Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation and the chief negotiator of the New START agreement, spoke to the press at the United Nations on Tuesday after a briefing with the Russian Ministry of Fore…
Iran and North Korea – Growing Connections
News has surfaced that Iran has invited Kim Jong-Il to Tehran in order to ‘to further economic ties’. The invitation comes amid a flurry of recent diplomatic contact between the two states. Two weeks ago, an Iranian delegation led by Vice-Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi met with Kim Yong Nam, de facto head of the North Korean state, to hold talks regarding ‘bilateral political, economic and cultural relations’ and ‘international and regional issues’. Last week Iran’s ‘Press TV’ subsequently reported that Kim Yong Nam will visit Iran this summer to launch a ‘scientific and cultural exchange program’ between the two countries.
Even if suggestions that Kim Jong-Il has an aversion to flight are true (thus rendering the idea of him visiting Tehran unfeasible), that the invitation was sent is in and of itself significant. Indeed, it marks the greatest diplomatic contact between the two countries since their recognition of one another diplomatically in 1979. Given their shared history of missile collaboration, however, these closer ties raise some disconcerting questions…
Regarding economic relations, Iran’s Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh said in 2007, that ‘Both nations can cooperate in the fields of exploration, production and other fields of the energy sector’. It is well known that Pyongyang has had difficulties obtaining crude oil for many years, and that Tehran lacks enough refined petroleum to meet domestic demand. As such, Hammeneh summarized his Iranian-Korean proposal as ‘North Korea [getting] oil from Iran and [providing] Iran with a surplus of its own refined petrol’. However, a closer look reveals that this concept doesn’t quite add up.
According to research released by Choi Su Young just three months after Hamaneh’s statement, North Korea was at the time importing its ‘entire amount of petroleum for transportation and production’. The CIA World Factbook 2010 states today that this situation remains unchanged, with North Korea only importing – not exporting – petroleum. Indeed, so reliant has the DPRK’s been on importing petroleum that it remains highly unlikely that Pyongyang has ever had a surplus of petroleum to export. Thus, the notion that North Korea might import extra heavy oil from Iran to refine it into petroleum for export back to the Iranian market seems far fetched, especially due to the extreme distances and costs involved. So if North Korea is getting oil from Iran, what might Pyongyang be getting in return?
Well, history shows that in the 1980s and early 1990s Iran got arms in return. Early in its war with Iraq, Tehran bartered with North Korea to obtain conventional Soviet technology in exchange for crude oil. Similarly, Iran used its oil in 1993 to invest in the research and development of North Korea’s new No-Dong missile, which helped greatly in the establishment of an indigenous Iranian missile production infrastructure.
Recent reports suggest that Iran may be continuing to purchase arms from North Korea – although with what intensity is unclear. An article from 2007 stated that Iran may have received four mini submarines from North Korea. In August 2009, the UAE intercepted a ship carrying DPRK-manufactured munitions bound for Iran. And just days ago, Shimon Peres stated that North Korean entities were continuing to supply weapons to both Iran and its affiliates, although admittedly without any evidence.
Whether Iran is still purchasing missile technology from the DPRK today seems less likely, due to the more advanced state of the Iranian missile / space program. That said, there does appear to still be some evidence detailing scientific cooperation in this area, with Iranian nationals allegedly dispatched to North Korea to assist in last April’s attempted satellite launch. The Department of Defense’s April 2010 report on Iran’s military power states that “In developing and expanding its missile program, Iran has received assistance from North Korea and China,” but it does not elaborate on what form this assistance has taken or when it occurred.
In the nuclear domain it is interesting to note the sympathetic regard Iran and North Korea have for each other’s respective programs. Following North Korea’s 2006 test Iran targeted the totality of its criticism at the U.S (for provoking it). Likewise, following Pyongyang’s 2009 test, Tehran simply denied that it had been involved – it did not criticize North Korea. For its part, North Korea’s ambassador to Tehran, Kim Chon Ryong, reportedly has expressed North Korea’s support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. How far cooperation in the nuclear domain goes or will go beyond this mutual deference is unclear.
Overall, it is evident that Iran and North Korea are forging closer and closer ties – a worrisome development. And further sanctions would likely ensure that these ties continue to flourish.
Iran to Hold Major Gathering This Spring
No joke – This spring, Iran will hold an international conference on… wait for it: Nuclear Disarmament.
The conference, dubbed “Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapon [sic] for None,” will be held in Tehran on April 17 and 18.
Foreign ministers, representatives and nuclear experts from 60 countries have been invited to attend the event where “participants are slated to assess the causes and reasons underlying the lack of heed and attention to the implementation of nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regulations.”
Do you think this might mean some serious contemplation by Iran of its numerous violations?
So grab your tickets today! The conference even includes a field trip. Perhaps on their way to Isfahan attendees will take the advice of Nathan Hodge and stop off at Natanz, maybe even Qom… could be a great trip!
IAEA Reports Multiple "Concerns" in Iran
The IAEA released its latest Safeguards Report on Iran’s nuclear program today, following up a shorter statement released last week. The report confirms that Iran has begun to enrich uranium at a level of 20 percent at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.
On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg of low enriched UF6 from [its Fuel Enrichment Plant] to the PFEP feed station. The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results which indicate that enrichment levels of up to 19.8% U-235 were obtained at PFEP between 9 and 11 February 2010.
To explain why it is much faster and easier for Iran to go from 20 percent to 90 percent enriched uranium, which would be required to produce a bomb, than from 5 percent to 20 percent, I defer to a true Arms Control Wonk.
Essentially, though, Iran has moved nearly its entire stock of LEU to PFEP, where a single cascade is currently producing 20 percent enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). “‘This is way more than the TRR needs and raises concerns about why Iran would be planning to convert so much’ of its low enriched uranium stockpile to higher enriched uranium,” says Jacqueline Shire of ISIS to Laura Rozen at POLITICO.
Further, the report notes that:
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
Before centrifuge technology for enriching uranium became available, the plutonium route using heavy-water reactors was the common choice for aspiring nuclear weapons states. India’s Cirrus reactor, Pakistan’s Khushab reactor, and Israel’s Dimona reactor are all large, heavy-water reactors. Since Iran’s civil nuclear power program is based on light-water technology, the use of a heavy-water production facility and a heavy-water “research” reactor have caused many experts to take note.
Iran has ignored multiple IAEA requests to cease its heavy-water program at Arak and previously refused an offer by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to replace its 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor with a light-water research reactor.
In response to the implications of these combined current activities, the IAEA has stated its “concerns” for the first time:
The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
This change may have been partially influenced by the leadership of Yukiya Amano, who became IAEA head in December, since the report appears to be more directly critical of Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA than most issued under his predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei.
Ahmadinejad Declares Iran a Nuclear State on Anniversary of Islamic Revolution
Less than a week after declaring to the international community that Iran was increasing its uranium enrichment from 3.5 to 20 percent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that the efforts were successful and that Iran should be considered among the nuclear countries of the world.
Making his declaration at an event in Azadi Square in Tehran to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad insisted that the uranium enriched to 20% was for peaceful purposes. “The Iranian nation is brave enough that if one day we wanted to build nuclear bombs, we would announce it publicly without being afraid of you,” he told the crowd assembled for the observation of the anniversary.
Uranium enriched to 20% U235 is considered highly enriched uranium that could be further enriched with relative ease to make a nuclear weapon. Iran claims that the enriched uranium will be used in a research reactor to produce medical isotopes. Tehran backed away from an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium outside the country, raising concerns that Iran’s intentions may not be as benign as it is making them out to be…
There is consensus among nuclear experts that, while Iran does have the capacity to enrich uranium to 20%, the amount that could have been produced by the time of Ahmadinejad’s announcement is negligible. The International Atomic Energy Commission suggested that Iran’s increased enrichment efforts are only modest to this point, though David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security suggested that at the rate Iran plans to produce 20%-HEU, it may have enough HEU in three years to further enrich enough material for one nuclear weapon.
The announcement of Iran’s intention to increase the level of uranium enrichment, and the later claims of success, was met with an announcement by the United States Treasury Department of further “smart sanctions” against a handful of Iranian construction companies affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard allegedly involved in weapons production and trade.
There is also talk of a fourth round of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Russia — which has historically been less enthusiastic about sanctions than the United States, the United Kingdom, and France — has indicated that they might support further sanctions. The international community seems increasingly dubious of Iran’s denial of intent to develop a nuclear bomb. However, China remains reluctant to impose new sanctions and may thwart attempts by the UN Security Council to tighten the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.
In light of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s sudden announcement of scaling up mere days before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, one cannot help but wonder if Ahmadinejad’s triumphant proclamation was an attempt to flex muscle to an increasingly vocal and active opposition and an international community sympathetic to the anti-government activists and increasingly distrustful of the aims of Iran’s nuclear program.
All steps adopted by the United States and the international community should be careful to avoid undermining the pro-democracy opposition movement in Iran. The international community should continue strong and active diplomatic engagement with Iran, and impose sanctions only so long as they are targeted and designed to minimize the burden on the civilian population. Calls for aggression and military intervention should be turned aside; the consequences of such escalation on both the stability and security of the region and on the civilian population would be catastrophic.
At the same time, the international community must continue to implore Iran to be more transparent with the IAEA about its intentions and grant it greater access to suspected nuclear-related information and facilities. Iran should know that its plans to increase enrichment will only increase concerns over its nuclear program, especially since it rejected an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium in France and Russia.
Patience, careful monitoring and involvement by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and persistent diplomatic engagement by Western powers will not guarantee success but is the only sensible option to try to block Iran’s nuclear weapons plans.
