Iranian nuclear activity has not significantly grown in the three months since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took office according to a report released yesterday to the UN Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

Expansion of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity has virtually come to a halt.
•    Only four new first-generation IR-1 model centrifuges, devices used to enrich uranium, were installed at Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz since August. By comparison, 1,861 centrifuges had been installed in the three months previous to Rouhani’s election. While this expansion brings the total number of IR-1 centrifuges to 15,240, many of the centrifuges are not operating.
•    No advanced IR-2M model centrifuges were installed over this same period. None of the existing 1,008 IR-2Ms are currently in operation.
•    Iran’s previous installation of IR-2M centrifuges were of particular concern to the international community due to the fact that they enrich uranium at a much faster rate than first-generation IR-1 centrifuges. As such, they could potentially shorten the amount of time required for the construction of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Increases in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has been marginal.
•    Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium rose by 5 percent from 185.8 kilograms to 196 kilograms between August and November.
•    410 kilograms of 20 percent uranium has been enriched in total. Nearly half of this enriched uranium has been converted into metal. The converted metal produced is far more difficult to purify than the original uranium.
•    250 kilograms of 20 percent uranium is the approximate amount required to build a nuclear bomb, and forms Israel’s “red line” for taking military action against the Islamic Republic.
•    Iran’s stockpile of 5 percent enriched uranium rose by 6.3 percent from 9,704 kilograms to 10,357 kilograms.

Construction at Iran’s main heavy water reactor at Arak, a facility that could produce spent fuel that with additional reprocessing could provide Iran a plutonium pathway to the bomb, has “more or less frozen”.
•    The IR-40 heavy water facility at Arak has been a major concern to many Western observers due to the plants ability to produce spent fuel that could be further processed to make weapons-grade plutonium. If produced, this plutonium could provide an alternative to Iran’s enriched uranium in the construction of a nuclear weapon.
•    The report states that “no major components … had been installed” at the facility since August.

The IAEA findings, released only a week before the P5+1 (Russia, China, France, the UK, the US and Germany) are set to resume talks with Iran in Geneva, will likely provide a boost for ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Since coming to office, President Rouhani has attempted to present himself as a moderate willing to negotiate a diplomatic solution with the P5+1 over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The report’s findings will likely strengthen his credibility in next week’s talks by providing hard evidence of Iran’s willingness to draw down its nuclear activity in line with P5+1 demands.

Furthermore, the findings could dampen some specific P5+1 concerns that caused the last round of talks, held in early November, to fail to produce a deal.  According to reports, France was deeply concerned about ongoing construction at the Arak heavy water reactor. While the halting of construction may not fully alleviate this concern, it could ease French fears enough to allow for a phase one deal to be made.

Unfortunately, staunch critics of Iran and efforts to diplomatically engage the country may remain unfazed by the IAEA findings.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a group of journalists that he was “unimpressed” with the report on the grounds that Iran could still produce the necessary fissile material to build a nuclear weapon with existing capacities. Count on a number of Iran hawks within Congress to make similar comments in the next week as they attempt to pass a new round of sanctions on Iran.

Critics aside, the report’s findings are a positive development going forward and provide good grounds to be optimistic about the chances for a more successful round of talks next week in Geneva.

This week, talks between Iran and the P5+1 regarding Iran’s nuclear program will resume. All eyes are on Geneva, given that the first series of talks was reportedly the most productive and positive that the two sides have had in quite some time.

To help us better understand why the last round of Geneva talks was significant, I’ve written a piece in The National Interest analyzing that negotiation. I focus on the ways in which these talks represented a welcome improvement over the past decade of negotiations with Iran, which have too often been characterized by unrealistic demands, an unwillingness to focus on the most important issues, and an inability to link interim progress with long-term goals.

Here’s an excerpt:

“Finally, a crucial, if subtle, shift in the two sides’ approaches has been a greater willingness to look at the ultimate goals of the talks—what commentators like to call the ‘endgame’—and to work backwards from there to determine interim steps. To an outside observer, this may seem like an obvious way to negotiate, but as Trita Parsi pointed out, the West in particular has studiously avoided discussions of the ‘endgame’ in an effort to maintain the upper hand in past negotiations. Now, that could be about to change.”

Have a look at the full piece, here.

It has been a busy and interesting several weeks since President Obama’s United Nations General Assembly speech on September 24. Here’s a breakdown of the events that have taken place since and a look at what a plausible and mutually beneficial endgame we might expect to see.

•    On September 26, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. Kerry emerged from the meeting pleased but did not shy away from the many challenges ahead.

•    The next day, Iranian Ambassador Reza Najafi and his team of negotiators met with International Atomic Energy Agency officials led by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts. Details were scarce, but Nackaerts did say that the talks were “very constructive.”

•    Later that day, President Rouhani made history by breaking the 34 year silence between Iranian and U.S. heads of state when he spoke with President Obama by phone. Afterward, President Obama suggested that deeper ties might be possible if the two sides are able to come to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.

•    On September 30, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Obama at the White House where he advocated for the strengthening of sanctions if Iran continues its enrichment program.

•    The following day, Netanyahu gave his UN General Assembly speech. He criticized Iran and President Rouhani saying, among other things, “Rouhani thinks he can have his yellowcake and eat it too.”

•    On October 2, the Iranian parliament, including many members loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, announced their support for Rouhani’s diplomatic approach.

•    That same day, EU leaders hinted that they may drop abandonment of enrichment from their negotiating demands in Geneva.

•    On October 6, Iran called on the West to put a new negotiating offer on the table. Secretary of State Kerry responded the following day by saying Iran must first address the U.S. offer put forth in February which includes ceasing enrichment of uranium to 20% and handing over some current uranium stockpiles to Western powers.

•    On the October 6, Pres. Obama quoted U.S. Intelligence estimates that it would take Iran about a year to make a nuclear weapon if it so desired.

•    On October 9, Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani reported in an Associated Press interview that Iran might be willing to hand over some of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile. Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi said on the October 13, however, that Iran is not willing to ship its uranium surplus abroad.

•    On October 10, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) began drafting a bill that would give the President the authority to go to war with Iran if negotiations fail. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) announced that he would allow some time for negotiations to take place but will only be able to wait until the end of October before going ahead with a sanctions bill targeting Iranian oil sales. Several Senate Democrats both on and off the Banking Committee have also voiced opposition to the easing of sanctions.

•    On October 12 it was announced that Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman would lead the U.S. delegation accompanied by Adam Szubin, the U.S. government’s foremost expert on sanctions.

•    P5+1 talks took place on October 15 and 16. You can see a full rundown here. The talks were encouraging and the parties agreed to meet again on November 7 and 8.

•    In the meantime, on October 28, Iran will meet with International Atomic Energy Agency negotiators to discuss possible inspections of nuclear facilities.

Short and long term goals
The confidentiality of the Geneva talks has caused rumors to swirl about Iran’s possible offer; an Iranian source has come forward saying that Iran is willing to convert its 20% enriched uranium to fuel rods while also relinquishing plutonium-laced spent fuel from the still under construction Arak heavy water facility. While this would certainly be good news if true, no offer has yet been made public by any of the parties involved, and it is important to note that Iran’s real offer may not resemble the rumored offer.

A short term goal of negotiations should be to outline early confidence building measures and agreement on the contours of a broader, longer-term agreement. Such an agreement would likely need to include limitations on enrichment levels to no more than 5%, the dismantling of Fordow (or at the least a very tight inspection schedule), limitations on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of enrichment centrifuges commensurate with its realistic civilian nuclear power needs, and submission to full inspections (scheduled and unannounced) from the International Atomic Energy Agency. In return Iran will expect significant sanctions relief.

These concessions combined with early confidence building steps such as the relinquishment or conversion of all 20% enriched uranium while the negotiation process on a long-term agreement is ongoing  could go a long way toward demonstrating that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for peaceful purposes, as the country suggests. These concessions would also, hopefully, reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran and might allow for improved relations. Even if a deal is reached, however, it would remain imperative to continue inspections to ensure that Iran does not attempt to acquire breakout capability after sanctions are lifted.