that the United States should also trim its force; anything else will cater to those elements in Russia who want to stop and reverse the reduction.  How could such a future possibly be in the interest of the United States or its allies (and, for that matter, Russia)?”  Finally, drawing down to 500 delivery vehicles would not threaten the survivability of the U.S. deterrent, since Russia is moving down to that level in any event.  Payne does not bother to explain why the U.S. would be more vulnerable with 500 delivery vehicles; he simply asserts that it would be.

Third, Payne complains that the Joint Understanding does not address Russia’s numerical advantage in so-called tactical nuclear weapons.  Once again, however, the Strategic Posture Commission notes that this is a challenge to be addressed in the context of deeper nuclear reductions, not the “modest first step.”

In sum, the Joint Understanding comports comfortably with the recommendations of the Strategic Posture Commission.  Perhaps Keith Payne should be reading more…Keith Payne.

Update (7/9): Hans Kristensen sends the following e-mail: “On Payne’s point about Obama locking in the reductions before completion of the NPR, recall that Bush did the same with 1,700-2,200 before the 2001 NPR that Payne was part of was completed. I didn’t hear any complaints from him back then.”