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You are here: Home / Archives for Iran Diplomacy

January 20, 2011

Experts Reject Zero Enrichment Push Ahead of Talks in Istanbul

As a new round of P5+1 talks with Iran are just getting underway in Istanbul, the following letter has been released by a group of experts including Columbia professor and former National Security Council staffer Gary Sick, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador John Limbert, and former British Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton.  The letter urges the US to “reinvigorate diplomacy” by engaging with Iran more persistently, broadening the US-Iranian dialogue, and above all, setting realistic objectives.  The group advocates that the US be prepared to recognize a peaceful Iranian enrichment program following the establishment of more effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, including the Additional Protocol.

Text is below and after the jump:

As the United States prepares for the upcoming round of multilateral talks with Iran, it is imperative that the Obama Administration reinvigorate its diplomacy by pursuing engagement with Tehran more persistently, setting realistic objectives, and broadening the US-Iranian dialogue.  Diplomacy is the only sustainable means of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, avoiding the dangerous folly of military confrontation in the Middle East, and enabling progress in other critical areas of US interest, such as Afghanistan and the human rights situation within Iran.

Reinvigorating diplomacy means seeking to engage Iran more persistently.  The upcoming Istanbul meeting is only the fourth meeting on the nuclear issue involving both the United States and Iran, and no breakthrough can be expected without additional talks. Fortunately, time exists to pursue a diplomatic solution.  Both US and Israeli officials have made public statements recently acknowledging that Iran remains years away from having the capability to construct a nuclear weapon.

Reinvigorating diplomacy also means pursuing realistic objectives. Unrealistic outcomes, such as insisting that Iran cease uranium enrichment entirely, however desirable, must be set aside.  Focus should instead be placed on establishing monitoring and verification mechanisms that can ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, indeed, used solely for peaceful purposes.  Secretary Clinton stated in December that the United States would be prepared to recognize a peaceful enrichment program on Iranian soil.  This is a productive step to achieve a satisfactory compromise for which the Administration should be commended.

Finally, reinvigorating diplomacy means addressing issues with Iran beyond the nuclear file.  Tehran presents challenges and opportunities in many other areas of importance to US national security, including the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq, drug trafficking, and the human rights situation in Iran itself.  The US should seek common ground in all areas of interest and not hold progress in one area hostage to resolution of others.  Indeed, progress on human rights or Afghanistan may create a better climate for progress on the nuclear issue. The US engagement agenda must be expanded to reflect this.

Diplomacy with Iran will not be easy and no quick fixes should be expected. Iran must also negotiate in earnest and make the serious compromises necessary for resolution of the nuclear issue.  The concerns of the IAEA, the P5+1, and the international community more broadly must be addressed by Iran on the basis of transparency and cooperation.  Resolving decades of enmity between the US and Iran will require that both sides work to create openings for successful engagement.

Only reinvigorated diplomacy holds the promise of bridging the many divides between the US and Iran and achieving a sustainable solution that prevents a disastrous military confrontation, prevents an Iranian bomb and the additional proliferation that would follow, and protects the human rights of the Iranian people.

Barry Blechman, co-founder, the Stimson Center?
Professor Juan Cole, University of Michigan ?
Sir Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Former British Ambassador to Iran ?
Debra DeLee, President and CEO, Americans for Peace Now?
Jonathan W. Evans, Legislative Representative for Foreign Policy, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Professor Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii ?
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and President, Middle East Policy Council
Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (USA, Ret.) Chairman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Col. Sam Gardiner (USA, Ret.)?
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association ?
Amb. John Limbert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Firuzeh Mahmoudi, Executive Director, United4Iran?
Paul Kawika Martin, Policy Director, Peace Action ?
Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy?
Robert Naiman, Executive Director, Just Foreign Policy?
Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council?
Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Professor Paul Pillar, Georgetown University?
Jon Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West?
Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, Director, Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington Office?
Professor Gary Sick, Columbia University?
Professor John Tirman, Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for International Studies

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Non-Proliferation, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 5, 2010

CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 185 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation […]

Posted in: Asia, China, India and Pakistan, Iran Diplomacy, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, United States

July 2, 2010

Making the 2012 Middle East Conference Work

By Chad O’Carroll Efforts to place unique pressure on Israel over its presumed nuclear arsenal could scuttle plans for the scheduled 2012 Conference on establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction, President Barack Obama said earlier this month. In summarizing Obama’s comments, the White House suggested that “the Conference will only […]

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Treaties

May 18, 2010

P5+1 Reach Agreement on Iran Sanctions Draft

Secretary of State Clinton announced in her remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START that the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia) and Germany have agreed to …

Posted in: Front and Center, Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

May 17, 2010

Iran Agrees to TRR Deal… Again

Good news – and, one way or another, I do think this is good news – this morning from Tehran.

Following on talks between Turkish, Brazilian and Iranian leaders over the weekend, Iran has agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a deal that, according to AP, “could ease the international standoff over the country’s disputed atomic program and deflate a US-led push for tougher sanctions.”

“According to the trilateral deal, Iran will deliver 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during a press conference on the sidelines of the 14th G-15 Summit in Tehran today.  In return, Iran will receive 120 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium fuel rods for use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment.

While the mainstream media may be getting ahead of themselves a bit, this move is good in many ways.  Tensions over Iran’s nuclear program have continued to rise since the announcement of a second, secret, Iranian uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom almost a year ago. Congress is chomping at the bit for new sanctions and even the use of force.

Without a doubt, skeptics will immediately point out Iran’s long history of cooperation up to the very precipice of a deal, with no eventual follow-through.  It may not matter much whether the deal makes it to a close, however.  In the end, it provides for one undeniably positive benefit: time.

In the time it has taken to negotiate this deal, Iran has doubled its stockpile of LEU.  The original purpose, which hoped to delay any Iranian “breakout” capability by at least a year, is effectively dead – so in the end, even “success” will make little difference.  

Politically, however, the deal provides a treasury of stalling techniques to the administration, which will likely want to employ as many as possible.

What remains true is that the situation in Iran needs more time…

When this deal was proposed, Iran remained submerged within an interior struggle over human rights.  While the struggle remains, it has cooled.  Iran’s leaders may now have the ability to turn their attention more fully to the nuclear issue.  

If this is too optimistic a scenario, more time may also provide the administration with what it needs to secure strong multilateral sanctions – the kind that won’t benefit the Iranian Regime.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said that the IAEA should expect to receive a letter with regards to the swap deal “within a week.”  

The swap will have to wait for official approval from the Vienna Group, which consists of representatives from France, Russia and the US and the IAEA, but will begin nearly a month after it is given.

The details of the deal are still unclear and agreement from the Vienna Group is far from certain.  Since another country will need to provide 1200 kg of LEU for the swap, this will not be just a trilateral deal – others must be convinced to cooperate.

Where the US is concerned, Jeffrey points out in a great post on Arms Control Wonk why the administration won’t want to be perceived as at fault if this one falls through.  In this way, I would argue that at least tacit US participation is likely.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns are due to discuss Iran at a meeting today with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov.  

For now, the text of the agreement is below:

JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL
(17 May 2010)

Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on the following Declaration:

1) We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

2) We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation.

3) We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction.

4) Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran’s rights and obligations under the NPT.

5) Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200 kg LEU in Turkey. While in Turkey this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA may station observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey.

6) Iran will notify the IAEA in writing through official channels of its agreement with the above within seven days following the date of this declaration. Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA) further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna Group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 kg of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

7) When the Vienna Group declares its commitment to this provision, then both parties would commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement mentioned in item 6. Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1200 kg) within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year.

8) In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.

9) We welcome the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue as in the past
their talks with the 5+1 countries in Turkey on the common concerns based on
collective commitments according to the common points of their proposals.

10) Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran’s commitment to the NPT and its constructive role in pursuing the realization of nuclear rights of its member states. The Islamic Republic
of Iran likewise appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly countries Turkey
and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for realization of Iran’s nuclear
rights.

Posted in: Front and Center, Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

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