By Chad O’Carroll Efforts to place unique pressure on Israel over its presumed nuclear arsenal could scuttle plans for the scheduled 2012 Conference on establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction, President Barack Obama said earlier this month. In summarizing Obama’s comments, the White House suggested that “the Conference will only […]
P5+1 Reach Agreement on Iran Sanctions Draft
Secretary of State Clinton announced in her remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START that the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia) and Germany have agreed to …
Iran Agrees to TRR Deal… Again
Good news – and, one way or another, I do think this is good news – this morning from Tehran.
Following on talks between Turkish, Brazilian and Iranian leaders over the weekend, Iran has agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a deal that, according to AP, “could ease the international standoff over the country’s disputed atomic program and deflate a US-led push for tougher sanctions.”
“According to the trilateral deal, Iran will deliver 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu during a press conference on the sidelines of the 14th G-15 Summit in Tehran today. In return, Iran will receive 120 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium fuel rods for use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment.
While the mainstream media may be getting ahead of themselves a bit, this move is good in many ways. Tensions over Iran’s nuclear program have continued to rise since the announcement of a second, secret, Iranian uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom almost a year ago. Congress is chomping at the bit for new sanctions and even the use of force.
Without a doubt, skeptics will immediately point out Iran’s long history of cooperation up to the very precipice of a deal, with no eventual follow-through. It may not matter much whether the deal makes it to a close, however. In the end, it provides for one undeniably positive benefit: time.
In the time it has taken to negotiate this deal, Iran has doubled its stockpile of LEU. The original purpose, which hoped to delay any Iranian “breakout” capability by at least a year, is effectively dead – so in the end, even “success” will make little difference.
Politically, however, the deal provides a treasury of stalling techniques to the administration, which will likely want to employ as many as possible.
What remains true is that the situation in Iran needs more time…
When this deal was proposed, Iran remained submerged within an interior struggle over human rights. While the struggle remains, it has cooled. Iran’s leaders may now have the ability to turn their attention more fully to the nuclear issue.
If this is too optimistic a scenario, more time may also provide the administration with what it needs to secure strong multilateral sanctions – the kind that won’t benefit the Iranian Regime.
Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said that the IAEA should expect to receive a letter with regards to the swap deal “within a week.”
The swap will have to wait for official approval from the Vienna Group, which consists of representatives from France, Russia and the US and the IAEA, but will begin nearly a month after it is given.
The details of the deal are still unclear and agreement from the Vienna Group is far from certain. Since another country will need to provide 1200 kg of LEU for the swap, this will not be just a trilateral deal – others must be convinced to cooperate.
Where the US is concerned, Jeffrey points out in a great post on Arms Control Wonk why the administration won’t want to be perceived as at fault if this one falls through. In this way, I would argue that at least tacit US participation is likely.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns are due to discuss Iran at a meeting today with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov.
For now, the text of the agreement is below:
JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL
(17 May 2010)
Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on the following Declaration:
1) We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
2) We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation.
3) We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction.
4) Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran’s rights and obligations under the NPT.
5) Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200 kg LEU in Turkey. While in Turkey this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA may station observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey.
6) Iran will notify the IAEA in writing through official channels of its agreement with the above within seven days following the date of this declaration. Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA) further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna Group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 kg of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).
7) When the Vienna Group declares its commitment to this provision, then both parties would commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement mentioned in item 6. Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1200 kg) within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year.
8) In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.
9) We welcome the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue as in the past
their talks with the 5+1 countries in Turkey on the common concerns based on
collective commitments according to the common points of their proposals.
10) Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran’s commitment to the NPT and its constructive role in pursuing the realization of nuclear rights of its member states. The Islamic Republic
of Iran likewise appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly countries Turkey
and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for realization of Iran’s nuclear
rights.
Gottemoeller: New START affects Iran
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation and the chief negotiator of the New START agreement, spoke to the press at the United Nations on Tuesday after a briefing with the Russian Ministry of Fore…
Iran and North Korea – Growing Connections
News has surfaced that Iran has invited Kim Jong-Il to Tehran in order to ‘to further economic ties’. The invitation comes amid a flurry of recent diplomatic contact between the two states. Two weeks ago, an Iranian delegation led by Vice-Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi met with Kim Yong Nam, de facto head of the North Korean state, to hold talks regarding ‘bilateral political, economic and cultural relations’ and ‘international and regional issues’. Last week Iran’s ‘Press TV’ subsequently reported that Kim Yong Nam will visit Iran this summer to launch a ‘scientific and cultural exchange program’ between the two countries.
Even if suggestions that Kim Jong-Il has an aversion to flight are true (thus rendering the idea of him visiting Tehran unfeasible), that the invitation was sent is in and of itself significant. Indeed, it marks the greatest diplomatic contact between the two countries since their recognition of one another diplomatically in 1979. Given their shared history of missile collaboration, however, these closer ties raise some disconcerting questions…
Regarding economic relations, Iran’s Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh said in 2007, that ‘Both nations can cooperate in the fields of exploration, production and other fields of the energy sector’. It is well known that Pyongyang has had difficulties obtaining crude oil for many years, and that Tehran lacks enough refined petroleum to meet domestic demand. As such, Hammeneh summarized his Iranian-Korean proposal as ‘North Korea [getting] oil from Iran and [providing] Iran with a surplus of its own refined petrol’. However, a closer look reveals that this concept doesn’t quite add up.
According to research released by Choi Su Young just three months after Hamaneh’s statement, North Korea was at the time importing its ‘entire amount of petroleum for transportation and production’. The CIA World Factbook 2010 states today that this situation remains unchanged, with North Korea only importing – not exporting – petroleum. Indeed, so reliant has the DPRK’s been on importing petroleum that it remains highly unlikely that Pyongyang has ever had a surplus of petroleum to export. Thus, the notion that North Korea might import extra heavy oil from Iran to refine it into petroleum for export back to the Iranian market seems far fetched, especially due to the extreme distances and costs involved. So if North Korea is getting oil from Iran, what might Pyongyang be getting in return?
Well, history shows that in the 1980s and early 1990s Iran got arms in return. Early in its war with Iraq, Tehran bartered with North Korea to obtain conventional Soviet technology in exchange for crude oil. Similarly, Iran used its oil in 1993 to invest in the research and development of North Korea’s new No-Dong missile, which helped greatly in the establishment of an indigenous Iranian missile production infrastructure.
Recent reports suggest that Iran may be continuing to purchase arms from North Korea – although with what intensity is unclear. An article from 2007 stated that Iran may have received four mini submarines from North Korea. In August 2009, the UAE intercepted a ship carrying DPRK-manufactured munitions bound for Iran. And just days ago, Shimon Peres stated that North Korean entities were continuing to supply weapons to both Iran and its affiliates, although admittedly without any evidence.
Whether Iran is still purchasing missile technology from the DPRK today seems less likely, due to the more advanced state of the Iranian missile / space program. That said, there does appear to still be some evidence detailing scientific cooperation in this area, with Iranian nationals allegedly dispatched to North Korea to assist in last April’s attempted satellite launch. The Department of Defense’s April 2010 report on Iran’s military power states that “In developing and expanding its missile program, Iran has received assistance from North Korea and China,” but it does not elaborate on what form this assistance has taken or when it occurred.
In the nuclear domain it is interesting to note the sympathetic regard Iran and North Korea have for each other’s respective programs. Following North Korea’s 2006 test Iran targeted the totality of its criticism at the U.S (for provoking it). Likewise, following Pyongyang’s 2009 test, Tehran simply denied that it had been involved – it did not criticize North Korea. For its part, North Korea’s ambassador to Tehran, Kim Chon Ryong, reportedly has expressed North Korea’s support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. How far cooperation in the nuclear domain goes or will go beyond this mutual deference is unclear.
Overall, it is evident that Iran and North Korea are forging closer and closer ties – a worrisome development. And further sanctions would likely ensure that these ties continue to flourish.