In what quickly is becoming the real-life manifestation of the classic P. Diddy song, the situation in Syria swings from the cusp of war, to a major diplomatic breakthrough, and now on to uncertainty over the next stages.

First, let’s examine the status of the proposed U.S.-Russia framework to disarm Syria’s chemical arsenal:

• Syria declared its chemical weapon and facilities. (October 24, 2013)
• The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) completed site inspections of 21 of 23 facilities and continues destruction of mixing/filling/weaponizing equipment. (October 27, 2013)
• OPCW completed and verified functional destruction of chemical weapons equipment. (October 31, 2013)
• OPCW verified a 22nd site near Aleppo. (November 7, 2013)
• OPCW Executive Council adopted a plan to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons by June 30, 2014. The plan included the transportation of Syria’s arsenal outside of the country for destruction in the “safest and soonest manner.” (November 15, 2013)

At this stage, the OPCW has nearly entirely eliminated President Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons in the future.  While questions exist regarding destroying the specific chemical agents, the ability of the Syrian regime to weaponize and use chemical weapons has nearly vanished.  This is a clear success for the framework and international moratorium against chemical weapons.

On November 18, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry stated at a press conference that the Department of State was evaluating two options for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. He did not give further details.

In the next days, newspapers began reporting that the two options under consideration are the use of mobile destruction technologies within Syria and/or at-sea destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal.  The U.S. Department of State and OPCW also stressed that they are still working with other States to review destruction options.

If the OPCW uses the mobile destruction technology that has been developed, the facilities would be operational within ten days of reaching their location.  This option allows for the weapons to be destroyed where they are currently stored and does not require shipment to another country.  The concern is the risks associated with carrying out the sensitive destruction process during an ongoing civil war.

The at-sea destruction option includes incineration or hydrolysis units placed on ships that will neutralize the precursor and chemical agents under European Union and American environmental safety standards.  Smaller scale at-sea destructions have been successful, most notably by Japan. OPCW would retain its verifying and inspecting role but it is unclear what nation/organization would provide the diplomatic status of the floating destruction location.

The major concerns about this approach are the necessity to ship the neutralized but still toxic chemical weapons to a port, opening the opportunity for the material to be stolen, “misplaced,” or captured.  Additionally, there are significant security and environmental concerns. Supporters of the plan stress that the chemicals will be neutralized to harmless salts and solids.

Regardless of which destruction options are undertaken, the major concern is funding the OPCW’s operations.  As of early November, OPCW had raised $13.5 million for its operations and that funding will run out by the end of November, according to a Reuters exclusive. Moving destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal offshore would certainly increase costs.  Some countries have agreed to provide security and logistical support for the transportation of Syria’s chemical weapons. They could be convinced to provide similar support for at-sea destruction.

Logistical challenges are not the only issues complicating the U.S.-Russian framework to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. On November 5th, CNN reported that U.S. officials were reviewing intelligence that Syria had not been entirely truthful with its chemical weapons declaration or entirely cooperative with the destruction protocol established by the OPCW Executive Council. U.S. officials have suggested that Syrian President Assad is likely to want to preserve some chemical weapons capacity as a hedge against his perceived threat from Israel.

It is important to note that both the OPCW Executive Council decision and United Nations Security Council resolution had strong and speedy enforcement mechanisms for Syria’s non-compliance.

It is clear that there are a number of nagging issues that need to be resolved to completely eliminate Syria’s chemical arsenal but in less than two months the functional capacity of one of the world’s largest chemical arsenals has been dismantled. This success is worthy of international celebration.

Significant progress toward dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile has been made in a short period of time, but significant challenges and a looming deadline remain. The disarmament process provides several lessons to be learned, and the deal which made disarmament an option offers key insights into the viability of diplomatic solutions to difficult problems.

In just under a month, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has inspected 21 of the 23 chemical weapons sites reported by the Syrian government. The two remaining sites have not yet been accessed by inspectors due to security concerns.

Syria submitted its formal program declaration three days prior to the October 27 deadline set by the Executive Council of the OPCW. The number of sites initially inspected diverged greatly from international estimates. However, Syria’s formal declaration has revealed a total of 41 facilities, including 18 for production and 12 for storage, at the 23 locations being inspected – a number much closer to original expectations. The possibility that the Assad regime may be concealing sites is just one of the many challenges facing OPCW inspectors, the United States and other nations in their efforts to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons.

    When the OPCW was tapped as the party responsible for overseeing the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons in a time of civil war, many expected that the small organization would be overwhelmed. However, the inspectors have made staggering progress in verifying Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile.  Inspectors have visited 21 sites and rendered inoperable almost all of the vital equipment necessary to weaponize Syria’s chemical arsenal. Additionally, the 27 inspectors have surveyed the 1,300 ton stockpile of precursor chemicals and nerve agent. The final two sites have proven to be more challenging to survey owing to their location in rebel-controlled territory.

For its part, the U.S. has contributed $1.5 million in assistance from the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to purchase ten armored vehicles to transport inspectors. An additional $6 million has gone toward the overall disarmament effort. The U.S. has also been trying to find locations to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Officials have approached Norway which initially considered the proposal but later determined that it lacked the necessary infrastructure to destroy the weapons before the deadline.

Denmark has since offered funds and assistance in the destruction of hundreds of tons of the stockpile, according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Suggestions have also been made that Russia’s naval base at Tartus, Syria could be a possible location for the neutralization of the stockpile; in fact, an initial proposal, which was rejected by Russia, suggested shipping the precursor agents from the Tartus base to Russia for destruction. As of right now, no location has been determined.

With the site inspection phase of the disarmament process rapidly coming to a close, what can be learned so far?

The most obvious lesson is that the international norm against the use of chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the outrage and subsequent calls for action against Assad and Syria. Calls for military action led to the next lesson learned: diplomatic options always exist if one looks hard enough. The ongoing disarmament process, the mechanism for which was worked out between the United States and Russia, is not without challenges but it has led to significant progress in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons program without the use of military force.

Of course, trying to conduct weapons inspections in the middle of a civil war is dangerous. The final two declared weapons sites have yet to be inspected due to security issues, and United Nations inspectors came under sniper fire in September while trying to investigate the site of the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack. In its recent press conference, the OPCW admitted that it has not yet ventured into rebel-held territory.

Destroying a 1,300 ton chemical weapons stockpile is an enormous undertaking. Few countries in the world possess the necessary infrastructure to neutralize a weapons stockpile that is arguably the largest in the Middle East; even fewer countries are willing to take on such a burden. The schedule for destroying Syria’s massive stockpile is ambitious and incredibly tight. Maintaining security for chemical weapons facilities, overseeing weapons transportation to destruction facilities and destroying the weapons in a timely manner are all further complicating factors. Moving the weapons will also present challenges because the Chemical Weapons Convention forbids the international movement of weapons, so exceptions will need to be made for such an option to proceed.

The coming weeks and months will reveal whether or not Assad will make good on his commitments to destroy Syria’s chemical arsenal. The success of the disarmament process depends upon the truthfulness of the Syrian regime in disclosing all of its chemical weapons facilities, which some reports indicate could possibly be as high as 50. However by the actions of the OPCW Executive Council and United Nations Security Council, a mechanism has been put into place for addressing opposition to site inspections as well continuing verification of Syria’s compliance.

The U.S.-Russia deal demonstrates that diplomacy is a valuable tool and though it won’t be easy, provides the best hope to eliminate the Syrian chemical-weapons threat.