By the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that total US spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will surpass $1.4 trillion. This total includes approximately $823 billion for operations in Iraq and $557 billion for operations in Afghanistan. Funding for the war in Iraq has decreased significantly […]
Official Discomfort with Afghanistan War?
By: John Isaacs
While key Administration officials continue to vigorously support the war in Afghanistan, there appears to be a less-than-enthusiastic larger view about the war.
Take Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In his recent speech at West Point, he pointed out:
“In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”
That does not sound like a high level official who thinks that the United States military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq were bang up good ideas. Gates is not advocating getting out; he just does not think getting in was smart.
This skepticism was amplified at a February 17, 2011 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. There, Admiral Michael Mullen (USN), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not make the situation in Afghanistan sound exactly rosy.
Mullen thinks that the military situation in Afghanistan is going well: “On the military side, Senator McCain, I’m probably — I’m more optimistic than I’ve been.” [unofficial transcript]
The other aspects of the war are not so hot.
“But on the political side, the economic side, I — it’s — at least from my perspective, it looks worse than it has in a long time. So I share your concern. I share — I — the vector is going in the wrong direction overall for the country. We’re very unpopular there. You’ve seen that. It gets highlighted in each crisis, whether — I mean, we provided extraordinary support for the floods last year — we the military. And then that registers in a — in a popular way shortly. You have an incident like the one we’re going through right now, and our popularity is back down in very small numbers.”
Mullen wants to continue prosecuting the war. Neither he nor Gates has joined the “out now” caucus. But for Mullen, two out of three basic indicators of the war – economic and political progress – are in the toilet.
Gates did endorse the withdrawal dates put forward by the Obama Administration in the same hearing:
Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI):Secretary, you indicated that we are on track to end the presence of our combat troops in Iraq by the end of this year, as decided upon by President Bush. Do you continue to support that decision?
Sec. Gates: Yes, I do.
Levin: And are you planning to begin reductions of our troops in Afghanistan by July of this year, as ordered by President Obama, with the pace to be determined — of the reductions determined by conditions on the ground? And do you support that decision?
Gates: Yes, sir.
Levin: And can you tell us why?
Gates: Well, frankly, this was the most difficult part of the Afghan strategy going forward for me to come to support. I steadfastly — as some on this committee will remember — steadfastly opposed any deadlines in Iraq, and so came to this with a certain skepticism.
But I also realized that there is a difference between Iraq and Afghanistan in this respect. The truth of the matter is, the Iraqis want us out of the country as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the Afghans — at least, a certain number of them — would like us to stay forever. They live in a very dangerous neighborhood, and having U.S. forces there to support them and help them, often in the place of their own troops, is something that they would like to see. And so it seemed to me that we needed to do something that would grab the attention of the Afghan leadership and bring a sense of urgency to them of the need for them to step up to the plate to take ownership of the war and to recruit their own young men to fight.
Iran’s Ex-Negotiator Presents Plan to Resolve US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate
Guest post by Alex Bollfrass
Below is a summary of remarks made on 2/24 at Princeton University by Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.
Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead negotiator from 2003 to 2005, presented his vision for a resolution to the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. In his first public statement since his 2007 arrest, Ambassador Mousavian laid out a plan for political and diplomatic engagement with Iran.
The ex-negotiator described a space for mutual agreement that would respect the US redline of Iranian nuclear weapons and Iran’s non-negotiable right to uranium enrichment.
Without straying far from the official Iranian position, he argued for direct bilateral and comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, while recommending the continued pursuit of P5+1 negotiations. The proper institutional setting, in his view, is the IAEA. The UN Security Council’s involvement and its punitive resolutions should be ended.
Mousavian emphasized that any solution would require the international recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment. Iran would also need the provision of security assurances not only from the United States, but regional countries, as well…
Inside Iranian decision-making
In his rhetorical warm-up, he hypothesized that if the shah had remained in power, Iran would today have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his view, the West “owes a debt of gratitude to the Islamic Republic” for its restraint on the nuclear front over the past 30 years.
He mourned the lost opportunity for an agreement during President Khatamei’s presidency, which the former negotiator blamed on the Bush administration’s hard line and the West’s misreading of Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment as a sign that it could be pushed to surrender its right to enrichments.
Mousavian identified Ayatollah Khomenei as the ultimate decision-maker on Iranian national security questions, and as having driven the harder line in Iran’s confrontation with the international community upon Ahmedinejad’s election. In a glimpse into the mode of operation in Iran’s government, the ambassador confessed that he had only learned of the Qom uranium enrichment when President Obama revealed it in September 2009 at the G8 meeting in Pittsburgh.
Mousavian’s Plan
In a review of the P5+1’s options, he described the counterproductive effects of military strikes for the entire region. Sanctions have also failed to prevent Iran from developing missile and nuclear technology, while serving the interests of Iranian hardliners. He also argued that the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facility and assassination of nuclear scientists only raised distrust among Iranians and strengthening the arguments for the development of a nuclear deterrent.
Only diplomacy, in his view, holds promise for a resolution. However, so far the Obama and Ahmedinejad administrations diplomatic attempts have yielded no results because neither has proposed a comprehensive solution.
Mousavian argued that the US should engage Iran directly beyond the nuclear issue and build trust through cooperation on Afghanistan. He saw the UN Security Council’s involvement as counterproductive, in particular its use of sanctions, and as an obstacle to resolution. Therefore, the Iranian issue should be taken off the Security Council’s agenda and placed within the IAEA.
The NPT would serve as the basic framework to guarantee Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons should be taken as an assurance. However, he underlined that Iran would accept no inspections or restrictions that went beyond what is required of other NPT signatories.
Under Mousavian’s plan, there would be two steps of the regional component of engagement. The first would be engagement with the Persian Gulf states. This framework would later be expanded to the broader Middle East in an effort to establish an OSCE-type regional organization. In a veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapon, Mousavian called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as part of this regional integration.
In response to a question about Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment despite its lack of reactors that could put this fuel to use, Mousavian cited Western and Russian abrogation of past agreements for the provision of nuclear technology and fuel.
Persona non grata in Iran
Following Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Mousavian was removed from his position on Iran’s negotiating team with the P5+1 and the IAEA. Two years later, the Iranian government arrested Mousavian on espionage charges. Despite most charges having been dropped, he received a commuted sentence and barred from serving in the diplomatic corps. Mousavian then left the country for the West.
He has been a fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security for a year and a half. In poor standing with the Iranian regime, he would likely face arrest if he returned.
Alex Bollfrass is the NoH Senior New Jersey correspondent and a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.
Pakistan rapidly increasing arsenal, still says no to FMCT
Last week the public learned a few new things about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The size of its deployed stockpile is now estimated to be more than 100 weapons. It also is believed to possess the nuclear material for somewhere between 40-100 additional weapons, a capability which could make Pakistan the 4th or 5th largest nuclear weapon state – surpassing both France and the United Kingdom .
As David Sanger and Eric Schmitt pointed out in the New York Times and Karen DeYoung in the above article in the Washington Post—Pakistan’s nuclear-lust is a challenge to the twin goals of prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and reducing nuclear stockpiles globally.
Pakistan is the only country publically opposing the beginning of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the 65-nation UN Conference of Disarmament (CD). Their chief concern is India and the disparity between the two country’s arsenals. Even though, the latest estimates suggest that Pakistan may have more weapons than India. New Delhi does have the capacity to produce more weapons due to a larger fissile material stockpile.
Clearly Pakistan has more than enough weapons and material to deter any potential nuclear threat from India. But, as Daryl Kimball stated in the October 2010 edition of Arms Control Today, “Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT likely will not be alleviated as long as India’s production potential remains greater.” Note production potential. It is negligible that Pakistan has more weapons now. India can, at any time, increase the size of its arsenal and Pakistan sees that potential as a threat–even more so now because of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which could give India even more added potential to produce bombs.
Most observers are in agreement that this will not be an easy task. Still, there is a lot that can be done to lay the groundwork for future negotiations and to put added pressure on Pakistan to change its thinking. Kimball laid out some of the options in the Arms Control piece above. So long as Pakistan and India continue their quest to build more bombs, it is only a matter of time before a FMCT will have to be pursued outside the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.
An (anonymous) American Advisor in Rural Afghanistan: Part V: The Successes of Capacity Building
The fifth of occasional postings
Guest Post by Afghanistan Ag Man
In the months since I last posted on Nukes of Hazard there have been many country-wide and provincial-level changes in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal was relieved of command over a Rolling Stone article, which prompted Embassy staffers to rather humorously compare and contrast the affair with that of the movie Almost Famous. President Hamid Karzai attempted to ban private security companies and, thus, change the face of development in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has moveded into once Taliban-controlled territories. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has followed suit; and so I have transitioned from an eastern province to an even more kinetic—or combat active—district in Kandahar.
Last November, I saw the last of the 173rd Airborne paratroopers that I lived with for the past year leave on twin Chinook helicopters and head back to their bases in Italy and Germany. With the fighting season over in most of the country and winter in full force, we are fine-tuning our goals and objectives for the new year (or the last half of the Islamic calendar year). Yet at the same time US civilians and Afghan government officials plan for what is to come, we are also taking stock of the previous year. While there is much to be done, we have much to be proud of.
From my perch at the provincial level, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) has reignited a lackluster extension service that now effectively takes agricultural education to remote corners of the province, created farmers associations that revived export of Afghan products, increased services to once isolated parts of the province, and weaned itself away from primary dependency on foreign checkbooks and onto the Afghan government for support…
The monthly DAIL training sessions, for instance, bring 60 farmers to the capital from every district in the country, thus ensuring a DAIL presence in Taliban-controlled districts without risking the lives of US or Afghan civilians or troops. These training sessions have focused on various topics, including: integrated pest management (IPM) strategies, irrigation techniques, pruning, thinning, livestock health, and extension service efficiency. USDA created the trainings and provided funding for tools and techniques that are pertinent to the subject matter. Participants in these workshops then return to their own villages to share what they have learned. In my province of roughly half a million residents, for example, it is estimated that these trainings impact directly or indirectly impact roughly 200,000 farmers and their families each month.
In keeping with USDA’s mission of capacity building (aka “training the trainers”), these monthly sessions exemplify what capacity building can accomplish when properly executed. After we conducted the first set of trainings, the DAIL leadership independently organized a calendar with agricultural topics that coincided with the appropriate seasons (ie. pruning in late fall, pollination in early spring, etc). Even the funding for these workshops—which originally came from military Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CERP)—is now administered and regulated by the Afghan Provincial Development Council (PDC). Outside funding from Non-Governmental Organizations, USAID, and some bulk CERP funds still play a role, but decisions are filtered through the appropriate GIRoA officials for approval.
There are other examples of capacity building success. USDA established a farmers association (or cooperative) in a key terrain district within my province. The cooperative assists these farmers in post-harvest handling, packaging, processing, and methods of export. It now numbers 800 farmers. Equipping leaders with passports to the United Arab Emirates and India, USDA, DAIL, and implementing partners have been able to empower growers to export their fruit products at higher prices abroad, thus increasing disposable income at home and increasing the overall quality of life and health of Afghan farmers.
The cooperative is now taking the lead in establishing an even larger association in a neighboring district. In the past, these districts would have viewed one another as agribusiness competitors; however, these tribally mixed associations of Hazaras, Tajiks, and Pashtuns now see the financial benefits of cooperation and realize that a province-wide association is the key to raising profits long-term.
USDA has even helped the DAIL leadership physically access districts (via military convoy or air assets) that were—until last year—unreachable due to insecurity or geographic location. In one district DAIL leaders hosted the largest shura (or gathering) of farmers that the entire province had ever witnessed (with over 250 farmers). Just six months earlier, the Taliban sent a night letter threatening to kidnap and murder of any person caught working with USDA or DAIL, which resulted in USDA’s initial failed shura attempt in the district.
USDA, with the immense help of military and civilian partners, has fostered an extremely close relationship with the Afghan agriculture officials. These invaluable working relationships have built the foundation for a strong and responsive government directorate, and this can be seen in the growing confidence that Afghan citizens have toward their infant government.
For instance, when the kuchi (or nomadic herdsmen) (in my province?) experienced an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), they turned to the DAIL to assist them with vaccinations. When the codling moth and black rot were decimating apple yields, orchard owners turned to the DAIL to train them in cultural practices and sustainable solutions. When the floods destroyed orchards and eradicated the wheat harvest, the landowners turned to the DAIL for assistance in replanting techniques.
Just a year ago, the coalition forces were the sole source of funding and assistance for just about everything, whether for a mosque refurbishment or a generator or a well. Currently, such requests are now funded through the Afghan-led PDC and approved by the appropriate GIRoA line directors.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and implementing partners have a significant role to play as they complement government efforts. However, as it stands today, my province has realized that legitimate government bodies (i.e. DAIL, PDC, etc) that exist today will NOT be phased out anytime soon. Government ministries and directorates are serving their constituents, with tangible results that are strengthening their role in Afghan society.
As I look back on my time, I can see a lot of success mixed in with the occasional setback. This is a war, afterall, and things will not be perfect. We have lost many good men and women—both international and Afghan, military and civilian; government centers have been attacked; improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have detonated at increasing rates. These setbacks are right to be highlighted, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the real and measurable progress that has been made.
The Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Police Protection Program (AP3), the Afghan GIRoA officials, and the Afghan civilians that are working with the government all have made great strides this past year under the new counterinsurgency strategy. And the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and non-Afghan civilians imbedded with them have a lot to be proud of as well.
I leave this province in the hands of the 10th Mountain Division, the Nevada Agribusiness Development Team, and a new USDA Advisor. More importantly, however, I leave this province with a functioning, competent DAIL that is on the path toward reaching its many lofty goals—goals that were once deemed too unrealistic to ever be achieved.
In light of this large amount of progress, I am compelled to remain in Afghanistan for another year and to take over the agricultural efforts in a critical district in Kandahar. With half of my future district controlled by Taliban and the district governor recently assassinated, the challenges will be great and the promise of succeeding will be small. However, the successes I saw this past year will sustain me when I face the heat (literally and figuratively) of my new post and I look forward to what lies ahead.