In the eyes of some conservative media commentators, questioning whether Iran is bent on building nuclear weapons is tantamount to believing the moon landing never happened. But being skeptical of the prevailing Iran narrative isn’t just for loony conspiracy theorists – it’s the official assessment of the highest intelligence official in the United States.

Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 12, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper reiterated the view of the intelligence community about Iran’s nuclear development: “[w]e do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” (Clapper also stated that if Iran did make that key decision,” Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons-grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.”). More specifically, he noted “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.” Contrary to some media reports that suggest  a nuclear-armed Iran is inevitable, Iranian nuclear weapons are not a foregone conclusion.

To be clear: Clapper did not minimize the serious risks associated with Iran’s current strategic plans. He expressed concern about Iran’s ballistic missile program, whose progress has been a subject of extensive debate in recent years. Clapper said that Iran was “expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal,” and alluded to Iran’s interest in potentially developing ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). However, he offered no specific timeline for when Iran might be able to develop an ICBM (last year, the Department of Defense predicted that Iran would not be able to flight-test an ICBM until at least 2015).

On balance, Clapper’s remarks suggested that Iranian ballistic missile development was farther along than public information suggests, prompting some questions from analysts about the disparity. (For more on this matter, see Greg Thielmann’s assessment here).

If anything, the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s missile development underscores the importance of using all available time and political space to influence Iran’s future course. Clapper insists that this can be done, maintaining that “Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.”

There has been skepticism in some corners about the extent of this international influence, given that the nuclear impasse has yet to be resolved. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) asked DNI Clapper if he agreed with the sentiment of Gen. James Mattis, head of US Central Command, who recently voiced a belief that the sanctions were not working.

“Not completely,” Clapper answered. He went on to explain that the sanctions “are having a huge impact on Iran” and that his agency sees “indications” of a shifting decision-making calculus, although it was true that “thus far the sanctions have not induced a change in Iranian government policy.” Sen. Collins concluded her questioning by maintaining, “The fact that they [sanctions] haven’t produced a change suggests that Gen. Mattis is correct in saying they’re not working.”

But this is the wrong standard by which to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions. Sanctions are, as Clapper noted in his testimony, having a severe impact on Iran’s economy, but the only way we’ll know if they worked is if they are able to serve as leverage in the negotiation process (there is indication that the international community is now offering sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for limits on its uranium enrichment).

It’s important for policymakers not to view sanctions in a vacuum, but rather as part of a broader, multifaceted strategy aimed at breaking a dangerous stalemate. Otherwise, they risk losing sight of the need for flexibility later on, which will undoubtedly be needed to make sanctions an effective international policy tool.

All in all, this assessment by the top US intelligence official highlights the importance of being realistic about the status of Iran’s nuclear program. It should go without saying that US policy options should be determined by facts on the ground. The facts suggest the worst-case scenario is not imminent, and there’s time to find a workable compromise with Iran that forestalls a much more dangerous outcome.  

On Sunday night, Jack Nicholson and First Lady, Michelle Obama, announced that Ben Affleck’s acclaimed film Argo about the rescue of six American diplomats during the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis had won the 2012 Oscar for “best picture.”

The next day, retired diplomats and former hostages in Iran in 1979, Ambassador Bruce Laingen and Ambassador John Limbert called for renewed diplomacy with Iran to heal old wounds and open up channels of dialogue on shared interests with the goal of preventing war and a nuclear-armed Iran.

Ambassador Laingen was the U.S. Chief of Mission to Tehran when the embassy was overrun and he was taken hostage for 444 days (November 4, 1979 – January 20, 1981)  In his comments, Amb. Laingen remembered his words to the senior Iranian hostage taker at Mehrabad airport: “I look forward to the day when your country and mine can again have a normal, diplomatic relationship.” Those are the last words spoken by an American diplomat to an Iranian official in Iran for more than 32 years.

He told Beth Parker of FOX 5 that he hopes Argo will help bring people together to supporting opening dialogue with Iran.  “The more we are encouraged to talk about it because of this film, the better. It highlights the important role that I dedicated my life to — diplomacy, interaction between people to further our respective interests.”

Amb. Laingen was joined by Ambassador John Limbert who was serving as political officer when he was taken hostage in 1979.  Amb. Limbert told Parker that the experience renewed his commitment to diplomacy. “I became probably much more committed to the profession of foreign service and diplomacy because we were a living example of what happens when that system breaks down. The alternative — I can tell you from the inside — is not pretty.”

Amb. Limbert continued his career in the foreign service after his ordeal in Tehran including as US Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran under President Barack Obama.

Having most recently served as the senior adviser to Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton on Iran, Amb. Limbert’s insight on Washington’s impasse with Tehran provides a unique context for the Administration’s position.  He told Suzanne Kennedy of WJLA, “I hope and pray that time will let us begin a dialogue with each other. I feel strongly about that.”

Amb. Limbert provided an alternative plan to dealing with Iran, suggesting that America find consensus on shared interests before moving forward on addressing the nuclear issue.  He said, “If the nuclear issue may be just too politically difficult, then sustained negotiations on other issues – still starting small – will be the most effective way to start the countries on a new path of diplomatic engagement after three futile decades of trading insults, threats, and empty slogans.”

Brig. General John Johns had intended to join the ambassadors to highlight the lack of a military option to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran but was unable to attend. He did release a statement which stated: “Let me make this clear: There is no military solution to Iran’s nuclear program. If the U.S. were to conduct a strike campaign, it would not be a one-time show and would take several weeks. Likely, the strike would only set the program back a few years but greatly risk American and Israeli security.”

In regards to the P5+1 talks that are occurring in Amity, Kazakhstan this week, Limbert said there would be an 8th party in addition to the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council (US, Russia, France, UK and China,) Germany and Iran. That 8th party would be the ghosts of 1979.  These ghosts, he claimed, have derailed previous efforts to renew diplomacy with Tehran.

Amb. Laingen shared the sentiment saying, “Tearing down the wall of mistrust will not be easy, but brick by brick, every step toward that goal advances the national security interests of the U.S. and Israel and other allies in the region, which are threatened by the specter of another war in the powder keg of the Middle East.”