The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 185 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation […]
Position on Afghanistan for Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
In July of 2009, the Boards of the CLW and the Center adopted a position on Afghanistan calling on the Administration to provide a clear statement of objectives for the war and metrics that would show whether those objectives were being met. To date, no such clear objectives have been publicly stated, except for a […]
Making the 2012 Middle East Conference Work
By Chad O’Carroll Efforts to place unique pressure on Israel over its presumed nuclear arsenal could scuttle plans for the scheduled 2012 Conference on establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction, President Barack Obama said earlier this month. In summarizing Obama’s comments, the White House suggested that “the Conference will only […]
Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 – to be attended by all Middle Eastern states – which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”
Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty “ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”
Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.
Reports that Israeli submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles will deploy off the Iranian coast affirm the eminence of the threat posed by a nuclear Middle East, and the urgent need to make progress on the MENWFZ. Should Iran succeed in obtaining the capability to develop a nuclear weapon—which it seems bent on doing—the resulting change in power dynamics could be so extreme that Israel might feel obligated to act. Indeed Tel Aviv hasn’t shied away from threatening military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, underscoring its belief that the loss of its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region in the absence of a peace accord may not be something it is willing to countenance. Israel’s anger over the language in the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon only reaffirms this point.
What’s more, yesterday’s attack on the aid convoy bound for Gaza has contributed to further political tension in the region and condemnation of Israel by its neighbors and the international community. This incident also underscores how engaging Israel diplomatically in an effort to disarm its nuclear arsenal will prove increasingly difficult, as well as how the regional political volatility increases the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the region.
While the goal of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as reaffirmed in the NPT RevCon final document is laudable, it is clear that Israel is not yet a willing partner in this effort. The past few days have witnessed Israel deploy submarines armed with nuclear weapons off the coast of Iran and violate international law by attacking a humanitarian aid convoy in international waters. The time is right for the international community to be firm with Israel and demand cooperation in bringing stability to the region. Let’s cross our fingers for Israel’s participation in, and the success of, the 2012 MENWFZ conference.
Hezbollah and SCUDS – An Unlikely Combination?
Reports last week that Syria had transferred an unspecified number of SCUD missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon, whilst vehemently denied by Damascus, are now being ignored, ambiguously, by senior Hezbollah sources. If indeed the allegations are true, then the transfer would represent the first acquisition of SCUD type missiles by a non-state actor, a violation of UN Resolution 1701 – which called for the disarming of all armed groups in Lebanon. The missiles would also now be the furthest-range and most precise weapons in Hezbollah’s arsenal, reported in 2009 to contain as many as 80,000 short-range rockets.
Upon closer inspection, however, it seems that any SCUD missiles would have little utility for Hezbollah’s operations in Southern Lebanon. Thus, if the story is true, reactions which suggest the possible transfer could or should ignite a war seem highly misplaced…
The majority of the rockets Hezbollah fired during the 2006 Lebanon War were either of the Katyusha type, with a range of 20-40km, or improved variants of the Grad type, with ranges in the region of 70 – 100km. Both rockets are cheap to produce and thus Hezbollah acquired thousands of them. Because both rocket types were characterized by having man portable, remote, or truck mounted launchers, and were powered by solid fuel, they had the advantage of being able to be used by personnel with little training. This, combined with the scale of the arsenal, enabled Hezbollah to continue their bombardment even after countless launch operatives were killed by Israeli air attacks.
Since the 2006 conflict, it is evident that Hezbollah has continued its effort to stockpile rockets like those it used in its war with Israel. The 2009 claim that they possess 80,000 rockets suggests their arsenal has now increased in size by nearly three times since 2006. Any advances in Israeli anti-rocket technology will be greatly minimized by the sheer scale of this new force. In addition, it seems that Hezbollah recently took delivery of the Iranian made Fatah-110, capable of reaching targets up to 200km away using GPS guidance. Launched from southern Lebanon, the extended range of the Fatah-110 would now enable Hezbollah to target Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. These factors all greatly increase Hezbollah’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. In this context, and for a number of other reasons, it thus seems puzzling that they would be interested in acquiring SCUD capabilities from Damascus.
First, in contrast to Hezbollah’s current rocket capability, maintaining and operating any variant of the SCUD is substantially harder work. Being liquid fuelled, SCUDs require trained personnel knowledgeable of how to handle extremely hazardous liquid fuels. In addition, SCUD missiles and their transporter erector launchers (TELs) require a fair amount of logistics support. Consequently Hezbollah would have had to send personnel to undergo extensive training in Syria if they did acquire any SCUDs. And if these personnel were killed in conflict, replacing them would be far harder than replacing the personnel that launch Hezbollah’s short-range rockets.
Second, road-mobile SCUD launchers are substantial pieces of equipment – far easier to see from reconnaissance aircraft and satellites than the improvised rocket launching facilities that Hezbollah used in 2006. Given the Israeli Air Force’s experience and success in targeting the much smaller mobile launchers of the 2006 Lebanon War, it seems probable that any SCUD launchers would be even easier targets for Israel to destroy today. And because of this, they could even invite a pre-emptive Israeli strike, something Hezbollah would want only if it was actively seeking war (which is nonetheless possible).
Even if it did not destroy the launchers in advance of an attack, Israel has deployed its advanced Arrow missile defense system throughout the country to protect exactly from the threat of a SCUD type ballistic missile attack. Indeed, it was precisely because this system is so well suited to intercepting SCUDs that it proved so useless for Israel in defending against Hezbollah’s short-range rocket bombardment in 2006. As such, it is hard to understand why Hezbollah would now be motivated to procure a system so potentially susceptible to interception.
Finally, unless Hezbollah were to develop a chemical or biological warhead for its SCUDs, it is hard to see what strategic advantage (aside from range) SCUDs might provide over their rocket based alternatives. Indeed, in using conventionally armed warheads, Iraq’s volley of 39 SCUDS fired at Israel in 1991 resulted in just fourteen deaths. Thus without non-conventional warheads they offer little destructive advantage. Paradoxically, because Hezbollah are aware that using non-conventional warheads against Israel would invite a highly severe response (possibly eroding their public support), it seems even less likely that they would be interested in pursuing a non-conventional capability.
While it thus seems unlikely that it would be in Hezbollah’s interest to acquire SCUD missiles form Syria, it does of course remain plausible that a transfer did take place. For these very same reasons though, even if Hezbollah has acquired a limited SCUD capability, little has changed in the balance of power. As a result, the notion that this transfer is worthy of a military response, especially in the context of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 80,000 short-range rockets, seems ill-advised.
