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Chinese Déjà vu: Call for Emergency 6-Way Meeting – Seriously?

China’s proposal for “emergency consultations” among envoys to the Six-Party Talks in early December is reminiscent of an all-too familiar recent past. Beijing claims the meeting is to prevent further escalation between the two Koreas. But don’t get your hopes up just yet.

Wu Dawei, chief Chinese nuclear negotiator on CCTV:

“The Chinese side, after careful studies, proposes having emergency consultations among the nuclear envoys in early December in Beijing to exchange views on major issues of concern to the parties at present…”

Such words should be cautiously analyzed because it may be a veiled attempt to outwardly resume the Six-Party Talks but, in fact, evade any responsibility to influence North Korea regarding Pyongyang’s latest two attacks on the South. Beijing appears to be trying to elicit pre-Six Party Talks before the real thing. Click “Read More.”

Why? Look here:

Wu Dawei, chief Chinese nuclear negotiator on CCTV:

“Although the proposed consultations do not mean the resumption of the six-party talks, we hope they will create conditions for their resumption.”

As the saying goes, there’s a time and a place for things. First thing’s first, the latest North Korean attack, which killed two marines and two civilians, should be dealt with before discussions can take place on resuming nuclear talks.

After the Cheonan incident, China’s been trying to resume the Six-Party Talks in three phases: U.S.-North Korea direct talks –> unofficial, preliminary Six-Party Talks –> official Six-Party Talks. China’s latest proposal would only aggravate South Korea and perhaps even the US and Japan.

In light of North Korea’s consecutive deadly attacks on the South, the focus should be on defusing tensions and holding Pyongyang responsible for them. However, China appears to be trying to put current hostilities on the Six-Party agenda. That could, in effect, shift the focus away from the North’s attacks to the nuclear issue. Holding “emergency consultations” in early December would be the first time in two years for the six countries to meet since the Six-Party Talks broke down in December 2008.

Beijing has been under fire for mishandling the March 26 Cheonan attack, and Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have since called on Beijing to step up. South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have been reluctant to resume nuclear negotiations until North Korea first took responsibility for the Cheonan attack and showed a serious will to denuclearize. The pressure is on because North Korea has again attacked the South, this time killing and injuring civilians as well. By attempting to arrange six-way consultations again this time, Beijing may be trying to outwardly show its efforts while essentially pointing the finger toward Seoul, Washington and Tokyo if such a meeting doesn’t materialize knowing that the three countries would still want North Korea to first take responsibility for the Yeonpyeong attack.

The Six-Party Talks could be useful as a diplomatic stage for pressuring and grilling North Korea on the Yeonpyeong attack, but such objective would require very careful coordination so that the focus is not diluted at the six-way dialogue table. It’s uncertain whether this is possible.

Upcoming Trips:
We should keep an eye on the results of two upcoming trips between senior North Korean and Chinese officials:

  1. North Korea’s Choe Thae-bok, secretary of the Worker’s Party Central Committee and chairman of the regime’s parliament Supreme People’s Assembly, is expected to visit China on Tuesday at the invitation of Wu Bangguo, China’s top legislator and second-ranking official, according to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency.
  2. China’s Wang Jiarui, director of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, is expected to visit Pyongyang soon as Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao’s envoy.

These meetings could drastically change the current tide. If Beijing and Pyongyang miraculously strike a deal on the nuclear issue that the US or South Korea cannot ignore, then it could jumpstart nuclear negotiations but gloss over North Korea’s attacks, essentially leaving them unresolved. Pyongyang’s charm offensive to resume nuclear negotiations following its Cheonan attack was widely viewed as a way to evade taking responsibility for torpedoing the South Korean ship.

What Does North Korea Want?
No one knows for sure, but we can make some assessments based on clues from recent and past behavior. There have never been single explanations when it comes to North Korea, and most often, there are several elements in play, sometimes feeding off each other. Here are some possible scenarios surrounding the Yeonpyeong attack:

1. Kim Jong-il? If the Dear Leader is responsible for the Yeonpyeong Island attack, he may be trying to test U.S. patience, or “strategic patience” as Washington’s coined its policy. Kim ultimately wants to negotiate a peace treaty with the U.S. to replace the armistice. Why? Because a peace treaty would theoretically rid U.S. troops, by which North Korea feels threatened, from the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang may try to create a conflict zone in the West Sea by engaging in more military provocations and use them as an excuse to elicit peace treaty negotiations.

(propaganda organ) National Peace Committee of (North) Korea carried by KCNA:

“The madcap aggression war exercises launched by them in the sea and the sky near the extension of the Military Demarcation Line in the West Sea of Korea are putting the Korean Peninsula at a state of ultra-emergency… [The West Sea] is the most acute and sensitive area where military conflict might break out anytime.”

The Northern Limit Line in the West Sea (a.k.a Yellow Sea) was unilaterally drawn by the U.S.-led United Nations Command at the end of the Korean War in 1953 and denied by Pyongyang. The de facto maritime border has been the site of bloody naval skirmishes in the past.

We should be mindful that the North is preparing for a leadership succession and is working hard to meet its deadline to become a “mighty and prosperous nation by 2012.” Latest revelations of the North’s nuclear development (light water reactor construction and pilot uranium enrichment program) are also apprently part of the plan.
Another possibility is Kim Jong-il trying to further divide the progressives and conservatives in South Korea.

2. Kim Jong-un? If heir apparent Little Kim is responsible for the Yeonpyeong attack, he may be trying to show the North Korean military that he has what it takes to become the next leader despite his young age, which is believed to be 25 years old. There have been rumors that Kim Jong-un was behind the Cheonan attack and cyber-attacks on South Korean government websites.

3. North Korean military? Perhaps the Yeonpyeong attack was the doing of the North Korean military elite suggesting that it may have become much more powerful than Kim Jong-il expected or can handle. Perhaps the military wanted to exert its force after their leader elevated the authority of the Workers’ Party in September when the military had enjoyed the highest position in government for decades.

What Should the U.S. Do?

  • Continue to stand with and stand by South Korea in future actions.
  • Press China to take an active and responsible role as a regional superpower and “Big Brother” to rein in North Korea but focus on the immediate issue at hand, which is defusing tensions and preventing further North Korean military provocations.
  • Garner international support in dealing with the Yeonpyeong attack. When the U.S. takes over the presidency of the UN Security Council on December 1st, use that position to the fullest.
  • Find an opportune time in the future to resume talks with North Korea. History has shown us that North Korea at the least refrains from provocations during negotiations.

All I want for Christmas is… Negotiations with Iran?

The holidays are a time for sitting down with those you love and catching up. Of course, best-laid plans never do seem to work out as you’d hoped, do they? Grandpa remarks to Aunt Sally over appetizers that she looks like she’s gained some weight while fifteen cooks in the kitchen don’t realize they’re too many until the turkey is burned and somebody’s lost a thumb…

A couple of weeks ago the US and Iran were in that blissfully hopeful stage, planning dinner and setting the perfect table… then somebody forgot to put the sweet potatoes in the oven and set dinner back from November 15 to December 5. Now Grandpa’s starting to get saucy…

Iranian foreign policy expert and longtime confidant of Ahmadinejad, Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, said Monday that sanctions have had “no noticeable effect” and noted that Tehran will expect the P5+1 to take a position on Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal.

Hashemi further clarified that this would not preclude talks, but would force Iran to take a tougher position.  “If they do not state any response on these questions, it means they have not chosen the path of friendship,” he said. “Not answering these questions will mean they have decided not to commit to nuclear disarmament and support the Zionist regime being armed with nuclear weapons.”

Hashemi also said that Iranian negotiators would consider proposed changes to the TRR fuel swap, but that any deal would not stop Iran from enriching uranium up to a level of 19.75 percent.

All this just a week after Defense Secretary Gates said that the sanctions had caught Iranian leaders by surprise, citing a potential rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei:

We even have some evidence that Khamenei now is beginning to wonder if Ahmadinejad is lying to him about the impact of the sanctions on the economy and whether he’s getting the straight scoop in terms of how much trouble the economy really is in.

So, if everyone does eventually make it to the dinner table, can they pull it together enough to enjoy a nice family evening? I guess we’ll just have to wait for December 5.

In the mean time, have a happy Thanksgiving!!

Never Ending Story

We’ve seen this play before:

Act I Scene I: North Korea works on nuclear development.
Act I Scene II: The U.S. says “Woah~” Responds with engagement and/or sanctions. Signs of some “progress” become noticeable, but then, another impasse.
Act II: The U.S. gets distracted elsewhere, ignores North Korea for a few months, maybe years, slapping more sanctions every time Pyongyang engages in provocations.
Act III: North Korea tests a nuclear device and blasts missiles.
Act IV: The U.S. (and international community) resumes engagement, offers goodies for nuclear dismantlement, positive signs appear, but dialogue breaks down again.
Act V Scene I: A new U.S. administration comes in, and attempts to do something different: Ignore North Korea and blame Pyongyang for another impasse.
Act V Scene II: North Korean provocation (missiles, nuclear tests, nuclear facility tinkering, etc).
Act V Scene III: U.S. reaction: condemns, knocks on North Korea’s door, contains the situation, and then ignores some more until the next provocation.
Act VI: Repeat Acts I~V.

This is more or less how the North Korean nuclear saga has played out. For twenty years.

The Obama administration came into office saying it will “not buy the same horse twice” vowing to do things differently from his predecessor. But it doesn’t take long to recall that the Bush 43 administration took a similar path: It began with engagement in the Six-Party Talks, then turned hard-lined, and then softened its stance toward the end of its second term when it hit roadblocks in the Middle East.

The Obama administration may have begun with the extended hand, but quickly reverted to Act V: Ignore North Korea, and only react to North Korean provocations. Of course because of Pyongyang’s 2009 missile and nuclear tests.

Pyongyang is expected to test a third nuclear device. Now we’re also hearing about a light-water reactor to produce plutonium and a pilot uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges — the tools for bomb-making. It’s a matter of time until we hear another kaboom in North Korea and witness a boost in U.S. frequent flyer miles to contain the problem once again.

Perhaps some in this town are waiting, maybe even hoping, for another nuclear test. That way, Pyongyang can deplete its plutonium stockpiles and be further isolated and squeezed, which currently seems to be a bipartisan hope. After all, there are more urgent headaches overseas: Afghanistan.

But that doesn’t solve the problem, nor does it prevent the North’s nuclear pursuits as we’re witnessing now. More nuclear testing means it’s trying to miniaturize to tip a missile. And the latest construction work at Yongbyon indicates it wants to refill its plutonium stock.

North Korea is centered on juche (self-reliance), and Hecker’s latest report shows Pyongyang turning inward once again.

We must remember that North Korean behavior is not exclusively geared toward the U.S. It’s also preparing for a leadership succession, and has a fast-approaching deadline to become a “mighty and prosperous nation by 2012.” Kim’s minions are probably working around the clock to make sure their Dear Leader is not embarrassed with empty promises in the face of his domestic (and even international) audience, and that Great Leader Kim Il-sung is revered with the utmost respect during his 100th birthday celebration.

The Obama administration has not been entirely wrong to pursue its current “strategic patience” policy — it tried sometime different, and it may have been serving its purpose. But we’re now seeing that this policy may actually be adding to the vicious cycle.

The only way this administration can truly set itself apart from previous administrations is to proactively try to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Yes, North Korea probably won’t surrender its nuclear ambitions under the current Kim Jong-il regime. But chances are his son Kim Jong-un won’t either.

Cracking the problem begins with persistent engagement. Talking to adversaries is usually viewed as a reward. But in North Korea’s case, we may have now witnessed that not talking is the ultimate reward – it’s granted time for nuclear development and more provocations. History has shown that when North Korea is engaged in dialogue, it refrains from provocative actions. Inaction could result in the U.S. resigning itself to accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. And more nuclear actors could emerge following the “Pyongyang model.”

Sure, it’s increasingly difficult to engage in backdoor diplomatic dialogue without it being leaked to the press, which would then lead to heightened expectations for a breakthrough, and then lead to sheer disappointment and criticism if that one baby step didn’t produce substantive results. If a series of talks don’t lead to progress, then the blow is even greater.

But the nuclear game will only become more difficult to beat if Washington stands idly by without directly gauging its playmate’s position. Not talking only increases the intractability of problems, and keeps the stage curtain up forever.

World history has shown that the seemingly impossible has been made possible because of aggressive and ambitious — sometimes at first idealistic — initiatives. Foreign policy should always be crafted from a realistic and pragmatic foundation. But sometimes, a sprinkle of ambition and creativity can make history.