Lessons from South Africa: A New Strategy for Iran’s Nuclear Threat

Iran is closer than ever to acquiring nuclear weapons. The risks to the international community are obvious—an arms race with the Gulf monarchies or theft by terrorists, to name just two—but so are the costs to Iran itself, which is already crippled by economic sanctions that have contributed to domestic unrest. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal, provided an offramp until implementation concerns prompted unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2018, but the Islamic Republic’s leaders have proved resistant to reviving it. Bringing Iran back to the bargaining table, as the Biden administration sought, requires understanding why Iran clings to its nuclear ambitions despite the domestic costs. In doing so, policymakers can learn from a surprisingly similar case: apartheid South Africa, the only nation to give up its nuclear weapons.

Iran has two main reasons not to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The first is its sense of strategic vulnerability. Iran’s long-standing shadow war with nuclear-armed Israel, which this year escalated to an exchange of missiles and drones, has earned Iran a powerful enemy. Meanwhile, traditional Iranian allies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have been steadily weakened or collapsed altogether. Decades of American troop presence in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan have stoked fears of encirclement as well. Only nuclear weapons, the Iranian leadership seems to believe, can guarantee their country’s security.

The second reason that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions is its skepticism that nonproliferation will end its global isolation. Iran is not a pariah only because of its nuclear weapons program; oppression of women, minorities, and political opponents has done at least as much to turn the world against the Islamic Republic. So has Iranian support for the so-called “Axis of Resistance” and its destabilizing activities across the Middle East. As it stands, the international community is unlikely to relieve Iran from the full pressure of sanctions unless nonproliferation is paired with domestic reforms and abandonment of the Axis of Resistance, both of which are unpalatable to the current regime. Since renouncing nuclear weapons but not oppression at home or violence abroad would seemingly bring few benefits, Iran has little reason to do so.

Iran’s insecurity and isolation are not historically unique, and they do not make a nuclear-armed Iran inevitable. Apartheid South Africa developed and, by 1993, destroyed six nuclear weapons it had built despite harsh sanctions. It was as strategically insecure as modern-day Iran, surrounded by black majority-ruled states supported by the Soviet Union and at war in neighboring Angola. Against these threats—including that Soviet nukes could be deployed in Africa—nuclear weapons seemed the only way to guarantee the survival of white rule. That South Africa’s economic isolation was more a consequence of apartheid than its nuclear program further discouraged cooperation. For Iran, it is Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and the United States that fill the role of South Africa’s majority-ruled neighbors and their nuclear-armed patron, while oppression of women and political dissidents has made Iran a pariah just as apartheid did in South Africa. Despite vast cultural, economic, and political differences, the strategic environment of apartheid South Africa was remarkably similar to that of modern-day Iran.

South Africa, however, did renounce nuclear weapons. An internationally-sponsored peace deal to end the war in Angola, the commitment of all of South Africa’s neighbors to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced South Africa’s threat perceptions such that nuclear weapons became pointless. Equally important was the collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s, which left nuclear weapons the only obstacle to reintegration into the global economy. Without both improved security and the promise of economic benefits, South Africa would likely have stuck to its nuclear program as Iran is doing today. The opposite is true as well: by ensuring Iran’s security and economic wellbeing, the United States can make nuclear weapons unnecessary just as they were in South Africa.

The United States’ greatest contribution to South African denuclearization was to address its threat perceptions by helping negotiate an end to the war in Angola. The United States can do the same for Iran by pushing more forcefully for an end to the Israel-Hamas war, which has raised Iran-Israel tensions, as well as for agreements between Iran and the Gulf states on crisis deconfliction and nonintervention in neighboring states. Establishing formal diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as further drawing down American troop presence in the region, could reduce Iranian threat perceptions as well, making nuclear weapons seem less valuable.

American nonproliferation policy towards Iran should also prioritize the nuclear issue over political reform. The United States must make clear that even if Iran’s authoritarian practices continue, it will see a meaningful reduction in sanctions if it abandons its nuclear weapons program. The United States should also promote a nuclear agreement between Iran and the Gulf states, involving more comprehensive inspection and confidence-building measures than the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires, to provide Iranian leaders with political cover from charges that only their country has to submit to nuclear controls. Such an agreement could be based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action verification regime or an entirely new nuclear deal; whatever the final bargain, it would be more palatable for Iran if its rivals faced the same restrictions.

 Iran’s strategic and domestic conditions make ending its nuclear weapons program difficult, but not impossible. Disarmament succeeded in South Africa because its security concerns were addressed and economic benefits guaranteed. A similar strategy could work for Iran. By using diplomacy to stabilize relations between Iran and its neighbors and reducing American troop presence in the region, Iran’s threat perceptions will be reduced and nuclear weapons made less valuable. Equally important is a commitment to economic relief in exchange for Iranian cooperation, even if it reduces America’s leverage for political reform. These are steps the United States can take immediately and independently to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons will spread in the world’s most volatile region, if only it has the political will to enact them.

*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, William Bittner is a sophomore studying Arabic and public policy at the University of Mississippi. After graduation, he plans to work as an analyst on security issues in the Global South.