In case you missed them, the Center published two op-eds yesterday. The first, on defense budget sequestration, appeared in Roll Call.  In it, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard and I argue that: Rather than spin its wheels or continue to pretend that sequestr…

In a rare move, the U.S. and North Korea simultaneously released statements on the results of their February 23rd exploratory meeting in Beijing. While the overall gist and key points appear to be in sync, there are some differences in nuances and details.

Here are the key points of the State Department’s statement:

-“To improve the atmosphere for dialogue and demonstrate its commitment to denuclearization, the DPRK has agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including uranium enrichment activities. The DPRK has also agreed to the return of IAEA inspectors to verify and monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon and confirm the disablement of the 5-MW reactor and associated facilities.”

-“The United States still has profound concerns regarding North Korean behavior across a wide range of areas, but today’s announcement reflects important, if limited, progress in addressing some of these. We have agreed to meet with the DPRK to finalize administrative details necessary to move forward with our proposed package of 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance along with the intensive monitoring required for the delivery of such assistance.”

Here are the key points of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s statement issued through the regime’s state media KCNA:

-“The DPRK, upon request by the U.S. and with a view to maintaining positive atmosphere for the DPRK-U.S. high-level talks, agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at Nyongbyon and allow the IAEA to monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment while productive dialogues continue.”

-“The U.S. promised to offer 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance with the prospect of additional food assistance, for which both the DPRK and the U.S. would finalize the administrative details in the immediate future.”

-“Once the six-party talks are resumed, priority will be given to the discussion of issues concerning the lifting of sanctions on the DPRK and provision of light water reactors.”

The agreement of key points in principle is a positive and encouraging step forward, but the key is whether North Korea will follow through on its latest agreements.

It is a positive step development since food aid was a key sticking point that had stalled progress over the last several months. It is also positive since international monitors have not been able to confirm Pyongyang’s claims that it is operating a uranium enrichment facility revealed to American scientists in November 2010. If all goes well, the resumption of Six Party Talks may be possible in the next few months if roadblocks do not emerge along the way.

However, it appears more discussions need to take place particularly in the details and logistics. For example, the method for halting North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility, the timing of IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon in relation to the timing of receiving nutritional assistance, and the physical limits (boundaries) for IAEA inspectors in Yongbyon.

South Korea’s Yonhap News reported on the 29th that Pyongyang suggested it would be willing to temporarily “halt” its UEP facility using the “no-load method” to prepare for the day it would restart its uranium enrichment activities. This temporary halt method reportedly would proceed until its UEP facility is proven to be used for peaceful purposes.

“No-load operation” means that centrifuges would continue to spin (operate) without uranium fuel, which is used for actual enrichment. The purpose of the “no-load method” would be to continue to optimize cascade operations and management because centrifuge rotors spinning at lower speeds than their normal operating speed could lead to “crashing” or self-destruction due to possible violent vibrations. Technical experts say, the fraction of centrifuges that would crash is difficult to predict since it depends on the manufacturing quality of the North’s machines. Regardless, Pyongyang’s reported suggestion implies that it may be concerned about possible crashing.

The U.S. and South Korea have been demanding a complete halt in uranium enrichment activities. If the “no-load operation” method is true, it would still be an encouraging step if it meant granting the IAEA access – even limited access – to its UEP facility. It remains to be seen whether Washington and Seoul would accept this method.

However, hidden uranium enrichment facilities – not this disclosed plant at Yongbyon – is the greatest concern.

“Over the life of the New START treaty (10 years), our best estimate of the total estimated cost for DOD activities associated with implementation of the New START treaty would be between $880.5 million and $1,169 million. This estimate is tentative and does not include potential offsetting cost savings such as reducing operations and maintenance costs of eliminated forces. However, until final decisions are made on U.S. Air Force strategic delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for ICBM silos and conversion methods for the B–52 and SLBM launchers, it is not feasible to provide an accurate total cost estimate.”

Then-Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller in response to questions for the record after a May 4th hearing of the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 4, 2011 (Hat Tip: the Federation of American Scientists Secrecy News blog). To my knowledge this is the first public record of a cost-estimate to implement the treaty. An interesting question is whether it would be more expensive or cheaper if the Pentagon achieved the reductions required by the treaty prior to the 2018 implementation deadline. At this point the Pentagon has no plans to implement the treaty early.

DoD’s responses to other questions for the record contain some additional interesting nuggets.  Here’s Gen. Robert Kehler, Commander of STRATCOM, responding to Sen. Jeff Sessions about the prudence of considering further reductions below New START levels:

And here are Dr. Miller and Gen. Kehler responding to a question from Sen. Sessions about nuclear policy and targeting guidance:

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is wrong with the current guidance?

Dr. MILLER. Current guidance is not ‘‘wrong.’’ Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting strategy have continually evolved with the global strategic environment. The United States would be remiss if we did not reexamine our nuclear strategy in today’s dynamic security environment. Revisions to current guidance may be required to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured for the real threats of today and tomorrow. Updating guidance to support deterrence is a key responsibility of any administration and both previous NPRs preceded pres- idential updates in nuclear guidance.

General KEHLER. Reviewing nuclear employment guidance following a NPR is a logical follow-on step, given past precedent and today’s dynamic security environment.

Remember that existing nuclear doctrine and targeting principles are based on guidance from the George W. Bush administration, which was developed approximately a decade ago. As Kehler and Miller note, the ongoing Obama administration review of this outdated guidance is something that every administration does. It’s smart national security due diligence.

Over the past few weeks, pronouncements and threats concerning Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly worrisome. Inflammatory remarks by the US and Israel have elicited an equally inflammatory response from Iran, and the end result is anyone’s guess.

The tension has been building for months, and recently some top American officials have begun to question whether Israel really is on the brink of (overt) military action. After all, this scenario seems quite familiar. In an interview with CNN, Defense Secretary Panetta asserted that Israel has a tendency to go through cycles of belligerent statements in an effort to pressure the U.S. and Europe into more forceful action, but whether this amounts to another round of bluffing and bluster, an attempt to deliver a “credible military threat,” or something more, the rhetoric is equally dangerous.

The threat of accidental war due to unintended escalation by one or both sides is greater than ever, and the U.S. lacks a direct line of communication to Iran that might prevent such a catastrophe. Shortly before departing as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen expressed his concern that without such a line of communication, “it’s virtually assured that we won’t get it right—that there will be miscalculation, which would be extremely dangerous in that part of the world.”

Read the Center’s full analysis here.

In his latest New York Post column, the Heritage Foundations Peter Brookes lambasts the Obama administration for allegedly considering reductions in deployed strategic warheads below the New START limit of 1,550.  No surprise here, given that Brookes vehemently opposed the New START treaty.

We could have plenty of fun with most everything in the op-ed, but the third to last paragraph was my favorite:

Yes, Republican presidents have ditched plenty of nukes over the years. But those reductions came with US arms-control wins, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and our indisputable conventional superiority.

In other words, it’s fine when Republican presidents move to reduce the arsenal (1) by pursuing arms control agreements, (2) because the world has changed, and (3) due to our overwhelming conventional superiority. But it’s basically appeasement when Democratic presidents move to reduce the arsenal (1) by pursuing arms control agreements, (2) because the world has changed, and (3) due to our overwhelming conventional superiority.

Sounds like Robert Burns’ follow-up story on the administration’s review titled “Boldest nuclear cutters recently? It’s been GOP” struck a nerve with the Heritage folks.

There are legitimate arguments one can make against further reductions in the arsenal.  See this contribution from Elbridge Colby, for example. I strongly disagree with Colby (that’s a post for another night), but it’s a seriously argued case.

The same can’t be said of Brookes latest diatribe.