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Iran’s Ex-Negotiator Presents Plan to Resolve US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate

Guest post by Alex Bollfrass

Below is a summary of remarks made on 2/24 at Princeton University by Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.

Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead negotiator from 2003 to 2005, presented his vision for a resolution to the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. In his first public statement since his 2007 arrest, Ambassador Mousavian laid out a plan for political and diplomatic engagement with Iran.

The ex-negotiator described a space for mutual agreement that would respect the US redline of Iranian nuclear weapons and Iran’s non-negotiable right to uranium enrichment.

Without straying far from the official Iranian position, he argued for direct bilateral and comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, while recommending the continued pursuit of P5+1 negotiations. The proper institutional setting, in his view, is the IAEA. The UN Security Council’s involvement and its punitive resolutions should be ended.

Mousavian emphasized that any solution would require the international recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment. Iran would also need the provision of security assurances not only from the United States, but regional countries, as well…

Inside Iranian decision-making

In his rhetorical warm-up, he hypothesized that if the shah had remained in power, Iran would today have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his view, the West “owes a debt of gratitude to the Islamic Republic” for its restraint on the nuclear front over the past 30 years.

He mourned the lost opportunity for an agreement during President Khatamei’s presidency, which the former negotiator blamed on the Bush administration’s hard line and the West’s misreading of Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment as a sign that it could be pushed to surrender its right to enrichments.

Mousavian identified Ayatollah Khomenei as the ultimate decision-maker on Iranian national security questions, and as having driven the harder line in Iran’s confrontation with the international community upon Ahmedinejad’s election. In a glimpse into the mode of operation in Iran’s government, the ambassador confessed that he had only learned of the Qom uranium enrichment when President Obama revealed it in September 2009 at the G8 meeting in Pittsburgh.

Mousavian’s Plan

In a review of the P5+1’s options, he described the counterproductive effects of military strikes for the entire region. Sanctions have also failed to prevent Iran from developing missile and nuclear technology, while serving the interests of Iranian hardliners. He also argued that the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facility and assassination of nuclear scientists only raised distrust among Iranians and strengthening the arguments for the development of a nuclear deterrent.  

Only diplomacy, in his view, holds promise for a resolution. However, so far the Obama and Ahmedinejad administrations diplomatic attempts have yielded no results because neither has proposed a comprehensive solution.

Mousavian argued that the US should engage Iran directly beyond the nuclear issue and build trust through cooperation on Afghanistan. He saw the UN Security Council’s involvement as counterproductive, in particular its use of sanctions, and as an obstacle to resolution. Therefore, the Iranian issue should be taken off the Security Council’s agenda and placed within the IAEA.  

The NPT would serve as the basic framework to guarantee Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons should be taken as an assurance. However, he underlined that Iran would accept no inspections or restrictions that went beyond what is required of other NPT signatories.

Under Mousavian’s plan, there would be two steps of the regional component of engagement. The first would be engagement with the Persian Gulf states. This framework would later be expanded to the broader Middle East in an effort to establish an OSCE-type regional organization. In a veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapon, Mousavian called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as part of this regional integration.

In response to a question about Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment despite its lack of reactors that could put this fuel to use, Mousavian cited Western and Russian abrogation of past agreements for the provision of nuclear technology and fuel.

Persona non grata in Iran

Following Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Mousavian was removed from his position on Iran’s negotiating team with the P5+1 and the IAEA. Two years later, the Iranian government arrested Mousavian on espionage charges.  Despite most charges having been dropped, he received a commuted sentence and barred from serving in the diplomatic corps. Mousavian then left the country for the West.

He has been a fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security for a year and a half. In poor standing with the Iranian regime, he would likely face arrest if he returned.

Alex Bollfrass is the NoH Senior New Jersey correspondent and a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.

Pakistan rapidly increasing arsenal, still says no to FMCT

Last week the public learned a few new things about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The size of its deployed stockpile is now estimated to be more than 100 weapons.  It also is believed to possess the nuclear material for somewhere between 40-100 additional weapons, a capability which could make Pakistan the 4th or 5th largest nuclear weapon state – surpassing both France and the United Kingdom .

As David Sanger and Eric Schmitt pointed out in the New York Times and Karen DeYoung in the above article in the Washington Post—Pakistan’s nuclear-lust is a challenge to the twin goals of prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and reducing nuclear stockpiles globally.

Pakistan is the only country publically opposing the beginning of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the 65-nation UN Conference of Disarmament (CD). Their chief concern is India and the disparity between the two country’s arsenals. Even though, the latest estimates suggest that Pakistan may have more weapons than India. New Delhi does have the capacity to produce more weapons due to a larger fissile material stockpile.  

Clearly Pakistan has more than enough weapons and material to deter any potential nuclear threat from India. But, as Daryl Kimball stated in the October 2010 edition of Arms Control Today, “Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT likely will not be alleviated as long as India’s production potential remains greater.” Note production potential. It is negligible that Pakistan has more weapons now. India can, at any time, increase the size of its arsenal and Pakistan sees that potential as a threat–even more so now because of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which could give India even more added potential to produce bombs.

Most observers are in agreement that this will not be an easy task. Still, there is a lot that can be done to lay the groundwork for future negotiations and to put added pressure on Pakistan to change its thinking.  Kimball laid out some of the options in the Arms Control piece above.  So long as Pakistan and India continue their quest to build more bombs, it is only a matter of time before a FMCT will have to be pursued outside the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

An (anonymous) American Advisor in Rural Afghanistan: Part V: The Successes of Capacity Building

The fifth of occasional postings
Guest Post by Afghanistan Ag Man

In the months since I last posted on Nukes of Hazard there have been many country-wide and provincial-level changes in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal was relieved of command over a Rolling Stone article, which prompted Embassy staffers to rather humorously compare and contrast the affair with that of the movie Almost Famous. President Hamid Karzai attempted to ban private security companies and, thus, change the face of development in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has moveded into once Taliban-controlled territories.   The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has followed suit; and so I have transitioned from an eastern province to an even more kinetic—or combat active—district in Kandahar.

Last November, I saw the last of the 173rd Airborne paratroopers that I lived with for the past year leave on twin Chinook helicopters and head back to their bases in Italy and Germany. With the fighting season over in most of the country and winter in full force, we are fine-tuning our goals and objectives for the new year (or the last half of the Islamic calendar year). Yet at the same time US civilians and Afghan government officials plan for what is to come, we are also taking stock of the previous year. While there is much to be done, we have much to be proud of.

From my perch at the provincial level, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) has reignited a lackluster extension service that now effectively takes agricultural education to remote corners of the province, created farmers associations that revived export of Afghan products, increased services to once isolated parts of the province, and weaned itself away from primary dependency on foreign checkbooks and onto the Afghan government for support…

The monthly DAIL training sessions, for instance, bring 60 farmers to the capital from every district in the country, thus ensuring a DAIL presence in Taliban-controlled districts without risking the lives of US or Afghan civilians or troops. These training sessions have focused on various topics, including: integrated pest management (IPM) strategies, irrigation techniques, pruning, thinning, livestock health, and extension service efficiency. USDA created the trainings and provided funding for tools and techniques that are pertinent to the subject matter. Participants in these workshops then return to their own villages to share what they have learned. In my province of roughly half a million residents, for example, it is estimated that these trainings impact directly or indirectly impact roughly 200,000 farmers and their families each month.

In keeping with USDA’s mission of capacity building (aka “training the trainers”), these monthly sessions exemplify what capacity building can accomplish when properly executed. After we conducted the first set of trainings, the DAIL leadership independently organized a calendar with agricultural topics that coincided with the appropriate seasons (ie. pruning in late fall, pollination in early spring, etc). Even the funding for these workshops—which originally came from military Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CERP)—is now administered and regulated by the Afghan Provincial Development Council (PDC).  Outside funding from Non-Governmental Organizations, USAID, and some bulk CERP funds still play a role, but decisions are filtered through the appropriate GIRoA officials for approval.

There are other examples of capacity building success. USDA established a farmers association (or cooperative) in a key terrain district within my province.  The cooperative assists these farmers in post-harvest handling, packaging, processing, and methods of export. It now numbers 800 farmers. Equipping leaders with passports to the United Arab Emirates and India, USDA, DAIL, and implementing partners have been able to empower growers to export their fruit products at higher prices abroad, thus increasing disposable income at home and increasing the overall quality of life and health of Afghan farmers.

The cooperative is now taking the lead in establishing an even larger association in a neighboring district. In the past, these districts would have viewed one another as agribusiness competitors; however, these tribally mixed associations of Hazaras, Tajiks, and Pashtuns now see the financial benefits of cooperation and realize that a province-wide association is the key to raising profits long-term.  

USDA has even helped the DAIL leadership physically access districts (via military convoy or air assets) that were—until last year—unreachable due to insecurity or geographic location. In one district DAIL leaders hosted the largest shura (or gathering) of farmers that the entire province had ever witnessed (with over 250 farmers). Just six months earlier, the Taliban sent a night letter threatening to kidnap and murder of any person caught working with USDA or DAIL, which resulted in USDA’s initial failed shura attempt in the district.

USDA, with the immense help of military and civilian partners, has fostered an extremely close relationship with the Afghan agriculture officials. These invaluable working relationships have built the foundation for a strong and responsive government directorate, and this can be seen in the growing confidence that Afghan citizens have toward their infant government.

For instance, when the kuchi (or nomadic herdsmen) (in my province?) experienced an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), they turned to the DAIL to assist them with vaccinations. When the codling moth and black rot were decimating apple yields, orchard owners turned to the DAIL to train them in cultural practices and sustainable solutions. When the floods destroyed orchards and eradicated the wheat harvest, the landowners turned to the DAIL for assistance in replanting techniques.

Just a year ago, the coalition forces were the sole source of funding and assistance for just about everything, whether for a mosque refurbishment or a generator or a well. Currently, such requests are now funded through the Afghan-led PDC and approved by the appropriate GIRoA line directors.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and implementing partners have a significant role to play as they complement government efforts. However, as it stands today, my province has realized that legitimate government bodies (i.e. DAIL, PDC, etc) that exist today will NOT be phased out anytime soon. Government ministries and directorates are serving their constituents, with tangible results that are strengthening their role in Afghan society.

As I look back on my time, I can see a lot of success mixed in with the occasional setback. This is a war, afterall, and things will not be perfect.  We have lost many good men and women—both international and Afghan, military and civilian; government centers have been attacked; improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have detonated at increasing rates. These setbacks are right to be highlighted, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the real and measurable progress that has been made.

The Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Police Protection Program (AP3), the Afghan GIRoA officials, and the Afghan civilians that are working with the government all have made great strides this past year under the new counterinsurgency strategy.  And the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and non-Afghan civilians imbedded with them have a lot to be proud of as well.

I leave this province in the hands of the 10th Mountain Division, the Nevada Agribusiness Development Team, and a new USDA Advisor. More importantly, however, I leave this province with a functioning, competent DAIL that is on the path toward reaching its many lofty goals—goals that were once deemed too unrealistic to ever be achieved.

In light of this large amount of progress, I am compelled to remain in Afghanistan for another year and to take over the agricultural efforts in a critical district in Kandahar. With half of my future district controlled by Taliban and the district governor recently assassinated, the challenges will be great and the promise of succeeding will be small. However, the successes I saw this past year will sustain me when I face the heat (literally and figuratively) of my new post and I look forward to what lies ahead.

The Center Joins Bipartisan Calls for Common-Sense Standards for Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

(UPDATE 1/25 5:00 PM: Elaine Grossman over at Global Security Newswire reports today that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in the beginning phases of negotiating a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that may not contain restrictions on reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium on Saudi soil. Stay turned, as this issue is not going away!)

The Cable’s, Josh Rogin recently addressed the growing concern among lawmakers and non-proliferation experts from both parties about ongoing U.S. negotiations with other countries on civilian nuclear cooperation.

The concern is prompted by news reports last summer and fall alleging that the U.S. is negotiating deals with Jordan and Vietnam that won’t include restrictions on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing, which could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Lawmakers and non-proliferation experts are calling for all such agreements to mimic the 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which prohibits enrichment and reprocessing on UAE territory…  

According to Rogin’s summary:

[House Foreign Relations Committee Chairwoman] Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, wants to reform the Atomic Energy Act by requiring a vote in Congress before a civilian nuclear deal, like the 123 goes into effect.  In addition, she wants to make a pre-condition in which, a country must meet a number of requirements before even considering a deal.

Representatives Ed Markey (D-MA) and Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) introduced a resolution denouncing the 123 agreement between the United States and Russia. Both representatives are put off by Russia’s cooperation with Iran and believe that until they stop their correspondence on nuclear issues with Iran, we should not concede to a nuclear cooperation agreement.

Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Russ Feingold (D-WI), Daniel Akaka (D-HI) and John Ensign (R-NE) also wrote a letter to President Obama demanding the United Arab Emirates (UAE) standard be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation deals.

In a final bi-partisan effort in November, non-proliferation experts on both sides of the aisle also wrote a letter to President Obama echoing the previous letter on UAE standards for all civilian nuclear deals.

The Center also put together a letter to President Obama calling for consistency in civilian nuclear deals.  The letter states:

We understand that the U.S. stands to benefit from improving bilateral ties with Jordan and Vietnam. However, we believe that a “region-by-region” approach to commercial nuclear cooperation would be counter-productive for at least five reasons:

• First, it would undercut the precedent set by the UAE agreement, thereby weakening the global norm against the spread of enrichment and reprocessing.
• Second, a deal with Jordan that allows indigenous enrichment and reprocessing could prompt Abu Dhabi, as stipulated in the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement, to renegotiate the terms of the agreement if it determines that a U.S.-Jordan pact contains more favorable terms.
• Third, it will likely encourage other allies and partners to insist on the right to enrich and reprocess in future nuclear cooperation agreements and open the U.S. to charges of applying “double standards.”
• Fourth, it could increase the likelihood of forging nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Vietnam, if it does not already exist, while facilitating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
• Fifth, it could undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations.

While the bipartisanship on this issue is welcome, NoH can’t help but notice that some of the GOP voices now criticizing the Obama administration for its negotiating position were nowhere to be found when the George W. Bush administration negotiated the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which didn’t exactly strengthen the NPT.

CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 185 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation […]