Let’s start this post off with a pop culture confession: I didn’t like The Hangover. I realize that this probably puts me in the minority of the American movie-going public (the film earned nearly a half-billion dollars at the box office, making it the highest-grossing R-rated comedy of all-time), but I found it to be a bit too crass and a bit too formulaic for my taste.
Fact Sheet: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
By Sam Kane and Kingston Reif WHAT IS THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)? • The Proliferation Security Initiative is an international effort that aims to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their related components and materials. WHO IS INVOLVED WITH PSI? • Initially, PSI’s membership consisted of eleven countries (the […]
The NPT Turns 45
Today, July 1, marks the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. With the treaty now fully in the midst of middle age (it should be dying its hair and buying a motorcycle any day now), Nukes of Hazard looks back on the history of the treaty, its key successes and continuing problems, and what lies in store for it in the future.
A Brief History
The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968, and entered into force in 1970. After the expiration of its initial 25-year term, the treaty was indefinitely extended at a 1995 Review Conference. Over the course of its 45-year lifespan, the treaty has gained near-consensus approval from the international community — with 190 signatories, it is the most widely-adopted arms control treaty in history.
Successes
1. It has prevented a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario: The NPT came about at a time when many policymakers were justifiably concerned about the possibility of nuclear weapons spreading around the globe. After all, less than twenty years after America’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan, four additional states had already detonated their own nuclear devices, and many feared that this was only the tip of the proliferation iceberg. As I mentioned in a post from last week, President Kennedy ominously intoned in 1963 that there may be as twenty nuclear weapons states by 1975. However, in the 45 years since the NPT’s signing, Kennedy’s vision has not become a reality. Though the NPT is not the sole reason for this, it certainly deserves a large portion of the credit.
2. It has helped to establish nonproliferation as an international norm: Nowadays, we typically take the norm of nuclear nonproliferation for granted. States that acquire nuclear weapons are perceived by the international community as violating the rules of the international system. But it wasn’t always this way. In his landmark work on nuclear proliferation, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” Scott Sagan wrote that France, which tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960, did so primarily out of a desire to gain international prestige – a goal which, in the pre-NPT era, it was largely able to achieve, with few international repercussions. Compare this with the post-NPT era: states like North Korea and Iran are international pariahs, while some states, such as Ukraine and South Africa, decided to voluntarily relinquish their nuclear capabilities. In the NPT era, adherence to international norms about nonproliferation, rather than joining the “nuclear club,” has proven to be the most effective way for a state to enhance its international standing.
Problems
1. It hasn’t completely halted nuclear proliferation: While the NPT has succeeded in preventing a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario, it has not entirely halted the spread of nuclear weapons. Since the treaty was opened for signature in 1968, four additional states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the nuclear club, and many are concerned that Iran could be heading down the same path.
2. Article VI: One of the foundational trade-offs of the NPT is enshrined in Article VI of the treaty. Under the terms of Article VI, the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) pledge to work towards the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament, in exchange for the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) pledging to not develop weapons of their own. However, NWS compliance with Article VI has been questionable — the US and Russia have made strides in reducing the size of their arsenals, but the other three NWS have given little indication that they intend to make similar cuts. Meanwhile, additional US-Russia reductions will need to overcome a range of hurdles before they can become a reality. Though the NWS’ apathy towards nuclear disarmament is hardly a recent development, continued disregard by the NWS for their Article VI obligations has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the treaty as a whole.
What’s Next?
The next major event on the horizon for the NPT is the 2015 NPT Review Conference. These conferences are held every five years, and provide signatory states with an opportunity “to review the implementation of the treaty…and to set a forward-looking agenda for its further operation.” In a June speech at the Elliot School of International Affairs, Thomas Countryman, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, highlighted two issues that have played a major role in the annual Preparatory Committee meetings ahead of the 2015 Review Conference, and will likely dominate the conference itself: namely, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and concerns from NNWS about the slow pace of NWS disarmament.
Nuclear Terrorism: Analyzing the Threat and Charting the Way Forward
Next week, representatives from more than 100 countries will descend upon Vienna, Austria for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference on nuclear security. High on the conference’s agenda will be the issue of nuclear terrorism. However, in the run-up to the conference, expectations are already being tempered — a draft ministerial statement obtained by Reuters suggests that the conference will put forth no concrete steps towards establishing an international framework for combating nuclear terrorism, and will opt instead for a more state-based approach.
But let’s back up for a moment. Though the threat of nuclear terrorism is widely acknowledged by the international community as a serious one, commentators in some circles have expressed skepticism, dismissing it as unrealistic, exaggerated, and “magnified dramatically.” So, perhaps we should briefly un-pack this issue: how serious is the threat of nuclear terrorism?
The short answer: very.
In order to successfully carry out an act of nuclear terror, a terrorist group would need three things: (1) a sufficient amount of fissile material; (2) a working nuclear device; and (3) a viable plan to deliver that device to its target.
The third requirement could be satisfied with relative ease. Not to give aspiring nuclear terrorists any ideas, but America’s borders present ample opportunities for potential smuggling. By sea, maritime cargo has been described as “[offering] terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States.” America’s land borders are no less porous — Graham Allison has wryly noted that nuclear terrorists seeking a land-based delivery route would be well-advised to encase their device in a lead container and smuggle it across the border “in a bale of marijuana.”
What of the other two requirements? Given the technical challenges inherent in producing weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, it would be virtually impossible for a terrorist group to synthesize its own fissile material (the challenges inherent in this process are expertly documented in a 2006 piece by Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier). The impracticality of creating its own fissile material would likely force a terrorist cell to attempt to procure these substances from a state actor.
I wrote about the threat of state-to-terrorist nuclear transfer at-length in a report for GlobalSolutions.org earlier this year. In a nutshell: for a terrorist group, obtaining fissile material in this manner would be very difficult, but not impossible. To highlight a few potential scenarios: a terrorist group could steal fissile material from a inadequately-secured facility (it’s happened before); it could be on the receiving end of a nuclear transfer from a sympathetic nuclear insider (they exist); or it could purchase the requisite material from a complicit government (perhaps North Korea, which has been described as willing to “sell just about anything to anyone”).
Once a terrorist group acquired the requisite fissile material, actually constructing a nuclear device would pose challenges that are substantial, but far from insurmountable. For instance, in a 2006 report for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Charles Ferguson and William Potter wrote that “construction of a gun-type device [such as the type dropped on Hiroshima] would pose few technological barriers to technically competent terrorists.” The Union of Concerned Scientists and the Congressional Research Service have reached similar conclusions.
This brings us back to next week’s IAEA conference. If the aforementioned Reuters article is to be believed, the conference will stress the need for countries to take domestic-level actions to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, rather than pushing for any kind of broader international framework.
Such a framework is sorely needed. Attempts have previously been made to establish global standards with regards to combating nuclear terrorism, but these efforts have typically been more ad hoc in nature, with no unifying framework to connect them. Even then, these relatively-modest efforts have been stymied by a lack of international support. Take, for example, the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). These two treaties, both opened for signature in 2005, provide elements of the kind of framework that many seemed to be hoping would come out of next week’s conference – among other things, they require member states to establish sufficient security standards at domestic nuclear facilities and provide a framework for international cooperation in preventing the spread of nuclear material. And yet, these two conventions remain trapped in diplomatic limbo: the 2005 CPPNM amendment requires 99 ratifications in order to enter into force, but currently has only 68, while ICSANT has entered into force, but has only been ratified by 24 states (the US has yet to ratify either convention).
Nuclear terrorism is frequently described, quite appropriately, as a “low probability, high consequence” act. Obviously, any group of aspiring nuclear terrorists would face significant challenges in realizing their horrific ambitions – however, the prospect of them achieving success does not lie outside the realm of possibility. Clearly, the threat of nuclear terrorism is one that must be taken seriously by the international community. If preliminary reports are to be believed, next week’s conference is unlikely to yield any substantive progress on the issue, making agreements like CPPNM and ICSANT all the more important.
The Sun Sets on Nunn-Lugar in Russia
Nunn-Lugar in Russia, we hardly knew ye.
Well, that’s not entirely true – in fact, we knew ye fairly well. For more than twenty years, under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the United States partnered with Russia to secure, protect, and dismantle weapons of mass destruction throughout the former Soviet Union. However, this past Sunday saw the expiration of the US-Russian “umbrella agreement” that made this program possible.
In its stead the two sides have negotiated a successor agreement that will discontinue some US-Russian WMD cooperative efforts while allowing others to continue.
CTR in Russia arose in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, when Russia inherited most of the former Soviet Union’s massive nuclear weapons complex. However, in this chaotic period, the Russian government lacked the funds to maintain the security of its nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons. What resulted was the stuff of WMD security nightmares – accounts of this period reveal stories of vital security upgrades being ignored, salaries for personnel going unpaid, and “sheds [of] world-ending supplies of [highly-enriched uranium] protected by padlock only.”
Enter CTR. Founded in 1991, through legislation sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, CTR saw significant success in securing and dismantling excess Russian nuclear weapons. US-Russian cooperation resulted in the elimination of more than 7,600 warheads, 900 ICBMs, and 680 SLBMs from the Russian nuclear complex, as well as the implementation of important security upgrades at more than two dozen nuclear weapons facilities.
Since its inception, CTR has expanded beyond the realm of former Soviet states, broadening its mandate in order to to provide assistance to governments in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, under the terms of legislation proposed by Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) in May 2013, the program’s presence in the latter two regions would be stepped up significantly, in an effort to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of non-state actors.
Why, then, did the US and Russia allow the aforementioned “umbrella agreement” to expire? In October 2012, the Russian government announced that it would not seek to renew the pact, citing fundamental disagreements with the agreement extension proposed by US negotiators.
Analysts have highlighted a variety of potential reasons for the Russian withdrawal. Several have pointed to the embarrassment felt by many Russian officials about having to rely on a foreign power for domestic security concerns, with the Stimson Center’s Brian Finlay describing Nunn-Lugar as “an enduring political embarrassment for Moscow.” More specifically, the liability provisions of Nunn-Lugar, under which US representatives and contractors were essentially protected from all legal liability for CTR-related incidents, were a constant sticking point for the Russian government.
Despite the end of Nunn-Lugar, US-Russia WMD-security cooperation will continue, albeit in a truncated form. This past Monday, on the sidelines of the G-8 summit, President Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an agreement to continue the US-Russia partnership under a new framework, which our friends over at Arms Control Wonk have cleverly dubbed “non-Lugar.” Within the context of this new arrangement, the US will no longer be assisting Russian officials with the dismantlement of missiles, bombers, and chemical weapons, but, according to a senior US official, will be able to continue most of its nuclear security-related work without issue under the 2003 “Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation,” and a related protocol signed on June 14, 2013. Former senators Nunn and Lugar have come out in support for this new arrangement, though other analysts have expressed a bit more skepticism.
The end of US assistance in dismantling the Russian chemical weapons arsenal is particularly troubling, given that Russia is estimated to have thousands of tons of chemical agent still awaiting destruction. With the end of Nunn-Lugar, Russia will be left with the responsibility of ensuring that this important arms control mission is fulfilled. As David E. Hoffman pointed out in an October 2012 post for Foreign Policy, the Russian government, buoyed by a resurgent economy, certainly has the means to carry out this task – the more salient question is whether it will actually do so.
Such concerns about Russia’s commitment to Nunn-Lugar’s objectives are nothing new. Back in 2006, in a feature for The Atlantic, William Langewiesche detailed how many National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) technicians, sent abroad to help their Russian counterparts enhance the security of Russian nuclear facilities, questioned Moscow’s commitment to nuclear security, and expressed concerns that the CTR-funded upgrades would “slip into disrepair” upon the termination of US funding.
Though the US will apparently still have a hand in ensuring the security of Russia’s nuclear materials, its involvement in other aspects of the Nunn-Lugar agenda will be more limited. What this means for Russia’s WMD security remains to be seen.
