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Iranian "long-range" missiles?

In an otherwise interesting look at the state of Iran’s nuclear program and disputes among American and Israeli intelligence officials about how close Iran is to the bomb, The New York Times’ David Sanger gets away with a big whopper:

It is unclear how many months — or even years — it would take Iran to complete that final [nuclear weapon] design work, and then build a warhead that could fit atop its long-range missiles. [emphasis mine].

Now perhaps Sanger meant to say something along the lines of “and then build a warhead that could fit atop a future or yet to be developed long-range missile.”  But that is not what the above sentence suggests.  What it suggests is that Iran currently possesses long-range missiles, which, as NoH readers know, is, ummm, not true.  

According to a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s ballistic missile programs,

traditionally, the United States has defined long-range or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as those ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles).  To date, five countries have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain.  Other countries such as Iran, are believed by some observers to have ICBM programs in varying stages of development.

In other words, Iran does not now have any long-range missiles.  Iran does possess medium-range missiles that “may have range capabilities of 1,500-2,500 kilometers.”  While such missiles could reach targets in Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe, they could not threaten the rest of Europe or the United States.  And while Iran may be seeking to develop long-range missiles, without substantial foreign assistance, Iran is not likely to possess a ballistic missile capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States within the next ten to fifteen years.

Better fact-checking, please.

Current Status of Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs

Yesterday I published an analysis on the current status of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  Below are what I consider to be the six key takeaways:

1. Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain shrouded in secrecy and the country has committed numerous violations of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations.

2. Iran does not currently possess a nuclear weapon of any kind.

3. There is no evidence that Iran has made the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon.

4. In the event that Iran makes the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon, the weight of the evidence suggests that Iran will not possess a nuclear-armed ballistic missile capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States for many years to come.

5. All these estimates are exactly that – estimates

 Head over to the mothership to read the whole thing.  

Are They? Or Are They Not?

The U.S. government should be more cautious in its statements about Iran’s nuclear intentions. If we want the Iranians to sit at the negotiating table, we need to stop faulting them for things we are not sure about. As our executive director John Isaacs said last month, “Negotiations with Iran are more likely to bear fruit if Iranians don’t feel like the United States is officially accusing them of being dead-set on going nuclear.”

The recent testimony by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair is a step in the right direction.  Blair told Congress this month that Iran has not yet made an executive decision to convert its low-enriched uranium stocks into highly-enriched fuel that could be used for nuclear weapons. Neither has Iran decided to develop the technology needed to load an atomic bomb onto a ballistic missile, according to Blair.

Whether or not the Islamic Republic has made up its mind to develop a nuclear weapon makes an enormous difference to U.S. strategy. “If we definitely know what Iran wants to do, that they are planning to build a nuclear weapon, then it is indeed a very dangerous situation,” Isaacs noted on NPR’s Morning Edition in February. “If they’re only moving in that direction and haven’t made a final decision, not only does that take some time urgency off, but it also means there’s an opportunity for the Obama administration to try to launch some negotiations with the Iranian leadership.”

Iran can move toward a nuclear bomb “if it chooses to do so,” said Blair (emphasis mine.)  Added Blair: “Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop one.” This leaves the window open for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.

With his carefully picked words, Blair walked a fine line and aimed to strike a cautionary but not overhyped note about available intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program. Blair set a useful example for officials to follow when discussing delicate questions regarding Iran.

Blair’s statements, however, seem to have created quite a bit of confusion. Blair appeared to contradict earlier statements by CIA director Leon Panetta, who told Congress that, based on the information he’d seen, “there is no question” that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability. Something similar happened earlier this month when Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen told journalists that Iran had enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon on the same day that Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that Iran “was not close to a weapon.”

If administration officials can’t get their message straight, how can we expect the Iranians to know where we stand? The Obama administration should stay away from the microphones when debating what is inside the minds of Iranian leaders. Blair’s nuanced language is welcome and should be the standard throughout the executive branch.

Iran Can Be Deterred

by Kingston Reif Published in the Washington Times on July 10, 2008. In “Radar shield quest” (Commentary, Tuesday), A. Wess Mitchell makes three strategic arguments in favor of extending the U.S. missile defense system to a third site in Europe. All of them suffer from numerous flaws. First, the claim that the third site enjoys […]