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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

March 27, 2012

FMWG: Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Delivers Modest Results

Below is the Fissile Materials Working Group’s response to the outcome of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, including reaction from Center Deputy Director Duyeon Kim.

CONTACT: In South Korea Sean Harder (sharder@stanleyfoundation.org or 912-210-2862); in United States Jim Baird (jim@rethinkmedia.org or 202-510-7586)

Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Delivers Modest Results

Experts Call for Bolder Action to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

The communiqué and commitments world leaders agreed to today at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit mark a modest but important step forward in the effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe. However, bolder action is needed to effectively counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, according to the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), an international coalition of nuclear security experts.

“Several key steps should be taken prior to the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in 2014. States should institutionalize binding, comprehensive standards for security that emphasize performance and accountability,” said Ken Luongo, co-chair of the FMWG and president of the Partnership for Global Security.

“The current nuclear material security regime is a patchwork of unaccountable voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders,” Luongo said. “This system is not commensurate with either the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism. Consistent standards, transparency to promote international confidence, and national accountability are additions to the regime that are urgently needed.”

Outcomes of particular note from the Seoul Summit include setting a target date of 2014 for bringing the amendment of the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) into force; the addition of several nations such as Italy pledging to eliminate their stocks of fissile material; and an agreement between the U.S., France, Belgium and the Netherlands to produce medical isotopes without the use of highly enriched uranium by 2015.

“These pledges represent the most concrete results from the summit and represent some useful steps forward,” said Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and FMWG Steering Committee member. “If they are to be realized, however, the White House will have to be more active than it has been in winning congressional support for appropriate legislation and sufficient funding.”

Duyeon Kim, deputy director of nuclear nonproliferation, at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, lauded the inclusion of the nuclear safety and security interface in the Communiqué in the aftermath of Fukushima that demonstrated that a Fukushima-like terrorist attack is plausible.

“Notable achievements [in the Communiqué] is a consensus on and vision for strengthening nuclear safety-security as well as raising the importance of radiological security since the 2010 Summit,” Kim said. “Not only did world leaders acknowledge the overlap between nuclear safety and security, but they’ve agreed that the measures need to be incorporated in all stages including effective emergency preparedness. It’s an extremely significant first step but the key is implementing and sustaining measures that strengthen the nuclear safety-security nexus beyond 2014 as long as we opt for nuclear power to meet our energy needs.”

“Also, setting a target date to announce each country’s plans on minimizing the civilian use of HEU by the end of 2013 is a positive step forward but so far it’s an ‘encouragement’ to do so and the key is in the details, which are unclear.”

By the end of the four-year effort, there will be major progress in reducing the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism, said Matthew Bunn, co-principal investigator of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and FMWG Steering Committee member.

“But we won’t be done – keeping nuclear materials out of terrorist hands will require a culture of continual improvement sustained as long as nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them continue to exist,” Bunn said. “With at least two and probably three major terrorist groups having pursued nuclear weapons over the last 20 years, we cannot expect they will be the last,” Bunn said. “Despite the death of Osama bin Laden, the world is likely to be confronting the danger of nuclear terrorism as long as nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them continue to exist.”

Post-summit reactions from other FMWG members include:

*       Alexandra Toma, FMWG co-chair and executive director of the Connect U.S. Fund: “Leaders should be proud of what’s been accomplished to date, but they must also be realistic that global nuclear security cannot be accomplished in four years, as they originally agreed. A challenge as great as global nuclear terrorism requires constant vigilance and further improvements to the current system, which still remains a patchwork of voluntary agreements. Let’s keep momentum going through the 2014 Summit in the Netherlands and beyond.”

*       Sico van der Meer, research fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael: “Improving global nuclear security is a long-term process, the problem will not be solved in only a few years. This is why the Netherlands is fully committed to organize the third Nuclear Security Summit in 2014. These high-level summits are the best guarantee to retain international attention.”

*       Sharon Squassoni, director and senior fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Seoul meeting demonstrates that summit diplomacy can only accomplish so much.  States should use the time between now and the next summit to identify and target additional gaps in protection against nuclear terrorism as a high priority.”

*       Nobuyasu Abe, director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs: “A willful and targeted act of terrorism would be more vicious than the natural disasters that may hit nuclear power stations or spent fuel storages. There is no unilateral solution to the shared global threat posed by nuclear terrorism. More countries must be enlisted in this truly global endeavor. Our best defense is a strong, united front to prevent nuclear terror.”

The FMWG, a nongovernmental coalition of over 65 U.S. and international expert organizations, aims to provide action-oriented and innovative policy solutions to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 26, 2012

2012 Nuclear Security Summit: So What?

Fifty-eight world leaders will be in Seoul, Korea Monday and Tuesday to agree on ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Since when have we ever seen a nuclear terrorist incident?

True, nuclear terrorism is an extremely low probability scenario but its consequences are unimaginable.

Still, the threat is certainly real because terrorist groups including al-Qaeda are believed to pursue weapons of mass destruction. And an international consensus exists on the threat. More sobering is that there’s enough nuclear materials in the world to make 100,000 additional nuclear bombs.

Who really cares except a select group of policy wonks?

By agreeing to chair this summit, the largest Seoul has ever hosted, Korea has entered tough waters. It would, and still, puzzle many: nuclear terrorism is still a foreign concept for Koreans, they don’t have nuclear weapons or fissile materials, and security is always framed in the context of their number one threat, North Korea, which does not even make it on the Summit agenda, though for good reason. So the lack of initial interest and awareness is natural. The other problem is the lack of public outreach and education on the issue ahead of the Summit and amid this increasingly globalized and interconnect world – but this is true for all countries, not just Korea…

For a Korean president who needs to leave behind his legacy this year, the Summit may just be it in the security realm. This means the Summit needs to be successful. But success will only be determined by substantive achievements rather than the pomp and circumstance of a lavish VIP event. The same goes for all heads of state.

The barometer of success for this summit would be in the national commitments, more so than the Seoul Communiqué political agreements. That is, progress achieved since the 2010 Summit, new “gift baskets” (joint pledges by like-minded countries), and new money put down by heads of state to fund nuclear security programs.

But nuclear security and the Summit are certainly tough sells to a Korean public that’s concerned about far more pressing issues – the economy, jobs, and domestic politics.

The Summit is a tough sell to the global public too for the same reasons, and a few heads of state are in their final year, which raises doubts about their effectiveness on any policy for that matter.

The Korean media wouldn’t be too interested either because the Summit comes just days before the April 11th parliamentary elections, major media outlets are on strike for other reasons, the opposition party and anti-nuclear activists are protesting the Summit (protests are always newsy), and North Korea is making headlines again. What’s more, some may not want to “help out” a “lame duck” president in his last term by extensively covering the Summit at a time when there are some bones to pick of their own with the Presidential Office on other matters – although the point really should be on covering global nuclear security that helps protect the world instead of on one president who’s about to exit office.

International media including Korean would be far more interested in quotes coming out of bilateral and multilateral meetings on the sidelines of the Summit – the “real news” of the day – since heads of state are conveniently gathered in one location. Pre-Summit stories are already dominated by North Korea’s planned April rocket-satellite launch and Iran.

As a former Diplomacy and Security journalist, I know too well that there’s nothing sexy about nuclear security – it’s just too wonky, it doesn’t feel real, and it’s not urgent enough. We all know the world’s hot spots, economy and politics trump all other issues.

But the fundamental objective of nuclear security is prevention and protection. Most often, if not always, we wait until after a catastrophe to devise preventive measures. But when a nuclear or radiological incident occurs, we just might not be granted a chance to even clean up afterwards.

Korea should care because it’s not entirely off the Taliban’s radar. We also recently heard that Osama bin Laden had apparently advised his advisers to “target [sic] American interests in non-Islamic countries first, such as South Korea.”

As one of the world’s most wired and technologically savvy country, Koreans should care if they want to continue to enjoy the conveniences of IT since the country relies on nuclear power to provide almost 40% of their electricity.

All countries using or desiring nuclear power to meet their energy needs – or neighboring one of these countries – should care because those nuclear materials could be stolen or diverted, or become security and safety hazards if they’re not protected properly in the civilian sector. Despite Fukushima, many countries will continue to opt for nuclear power as an energy source, which means more nuclear parts and materials will be spread around the world, and one catastrophe transcends all territorial boundaries – so we should all care.

Just as locking our doors and wearing our seat belts are second nature to us, so should nuclear and radiological security and safety.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 26, 2012

Some Thoughts on the SSBN(X) Delay: Could 12 be the new 10? Or 8?

As was first revealed in its January 26 strategy paper titled “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” the Pentagon plans to delay the Ohio-Class replacement program (also known as the SSBN(X)) by two years. The document stated that the two-year delay will “create challenges in maintaining current at-sea presence requirements in the 2030s,” but that “we believe this risk can be managed.”

At a briefing previewing the new strategy paper, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter classified the delay as “a managerial decision made partly for budgetary reasons” that will place the program “on a more predictable and stable schedule.” The Navy currently plans to procure 12 SSBN(X)s to replace the current fleet of Ohio-Class SSBNs, the first of which is scheduled to be retired in 2027. The Pentagon estimates the total cost of building and operating the new subs at nearly $350 billion over the next 50 years. The need for 12 new submarines is based on an existing requirement to maintain a certain number of boats (most likely five) “on station” at any given time.

In its FY 2013 budget request released on February 14, the Pentagon stated that the two-year delay would save $502 million in fiscal year 2013 and $4.3 billion in fiscal years 2013-2017. The total 2013 request for SSBN(X) research and development is $565 million, a decrease of 47 percent from last year’s appropriation.

For more background on the sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, see our fact sheet here.

Since the formal FY 2013 budget release, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert has been telling Congress that the two-year delay to the SSBN(X) program will result in a strategic submarine fleet of “10 ships in the 2030s.” This is due to the fact that the procurement of new submarines will not keep pace with the retirement of older Ohio-Class SSBNs.  According to the post-delay schedule, the current fleet of SSBNs will dip to 10 in 2030, but the Navy won’t be able to put the twelfth SSBN(X) in service until 2041.

At a March 15 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the FY 2013 Navy budget request, Admiral Greenert suggested that the fleet of strategic submarines could actually dip to 9 at points during the 2030s…

ADM. GREENERT: Today, Senator, we have 14 Ohio class submarines. Two are in overhaul. So that leaves us with 12, really operational.

And with that, there are 10 or nine available at any given time for Strategic Command. We feel, due to this delay, we will ride a period where we’ll have 10 operational, sometimes nine. So we’ll have a similar risk there.

We have to watch it very closely because, at that time frame, in that future — and I’m talking about the late ’20s and the ’30s, we’ll have older Ohios. So we have to watch it very carefully.

But right now, we think that we can mitigate that risk.

It remains to be seen how this plays out. Some observers note that the Navy could avoid the dip to 10 or 9 subs by delaying the retirement of the current fleet of Ohio-Class SSBNs by two years. One way to do this would be for each boat to conduct fewer patrols.

On the other hand, by letting it slip that there may be times in the 2030s when only 9 boats are available, perhaps Greenert doesn’t want to bet all his chips that there won’t be any additional unplanned delays in the SSBN(X) or a need to speed up the planned retirements of the Ohio-Class subs.

In any event, I think it’s unlikely that the Navy will build twelve new subs for the following reasons:

  • If the Navy thinks it can get through the first few years of the 2030s with 9 or 10 boats, its seems unlikely that it would build two or three additional SSBN(X)s, especially in light of their enormous financial costs and opportunity costs on the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. (UPDATE 3/29: For a stark illustration of the opportunity costs, check out the Navy’s FY 2013 30 year shipbuilding plan, released on March 28. The pressure the SSBN(X) is putting on the shipbuilding budget, especially in the 2020s, is enormous.)
  • Speaking of costs, the Pentagon must decide how, on a tight budget, to replace the land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers that make up the nuclear triad, all of which are nearing the end of their service lives at roughly the same time.  Gen. James Cartwright, outgoing vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in July: “The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money to do it.” If the Pentagon wants a new bomber, to say nothing about a new ICBM or Air-Launched Cruise Missile, it might have to scale back its current plans for the SSBN(X). (UPDATE 3/26: I’m reminded that in a letter to Senators McCain and Graham last November, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote that sequestration would “Delay next generation ballistic missile submarine; cut force to 10 subs.” Even though the Pentagon says it not planning for sequestration, perhaps its planning to follow this playbook for the SSBN(X) regardless?)
  • As Amy Woolf recently noted, “at one point in time, we were going to buy….24 Ohio-class submarines; dropped to 21; dropped to 18.  We did buy 18, took four out, made them conventional cruise missile carriers; now at 14, dropping the next submarine to 12.  It does seem that the longer you wait, the less you need.” A similar fate may await the SSBN(X).
  • Finally, the administration is currently reviewing future deterrence requirements, which will ultimately revise existing presidential guidance regarding the targeting of nuclear weapons, appropriate force levels, and more. Given that policy and budgetary forces appear to suggest a smaller nuclear arsenal, all three legs of the triad are likely to shrink, including the sea-based leg.

The fewer SSBN(X)s, the better.  As I’ve explained previously, the U.S. can maintain a lethal deterrent and save billions with less than twelve strategic submarines patrolling the oceans.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 22, 2012

Attacking Iran – Not Cost Free for the United States

The United States military conducted a classified war game simulation earlier this month to evaluate the likely consequences of a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The game, called Internal Look, demonstrated the potentially high cost to the United States of an Israeli attack even without direct initial American participation.

The simulation included Iranian retaliatory missile strikes against American warships in the Persian Gulf, resulting in hundreds of American casualties. Obviously, this is an estimate, as it is impossible to be sure how the Iranian leadership would react to an attack against its nuclear program or whether it will be capable of, or interested in, distinguishing an Israeli attack from an American attack.

This simulation confirmed the risks involved in an attack on Iran revealed in a similar exercise conducted by the Brookings Institution in 2010.  That study examined how Israeli, Iranian, and American decision makers would react in the event of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

The creators of the exercise decided to begin by having Israel attack without alerting American officials – a highly possible scenario – leading to initial tensions between the allies. When Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, responded with increasingly intense rocket barrages on Israel and terrorist activities around the world, the United States was placed in the difficult position of trying to calm the Iranians while simultaneously granting Israel approval for a limited engagement in Lebanon whose success was anything but guaranteed.

Less than eight days after the start of the exercise, the United States was preparing to stage a large scale aerial bombardment campaign that would devastate Iranian military forces.  Even though the Israeli strike was deemed a success, the participants debated the overall efficacy of the bombings and many expressed concerns that the Iranian program would only be delayed at most a few years.

Many politicians expressing hawkish views on Iran, including Republican presidential candidate and former Senator Rick Santorum, have advocated launching an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities with blatant disregard for the repercussions. One commenter who has given credence to such outrageous claims has called a war with Iran the “least bad option” and has stated his belief that the American military would be able to conduct and manage a limited war.

Given the tremendous costs of America’s last “cakewalk” in the Middle East, it would behoove hawks like Senator Santorum to temper their rhetoric and develop a better appreciation for the potential costs of such a brash venture.

Although these are only war games, policy makers would do well not to ignore the dangers of the attacks they so blithely advocate. The outcomes of both exercises highlight the potential dangers of unintended consequences that could result from a preventive attack by either Israel or the United States. As former Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained to the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia, “If you think the war in Iraq was hard, an attack on Iran would be a catastrophe.”

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 22, 2012

2012 Nuclear Security Summit Preview

Duyeon Kim, who’s already in Seoul in preparation for the Nuclear Security Summit scheduled for March 26-27, has put together a handy fact sheet on the who, what, where, and why of the event. Head over to the mothership and check it out.   For so…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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