By John Erath
Readers of this blog will have noticed that of late we have featured several articles under a new heading: Next Up in Arms Control. This is our initiative to provide an opportunity for more diverse voices to make themselves heard and generate some discussion of new ideas and directions in our field. The idea came about last year when we heard from several students wanting to work with the Center. Unfortunately, we had no jobs open at the time but were impressed by the emerging interest in our field and the enthusiasm younger people showed in our issues. One of them, Cate Warden, was interested in a research project that became the basis for her eventual article. Discussing how we could work with students like Cate, the concept was born.
I have been involved with arms control longer than Cate and some of our other Next Up contributors have been alive. When I started, I was thrilled to be able to learn from some of the leaders in the field, folks who helped end the Cold War and participated in crafting such landmark achievements as the INF Treaty, the original START agreement and others. Their experience helped shape, and continues to influence, the approach the Center takes to arms control and non-proliferation. With full respect for the experience of the past, it’s time to look to the future. As I was learning the non-proliferation ropes, I had mentors who encouraged me to think my own thoughts and move beyond conventional wisdom. We want to use the platform of this blog series to provide that opportunity to others.
Consider this a challenge from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Send us your best thinking and share this link with the best minds you know. Take a moment to review the Center’s previous output – and go in a different direction. We aren’t looking for another explanation of why Russia’s nuclear threats are bad. Arguments that we need a No First Use policy or a new Conventional Forces in Europe agreement may have their place, but this isn’t it. Instead, advocate for improved technology for arms control verification, or ways to prevent medical research from being applied to biological weapons development. How should AI and machine learning be regulated to reduce threats of nuclear war while upholding freedom of expression?
This link contains instructions about how to submit ideas. Over the coming months, we look forward to reading and thinking about any and all submissions. Although we will not be able to publish each individual submission, we will consider the issues raised carefully and provide feedback. And we do not consider publication of an article the end of the process. Instead, we look forward to an ongoing conversation on the best ideas for how to manage the future of arms control. We believe in taking the dialogue forward from the experts of the Cold War era and seek to build on their experience with new and diverse voices. Make yours one of them.
