Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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Sanctions and Public Opinion

Earlier this year, Julian Borger reported on a provocative piece of news that appeared on the Gerdab website, run by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). The piece addresses the day after Iran’s first nuclear test, stating in a satirical tone that, “The day after Islamic Republic of Iran’s first nuclear test will be an ordinary day for us Iranians but in the eyes of some of us there will be a new sparkle.”

It is possible that Borger and others may have gone a little far in their interpretation of the article’s existence.  

Fast forward a couple of months and a couple of flame wars (see here and here for background) and it turns out that the piece was not actually related to the IRGC at all, but was written by an ordinary Iranian.

Today, Borger released an interview with Seyed Ali Pourtabatabaei, a journalist from Qom who says he wrote the piece.  Apparently, Pourtabatabaei’s post was picked up by an Iranian college student working for Gerdab whose job it is to repost at least five articles a day. The student liked the piece.  

Countless polls seem to show that Iran’s nuclear program garners support from the masses, which, while often misguided on the part of the masses, is an important factor in Iranian politics. Pourtabatabaei identifies himself as a reformist who is critical of the current regime, but supportive of the Islamic Republic, much like many supporters of the 1979 revolution who may not have gotten exactly what they bargained for. In his remarks to the Guardian, Pourtabatabaei does not blame the regime for its obstinance. He’s not angry that the regime’s continued refusal to cooperate in any productive way has led to crippling sanctions on its people, or that the regime has the power to make a change and does not. Pourtabatabaei is angry because Iran has not, as of yet, succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon. “I think sanctions will just continue until the end of days,” he says, “and they make us so angry. We don’t need nuclear weapons otherwise, but if we are going to have these sanctions, we should do a nuclear test to bring them to an end.”

Borger is able to explain this statement in a little more detail:

I asked how a nuclear test would end sanctions, and it emerged that what he meant was that if Iran was going to be under sanctions anyway, it might as well have a bomb and get some respect, and provide a counter-balance to the Israeli arsenal. He would view it as a regrettable necessity, as he believes nuclear weapons are ultimately futile.

Borger goes on to ask Pourtabatabaei about a topic he had previously seen as taboo in Iran, talking about nuclear weapons:

In the media and in formal situations there are rules against saying such things. But in Iran, in our blogs, we speak about them freely. Many people think this way. Many people in Iran think we already have a nuclear weapon, because of what they hear at Friday prayers. It is a wish: we would be stronger in our region – strong like Israel or like India and Pakistan. If we had a nuclear weapon there would be a balance.

Of course, there are many possible reasons for this view in Iran: misinformation and control of the media by the state, national pride, fear of an outside attack, the list goes on. It is not always clear in polls if Iranian support is limited to a purely civilian nuclear program or extends to a weapon as well, and (I can’t stress enough) Pourtabatabaei is just one Iranian, but his piece does raise an interesting question.

The true effect of sanctions is based on their ability to influence those one wishes to coerce. In this case, the target is the Iranian regime. Unfortunately, most economic sanctions end up targeting a given regime through its people, thus forcing the target to base its decision on the level of public outrage that results. At this point, it becomes a propaganda game, and if there is one thing the Iranian regime understands quite well, it is propaganda.

At this point it is unclear to me what, if anything, is being done to turn Iranian opinion in favor of the US and against the regime (short of propping up the MEK and imposing more sanctions). I could be wrong, but it seems that an important piece of the puzzle might be missing.

Dueling Quote(s) of the Day: Missile Defense Edition

“It is not credible to promise better relations with Europe—and then stun Poland and the Czech Republic by abruptly abandoning plans to build missile defense bases there.”

Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, June 21, 2011

“And let’s be blunt: The third site in Europe was not going to happen, because the Czech government wouldn’t approve the radar….And so if it was going to happen at all, it would’ve taken years longer [than the Phased Adaptive Approach] and we still hadn’t negotiated the required agreements with the Poles in terms of the interceptors.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 15, 2011.

Also of note from the hearing was outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen’s comments on the prospects for giving the SM3 Block IIB a boost phase capability:

I’ve been around missile defense for the last 15 years. And the whole issue of boost-phase intercept is an extraordinarily difficult technical challenge. And at least if someone’s broken through on that, I haven’t seen that. It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t seek it, but I’ve seen an awful lot of efforts go after that and I was very supportive of the program adjustments that we made — particularly with respect to that, because I thought — my view was I thought we were throwing good money after bad.

Defense Appropriations Bill approved by House Appropriations Committee

Yesterday, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Defense Appropriations Bill. The bill contains $530 billion in funding for non-war programs and accounts, an increase of $17 billion over FY 2011 and a decrease of approximately $9 billion from the President’s request.

In addition to $530 billion in base spending, the bill contains $118.7 billion in spending for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, $842 million above the President’s request and $39 billion less than FY 2011, a decrease due to the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This total includes $12.8 billion for the training and equipping of Afghan Security forces, and $1.1 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), which has moved from the subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations to the subcommittee on defense.

The total in the bill is $648.7 billion. Other portions of defense spending are contained in the Military Construction and Energy and Water Appropriations Bills.

The bill is expected to be considered by the full House of Representatives the week of June 20. It is expected that germane amendments will be permitted.

Check out the full analysis here.

What Could Possibly Be Wrong with Ratifying Nuclear Weapons Free Zones? Sen. Kyl?

The Obama administration’s recent submission to the Senate for ratification of two Nuclear Weapons Free Zones has prompted a backlash from Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ).  The basis for the good Senator’s opposition is about as compelling as the reasons for his opposition to New START.  In other words, not compelling at all.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are declared zones in which the presence, production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons are banned by the signatory states. On May 2, President Obama submitted two requests to ratify the protocols of nuclear free-zone treaties- Pelindaba in Africa and Rarotonga in the South Pacific.   The U.S. has signed the treaties, but has not yet ratified the protocols which commit us not to test or use nuclear weapons within the zones.  The U.S. did sign and ratify, however, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (with Reagan’s support for ratification), the Latin American and Caribbean nuclear weapons free zone treaty, so ratification of Pelindaba and Rarotonga would not be a grand departure from policy.

As the Arms Control Association’s Peter Crail has laid out, the arguments for Senate approval of the protocols are strong.

The treaties can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons usable technologies by requiring even stricter requirements than those in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Pelindaba, for instance, obligates members to follow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended standards of physical protection over nuclear facilities and material.  Both Pelindaba and Rarotonga require that member states only engage in nuclear commerce with countries that have applied IAEA safeguards over all of their nuclear activities.  This is significant because the two treaties’ members include some of the world’s key suppliers of uranium, including Australia, Namibia and Niger.  The treaties, therefore, contribute to non-proliferation beyond the core prohibition on acquiring nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, a terse press release from Sen. Kyl immediately followed the submission, condemning ratifying the treaties because:

1)    signing would support the President’s “flawed nuclear policy” as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which limits the circumstances under which the U.S. would use nuclear weapons, and
2)    the treaties do not address the proliferation threats posed by Iran, Syria and North Korea

Sen. Kyl’s first argument is moot because President Clinton already signed Pelindaba and  Rarotonga in 1996, giving our assurance not to test or bomb treaty members.  Is Sen. Kyl suggesting that there are circumstances under which the U.S. should renounce its political commitment and threaten to use nuclear weapons against one of the members?  If so, he should be asked to name them.  

Any future threat posed by members of these zones is addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review, which states that any country using chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies would still face a devastating conventional military response, and the leaders of the accountable countries would be held personally responsible.  This is a far more credible threat – especially as no country has used nuclear weapons since the end of World War II – and thus, a more effective deterrent than Sen. Kyl’s preferred theoretical U.S. nuclear strike.

Also, contrary to Sen. Kyl’s second argument, the fact that Pelindaba and Rarotonga are not directly tasked with curtailing the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs is not an argument against the zones.  Senate approval of the protocols of these treaties would actually strengthen the U.S. ability to reign in rogue states because members of the treaties have demonstrated active commitments to arrest proliferation.  For instance, Nigeria and South Africa have halted shipments of Iranian arms and ammunition bound for Gambia and North Korean tank parts bound for the Republic of Congo.  Australia has employed stronger sanctions against Iran than the U.N. recommended.

“U.S. failure to ratify the [Nuclear Weapons Free Zones] protocols has not prevented such cooperation from occurring, but doing so would be a cost-free way to bolster the case made by the United States that more countries should cooperate in such nonproliferation efforts in the future,” Crail argues.

For fifteen years we have supported these treaties and now, we can only benefit from ratifying them. Ratify-away, Senate.

Experts Say Likelihood of Attack on Iran is Small, Should Stay That Way

It doesn’t really matter who you ask, the answer always seems to be the same: an attack on Iran would be messy, to say the least.

Yesterday, I attended the last of four in the Arms Control Association’s series of briefings on Iran, Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle.  The briefing covered “The Military Option” and featured Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Jeffrey White with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Alireza Nader from RAND.  While all three spoke frankly, none painted a particularly sunny picture of a potential war with Iran.

White noted, as we’ve heard before, that since it is not possible to destroy knowledge or basic technology, any setback would likely be measured in years.  The idea of complete destruction of any program is just “not a fair argument to make.”

Further, White noted that, “The attack itself is a complicated thing.  It’s not something you can easily gloss over the complexity of.”  If we assume an air campaign of days-weeks (which White says would be necessary) then operations would need to be phased, allowing the Iranians to react and the US to respond in kind.  The US and its allies would need air defense for ships, intelligence, a plan to counter Iranian missiles – altogether a lot of assets and phases would be required, all with their own complications.

On top of all this, Pickering offered his view that any attack has the very real potential to reinforce Tehran’s drive toward building a nuclear weapon.

Thankfully, Pickering also noted that, right now, the possibility of a US attack on Iran “seems to be as close to zero as one can get it, for which I’m deeply happy.”  

Across town, Admiral William Fallon, former US CENTCOM Commander, also said that there is probably “little chance” of a US or Israeli strike on Iran, adding “we ought to be working pretty hard to focus on other things that would have us in a different place.”

“Improvement in relations, in my opinion, will likely occur with the realization that the interests of both people are better addressed with engagement and cooperation rather than antagonism and hostility,” said Fallon.