This post originally appeared on the Truman Project’s Doctrine blog on April 8, 2013.

Two days of negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan have left negotiations between the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran in a stalemate.  After a previous round in Almaty gave some observers [see my earlier analysis on the Fletcher Forum here] reason to be optimistic, the negotiators have returned from this second round with little progress and no agreement to meet again.

There is reason to believe, however, that the chances for a diplomatic solution may soon rise.  The key will lie in the crucial next steps taken not only by the P5+1, but also between the U.S. and Iran.

Following the latest round of negotiations in Almaty, a senior U.S. official, speaking not for attribution, told journalists that the talks, “were indeed quite substantive,” and noted that the discussion was, “more natural and free-flowing than past talks.”  But while the substance of the meeting was more comprehensive, even including a “30-45 minute” back and forth between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman and Iran’s lead negotiator, Saeed Jalili, reports indicate that the two sides remain far apart in their positions.

Despite this, the detailed level of this round of negotiations highlights each side’s willingness to search for points of agreement.  Secretary of State Kerry noted in response to the meeting’s outcome that, “It is important to continue to talk and to try and find common ground.” He said, “We remain open and hopeful that a diplomatic solution can be found.”

Iran’s position has remained largely the same, requiring an acknowledgement of the country’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, along with sanctions relief, in exchange for ceasing the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent.  The P5+1 has softened from its original offer and agreed to include some sanctions relief on gold and airplane parts, but so far the offer is not sufficient for Iran.

Just as the U.S. will have to deal with its own political pressures at home, Iran will need to be able to sell any eventual agreement to its people, who have become victims of the current sanctions regime.  At this point, difficulties buying medicine and the rising cost of food continue to trump the desire for gold, however much it may help to boost the Iranian economy.  Iran’s chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, pointed out that “Confidence building is a two-way street.”

Unfortunately, Iran’s unwillingness to budge could be interpreted as a disinclination to negotiate at all, which could derail future of talks.  Feeling that they have not seen sufficient movement in negotiations, the P5+1 has yet to respond to an Iranian request to schedule another meeting.  There is a real risk in suspending negotiations entirely, particularly at this point, when the window for diplomatic negotiations is smaller than ever.  Ultimately though, Iran will not be able to move forward with a deal until after the country’s elections in June.  After this time, Iran will have a new President.  It may also have a political opportunity to revise some of its policy positions.

In the months following Iran’s elections, bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Iran could have a real impact.  Each side has acknowledged its willingness to sit down for such negotiations, given that the U.S. and Iran have the most to discuss, but the two sides have stopped short of talking one-on-one.  The closest they have come is the direct discussion that took place last weekend.

Most experts agree that the only way to move forward is through bilateral negotiations.  Iran’s elections could provide the perfect opportunity for each side to play to their respective audiences while presenting a deal, the parameters of which have been clear for some time.

The key is in the two sides’ willingness to tip toe to the bilateral sit-down they’ve danced around for so long.

In the eyes of some conservative media commentators, questioning whether Iran is bent on building nuclear weapons is tantamount to believing the moon landing never happened. But being skeptical of the prevailing Iran narrative isn’t just for loony conspiracy theorists – it’s the official assessment of the highest intelligence official in the United States.

Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 12, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper reiterated the view of the intelligence community about Iran’s nuclear development: “[w]e do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” (Clapper also stated that if Iran did make that key decision,” Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons-grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.”). More specifically, he noted “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.” Contrary to some media reports that suggest  a nuclear-armed Iran is inevitable, Iranian nuclear weapons are not a foregone conclusion.

To be clear: Clapper did not minimize the serious risks associated with Iran’s current strategic plans. He expressed concern about Iran’s ballistic missile program, whose progress has been a subject of extensive debate in recent years. Clapper said that Iran was “expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal,” and alluded to Iran’s interest in potentially developing ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). However, he offered no specific timeline for when Iran might be able to develop an ICBM (last year, the Department of Defense predicted that Iran would not be able to flight-test an ICBM until at least 2015).

On balance, Clapper’s remarks suggested that Iranian ballistic missile development was farther along than public information suggests, prompting some questions from analysts about the disparity. (For more on this matter, see Greg Thielmann’s assessment here).

If anything, the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s missile development underscores the importance of using all available time and political space to influence Iran’s future course. Clapper insists that this can be done, maintaining that “Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.”

There has been skepticism in some corners about the extent of this international influence, given that the nuclear impasse has yet to be resolved. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) asked DNI Clapper if he agreed with the sentiment of Gen. James Mattis, head of US Central Command, who recently voiced a belief that the sanctions were not working.

“Not completely,” Clapper answered. He went on to explain that the sanctions “are having a huge impact on Iran” and that his agency sees “indications” of a shifting decision-making calculus, although it was true that “thus far the sanctions have not induced a change in Iranian government policy.” Sen. Collins concluded her questioning by maintaining, “The fact that they [sanctions] haven’t produced a change suggests that Gen. Mattis is correct in saying they’re not working.”

But this is the wrong standard by which to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions. Sanctions are, as Clapper noted in his testimony, having a severe impact on Iran’s economy, but the only way we’ll know if they worked is if they are able to serve as leverage in the negotiation process (there is indication that the international community is now offering sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for limits on its uranium enrichment).

It’s important for policymakers not to view sanctions in a vacuum, but rather as part of a broader, multifaceted strategy aimed at breaking a dangerous stalemate. Otherwise, they risk losing sight of the need for flexibility later on, which will undoubtedly be needed to make sanctions an effective international policy tool.

All in all, this assessment by the top US intelligence official highlights the importance of being realistic about the status of Iran’s nuclear program. It should go without saying that US policy options should be determined by facts on the ground. The facts suggest the worst-case scenario is not imminent, and there’s time to find a workable compromise with Iran that forestalls a much more dangerous outcome.