This first-step agreement with Iran represents a good way forward. Under the preliminary deal, Iran must halt further advancement of its nuclear program. There is no doubt that without this deal, Iran would continue to develop greater nuclear capabilities. This six-month agreement includes a rigorous inspection and transparency regime. Congress deserves credit for enacting credible […]
Iran-sanity: Addressing some of the criticism lobbed at the deal
First, a celebration. The US and its allies have signed a deal that curbs Iran’s nuclear program – much to the surprise of most skeptical onlookers, including myself. Not that I haven’t been working at this subject for at least six years, but at this point, we’ve all seen so many deals fall apart that a new moderate President and a historic phone call and could only go so far to stoke hopes that this could be the day.
And yet it was. The P5+1 managed to secure unprecedented transparency measures and stop Iran’s nuclear program in its tracks, taking the country from the brink of nuclear breakout to a dormant state that allows a significant amount of additional time to secure a final deal.
The first-step measure will require Iran to convert half of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to oxide, dilute the other half; install no new advanced centrifuges; cap its 3.5 percent stockpile; and halt all activities associated with its plutonium reactor at Arak.
And all this for, let’s be honest, a pretty insignificant amount of sanctions relief. As former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Paul Pillar points out, “any imbalance in the deal is markedly against Iran and in favor of the P5+1.”
It’s hard for non-proliferation experts to imagine any other reaction to this deal – an early holiday gift, you might say – than pure glee.
Unfortunately that glee hasn’t yet transferred to everyone else.
Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted on Saturday, “Unless the agreement requires dismantling of the Iranian centrifuges, we really haven’t gained anything.”
Sen. Marco Rubio said that it would make a nuclear-armed Iran more likely, not less, and called on Congress to vote on tougher sanctions.
And Sen. John Cornyn, the No. 2 Republican in the Senate, mind you, even managed to work a little healthcare snipe into his criticism when he tweeted, “Amazing what WH will do to distract attention from O-care.”
But perhaps the most extreme, and important, denouncement of the nuclear deal came from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called the deal “a historic mistake.”
Of course, not everyone in Israel agrees. Israeli stock prices rose to a record high on Sunday. And Amos Yadlin, the former head of the IDF’s Military Intelligence, and Ehud Yaari, a veteran and widely respected Arab affairs analyst, welcomed the deal.
And despite Netanyahu’s comments, it is hard to see how the deal signed this weekend does not increase the security of both the US and its greatest allies, particularly Israel.
But let’s take this piece-by-piece. Netanyahu and others make a few claims that aren’t quite accurate.
First, Netanyahu argues that the deal leaves Iran “taking only cosmetic steps which it could reverse easily within a few weeks, and in return, sanctions that took years to put in place are going to be eased.”
The sanctions relief included in this package is a pittance compared to the sanctions still in place, and focuses primarily on easing the consequences of the existing measures on Iran’s middle class. Relief focuses largely on cars, airlines, and students abroad – these issues are useful politically to an Iranian regime dealing with an unhappy population, but they do not provide a window for nuclear advancement.
And on this point, you might remind me. What, exactly, is the point of sanctions if not to serve as leverage to gain a deal? This was the plan all along.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon adds, “The President sees wisdom in placing trust, however limited, in a regime that has repeatedly violated international norms and put America’s security at risk.”
John Kerry said it, we’ve said it, it should be obvious but it clearly is not: this kind of deal is not about trust. It is about the exact opposite.
As Fred Kaplan points out here, “The thing about this agreement is that—like all well-written accords between countries with good reason to distrust one another—it doesn’t require trust.”
What level of trust are we putting in Iran if we allow their nuclear program to continue, without daily inspections, for even one more day while we pile on sanctions and wait? Intrusive daily inspections are the only means the US and the international community have to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is not moving forward more quickly than we think. Intrusive daily inspections will ensure that Iran does not have the chance to build a bomb, a lack of them will not. It’s a simple, fact-based concept. Blindness does not allow us better sight. We are better off now than we were before this deal.
Then there’s this from Sen. Bob Corker: “I think people are very concerned that the interim deal becomes the norm, and that’s why I’ve crafted legislation to hold the administration and the international community’s feet to the fire over the next six months to ensure that this interim deal is not the norm.”
This deal is not a new norm; it’s a window for negotiations, and it has a very explicit expiration date. The deal will expire in 6 months. If, at that time or at any time in between, Iran screws up, the consequences will be worse than ever. Not only will Congress have the full backing of the administration to move forward with tough new sanctions, it’s also likely that they won’t be far from an authorization for the use of military force.
This argument also applies to those arguing for a new round of sanctions that doesn’t kick in for six months. How long do we really think it would take to pass a bill if this deal starts to go south? It won’t be hard. But the dangers associated with passing new sanctions now (derailing the agreement, isolating the US from the rest of the P5+1, unraveling the entire sanctions regime) are far greater than the risk that Congress might lose a few hours in its rush to pass new legislation if the time comes.
Of course I could spend all day rebutting the criticism lobbed at the deal, and it’s likely I’ll need to do a lot more over the next six months. But for now, I’m just happy that at least I know we’re a little bit safer today than we were last week.
Now we can all go back to talking about the rollout of that website that ruined our day.
Gut reactions to the first step Iran deal
Late last night (or early this morning Geneva time), the P5+1 (the United States, China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran reached a historic first step agreement that if successfully implemented would verifiably halt Iran’s nuclear progress and provide a much larger window into Iran’s nuclear program and activities than we have ever had. The deal is a significant blow to Iran’s ability to make weapons grade fissile material without detection. Simply put, it is a win for U.S. national security, the security of its allies, and nonproliferation diplomacy.
Below is a brief outline of the details of the initial, six-month agreement and what it means. You can read the White House fact sheet on the deal here.
The deal halts and rolls back the most proliferation sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is required to halt all enrichment above 5% and, according to the White House fact sheet, “dismantle the technical connections” to enrich beyond that level. In addition, Iran must dilute or convert to a form than cannot be further enriched its accumulated stockpile of uranium enriched to 20% . As of the most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran had stockpiled nearly 200 kilograms (kg) of uranium enriched to 20 percent. This material is a big proliferation concern because, while uranium is not considered weapon-grade until it is enriched to about 90 percent, most of the work has occurred by the time it reaches 20 percent. Approximately 240 kg to 250 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent, when further enriched to weapon-grade, is enough for one bomb. Last year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the accumulation by Iran of one bombs worth of 20% enriched uranium would be a “red line” for Israel. The first step agreement effectively neutralizes this threat.
The deal stops Iran’s enrichment progress. The agreement prohibits Iran from installing or activating additional centrifuges beyond those that are already spinning, making additional centrifuges except for those needed to replace damaged machines, and increasing its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium “so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.”
The deal includes unprecedented transparency measures. Notably, the deal provides the IAEA with daily access to Iran’s enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow and access to centrifuge assembly facilities and centrifuge component and storage facilities. To reiterate, this is unprecedented, and the greater access is also an important (but by no means sufficient) step toward increasing our ability to deter and detect the construction of undeclared/covert Iranian nuclear facilities and sites.
The deal freezes work on Iran’s heavy water reactor near Arak. According to the White House fact sheet, Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track.” Kudos to the French for driving a hard bargain on this point.
In return for these significant Iranian concessions, the deal provides Iran with limited, proportional, and reversible relief from some sanctions in the amount of approximately $7 billion. The much-stronger sanctions on Iran’s oil and banking sectors would remain in place as leverage to secure a final deal.
The deal provides time and space to test Iranian intentions and negotiate a more encompassing agreement that places even more stringent verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear capacity, addresses the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, and more. As the White House fact sheet notes, “Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.”
The first step deal agreed to last night is a remarkably strong agreement without which Iran would continue to advance its nuclear progress and march toward a breakout capacity. In assessing the deal it is vital to keep in mind the nuclear advances Iran could have made over the next six months in the absence this cap on its nuclear program and the much larger window into the program we now have because of the deal. If after six months we are unable to reach a more permanent deal with Iran we will be no worse off than we are now; in fact we will be better off because of the additional time this agreement buys.
The criticism some are already making that the deal “only” marginally increases the time it would take Iran to dash to a bomb (if it were to decide to do so) is misplaced. This is precious time and the agreement’s transparency and monitoring measures significantly increase the odds that any dash to make weapons grade would be detected.
Ultimately, Iran’s nuclear program is highly unlikely to be stopped by more sanctions or U.S. military force. The purpose of sanctions was to bring Iran to the table, not stop its program – and this is what has transpired. While the deal isn’t perfect, it is much more stringent than many thought or predicted and puts us on the best path to placing even stronger and more intrusive constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. Calls for more sanctions or insisting that the initial and/or final agreement must require that Iran permanently cease enrichment makes it much more likely that the outcomes we’re trying to prevent (i.e. unconstrained Iranian nuclear development; a nuclear-armed Iran; a US war against Iran; or all of the above) come to pass.
Finally let me end with a note of caution. While we should applaud this first step, the hard diplomatic work is far from over. The important verifiable caps contained in the initial deal are low hanging fruit relative to the imitations the United States will ask of Iran and the sanctions relief Iran will ask of the United States and others after six months. Moreover, a diplomatic freeze on Iran’s program has been achieved before, but it wasn’t sustained. This is a good, meaningful first-step. But much more work remains.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Statement on P5+1 Deal with Iran
“This deal is unprecedented. International inspectors will have daily access to Iran’s nuclear facilities to ensure that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon,” said Laicie Heeley, director of Middle East and Defense Policy. “This is leaps and bounds ahead of what we have now in terms of ensuring the national security of the United States and our allies, especially Israel.”
Making a nuclear deal with Iran
With Iran’s nuclear program dominating the nonproliferation airwaves, I wrote my November Bulletin column on the merits of the ongoing talks in Geneva (the latest round of which resumed on November 20 and could continue into the weekend) and why a negotiating strategy premised on forcing Iran to surrender its enrichment program is not a wise strategy. Here’s how I begin:
When, in early November, Iran and six world powers met in Geneva, negotiators made significant progress toward an initial agreement that would pause Iran’s nuclear development. Hopes are high that the remaining obstacles to a first-phase deal between Tehran and the P5+1—the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—can be overcome soon,and that future talks will further allay concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.
Despite diplomatic progress, though, skeptics in the United States and Israel argue that the current negotiations are a fool’s errand. They say that the only worthwhile agreement would be one that requires Iran to dismantle its entire nuclear program, including uranium enrichment. In addition, the skeptics argue that Iran only responds to extreme pressure, and that therefore the US Congress must pass tougher sanctions immediately and back them up with a credible threat of military action.
These Godfather-esque arguments have a certain appeal. If the United States makes Iran an offer it can’t refuse, then surely it will back down and give in to every demand, or so the theory goes. But this isn’t Hollywood, and such tactics are much more likely to backfire than succeed.
A diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear impasse is squarely within American national security interests. A reasonable deal would constrain Iran’s nuclear program, increase the international community’s ability to monitor and verify compliance, and give the United States ample warning in the event that Iran makes a dash to acquire the bomb. The first-phase deal the Obama administration is pursuing is a step toward these ends. Attempts by the US Congress to increase sanctions and condition relief on unrealistic maximalist positions—such as insisting that Iran cease all uranium enrichment—would likely doom current diplomatic efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood that the outcomes Washington is trying to prevent come to pass. Those could include unconstrained Iranian nuclear development; a nuclear-armed Iran; a US war against Iran; or all of the above.
Read the whole thing here.
One issue I did not address in the column is the reported reasons for the failure to close an initial deal at the November 7-10 Geneva round. In most tellings, a deal appeared imminent until France insisted that the P5+1 drive a harder bargain, which the Iranian negotiating team could not accept without further guidance from Tehran. The most oft-cited stumbling blocks were (and continue to be?) how to deal with Iran’s construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak and how to describe/characterize Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium as part of an agreement.
On Arak, Jeffrey Lewis makes a strong case that the French were right to insist that “A freeze on Iran’s nuclear program needs to include a freeze on construction work at Arak.” Most experts seem to think that the P5+1 and Iran can reach a compromise that prevents this issue from becoming a deal breaker.
A modus vivendi on Iran’s enrichment rights could be a trickier road to hoe, but here to there is cause for cautious optimism. According to a November 15 report in the New York Times attributed to Western diplomats, a potential compromise “would be for an interim accord to affirm that Iran would be entitled to all of the rights of signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran and world powers would then agree to disagree on how to interpret that treaty.” Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif appeared to bless such an approach. However, its not clear if this will fly with the Supreme Leader or if additional sanctions relief beyond what the P5+1 has offered will be required in return.
Ultimately, a first-step deal that freezes and begins to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress is one the United States (and its allies) should take. As Shashank Joshi aptly puts it, “If Iran cheats, the West loses almost nothing; if it doesn’t, then Iran is put further from a nuclear weapon and trust is built for a bigger deal. Like all good diplomacy, it hedges against its own failure.” Meanwhile, the contemplated sanctions relief being offered to Iran is proportional to the cap on and more intrusive international monitoring of the program that is being asked of Iran. The claim that the very limited and reversible sanctions relief on offer would eviscerate the larger sanctions regime doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.
The value of the deal should be assessed relative to the gains Iran could make over the next six months in the absence of the deal. Critics of reported agreement must explain how more coercive approaches will reduce Iran’s breakout potential, given that existing sanctions to date have not stopped Iran’s nuclear progress.
