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How to Save $48 Billion from the US Nuclear Triad Over the Next 10 Years – While Still Keeping it

Last week, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its annual ”Options for Reducing the Deficit” report outlining 103 options to reduce the budget deficit between FY 2014 and FY 2023. Of specific interest to us, the report identifies potential savings in the submarine and bomber legs of the US nuclear triad; the ternary strategy of nuclear delivery systems that includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long-range strike bombers (LRS-B).

Individually, the bomber option would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023 while the submarine option would save $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023. Amazingly, neither option would eliminate either leg of the nuclear triad. Below are summaries of the two options:

Bomber Option: Postpone the development of the new Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The Air Force currently possesses 76 B52-Hs, 63 B1-Bs and 20 B2-As for a total fleet size of 159 long-range strategic bombers. The service is planning to replace this aging fleet with 80-100 new long-range strike bombers beginning in the middle of the next decade to the tune of an estimated total procurement cost of $55 billion. The CBO option would defer development of the new bomber until after FY 2023. This would save $32 billion between FY 2014 and FY 2023.

Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1.    The $32 billion in savings could be spent on maintaining  quality and readiness, which the Air Force claims is suffering from a lack of funding.
2.    The delay could potentially allow the Air Force to incorporate newer technologies into the aircraft design that do not currently exist. This would likely improve the lifespan of the aircraft in future years.

Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1.    There is a risk that the current generation of bombers may need to be retired earlier than expected and/or that the new LSR-B may take longer to develop than expected. If either scenario occurs, the US may be left without an adequate long-range strike capability.
2.    The existing bomber fleet consists of only 20 stealth aircraft, the B-2As. As air defense systems become more advanced, the need for long-range stealth aircraft increases. Going forward, such a small fleet of stealth aircraft may not suffice.
3.     As the US re-balances to East Asia, a region marked by limited basing options and long distances, the existing LRS-B capability may be inadequate.

Submarine Option: Cut the number of existing Ohio-class submarines in addition to deferring the development of and reducing the total order of the new Ohio-replacement submarines. At present, the Navy maintains a fleet of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN). The Navy currently plans to replace this fleet with 12 new nuclear-armed submarines (designation SSBN(X)) by 2042. The CBO option would reduce the existing SSBN fleet from 14 to 8 by FY 2020, defer the start of the SSBN(X) program from FY 2021 to FY 2024, and reduce the total order of SSBN(X) submarines from 12 to 8. Implementation of this option would save just under $16 billion between FY 2015 and FY 2023.

Option advantages identified by the CBO:
1.    The sea leg of the US strategic deterrent would remain credible and robust. Each of the 8 submarines (of either class) can carry 128 warheads deployed across 16 missiles (8 warheads per missile). This would total 1,024 deployed nuclear warheads in the sea-leg of the nuclear triad alone, allowing the United State’s to maintain the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.  
2.    Costs accrued from modernizing the missiles and warheads that these submarines carry would potentially be reduced. Because there are fewer submarines in the fleet, fewer missiles and warheads will require modernization at the end of their life span.

Option disadvantages identified by the CBO:
1.    The submarine leg of the nuclear triad would be less effective. Fewer submarines would mean that fewer areas could be patrolled and that a smaller fleet would be available for deployment in a crisis.
2.    Each submarine would be easier to target.  Because each submarine would have to fire more ballistic missiles in order to hit the same amount of targets that a fleet of 12 submarines could, more trajectories could be used by an adversary to accurately calculate the origin of the launches.
3.    Delaying development of the SSBN(X) would disrupt the joint UK-US development of a common missile compartment, which the UK requires for its own fleet of strategic nuclear-armed submarines.

The Pentagon will hopefully give these options some serious consideration. If across-the-board sequester cuts remain in place, $454 billion will have to be cut from the Pentagon budget between now and FY 2021. The two CBO options won’t cover all of these required savings, but they sure would help.

Sen. Feinstein on nuclear strategy, the "3+2" strategy, B61 LEP, and more

On November 15, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Women’s Actions for New Directions (WAND) hosted an event on Capitol Hill titled “The Next Steps in Nuclear Risk Reduction: U.S. Policy and Spending Options in an Age of Austerity”.

The event featured introductory remarks by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Congressman Mike Quigley (D- IL). Sen. Feinstein is Chair of the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee and Rep. Quigly is a member of the House Appropriations Committee. The event also featured an expert panel consisting of our Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret), Steve Pifer of the Brookings Institution, and Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service.

You can read more about the event here. Sen. Feinstein’s opening remarks are pasted below. Some highlights include:

  • “Let me begin by saying I agree with our nation’s military leaders—the U.S. has too many nuclear weapons and more can be done to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal.”
  • “Thousands of weapons remain part of the “hedge.” For every deployed weapon, there will soon be four in the hedge, which means if 1,000 warheads are deployed, 4,000 will be available in a reserve capacity.”
  • “The promise of the 3+2 plan was to provide a smaller stockpile in exchange for a larger investment. However, when the plan is examined, there is no decrease in the number of warheads.”
  • “My most immediate concern is with the life extension of the B61 gravity bomb. I am concerned the B61 life-extension program is unaffordable at $10 billion and a more narrow scope of work would safely extend its life while meeting military requirements.”
  • “Finally, I would like to highlight a worrying trend. Modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile has come at the expense of nonproliferation activities.”
  • “Since nuclear forces are larger than needed for current military missions, it is time to think more creatively about how to maintain a much smaller nuclear deterrent at an affordable cost.”

Introductory Remarks, Nuclear Weapons Panel Discussion Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, November 13, 2013

Good morning. I would like to thank Lt. Gen. Robert Gard and Kingston Reif from the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation for inviting me to speak today.

I applaud your efforts in educating members of Congress, their staff, and the public about nuclear weapons issues.

I believe today’s panel discussion—led by Steve Pifer from Brookings and Amy Woolf from CRS—is an important part of an ongoing debate about the future of nuclear weapons policy.

Nuclear Weapons

Let me begin by saying I agree with our nation’s military leaders—the U.S. has too many nuclear weapons and more can be done to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal.

America’s arsenal consists of about 5,000 nuclear weapons, and most are far more destructive than the one that destroyed Hiroshima.

What remains unclear is how these weapons will help solve 21st century national security threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks or global warming.

There have been some positive steps in the last few years. In December 2010, I voted for the New START Treaty, which limits actively deployed weapons to 1,550. I also support the president’s new nuclear employment strategy to further reduce the deployed strategic stockpile to about 1,000 weapons.

However, these efforts are not designed to reduce the total size of the stockpile.

Thousands of weapons remain part of the “hedge.” For every deployed weapon, there will soon be four in the hedge, which means if 1,000 warheads are deployed, 4,000 will be available in a reserve capacity.

In order to determine if such a large hedge is necessary, we direct the JASON group of scientific advisers in the FY2014 Energy and Water bill to assess the need for such a large hedge.

The question we asked the JASON group is whether NNSA is holding onto more weapons than is really necessary. The result should clarify this debate once and for all.

This year, NNSA rolled out an ambitious new plan, known as “3+2,” a 25-year plan to reduce warhead types from seven to five.

While I support reductions to the stockpile and the savings that come with it, the 3+2 plan requires spending tens of billions of dollars more on life extension programs as well as increasing technical risks such as design changes. These costs all come with little benefit.

The promise of the 3+2 plan was to provide a smaller stockpile in exchange for a larger investment. However, when the plan is examined, there is no decrease in the number of warheads.

In addition, sequestration, shrinking budgets and NNSA’s long history of cost overruns and schedule delays raise serious concerns about NNSA’s ability to execute this mission.

For example, the current plan shows 5 out of 7 weapon systems, or 70% of the stockpile, undergoing a life-extension program or major repair, all at the same time. Each of these life extension programs will cost billions of dollars.

Even more worrisome is that NNSA has not executed even one life extension program on time and on budget. There is no reason to believe it can handle five at once.

Bottom line: Work on life extension programs could crowd out all other investments needed to assess the safety, security and reliability of the current stockpile and address aging infrastructure.

B61

My most immediate concern is with the life extension of the B61 gravity bomb. I am concerned the B61 life-extension program is unaffordable at $10 billion and a more narrow scope of work would safely extend its life while meeting military requirements.

The administration has said it is serious about making “bold reductions” to our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. That would mean reductions of the B61, since it is the only tactical nuclear weapon in Europe. There is a serious question as to whether the B61 is needed in Europe at all.

Further, one of the main justifications for consolidating the different variants of the B61 is to retire the B83—a megaton weapon. However, we have not seen an official document from the Nuclear Weapons Council that commits to retiring and dismantling the B83 in exchange for the refurbished B61. I’ll believe that when I see it.

Nonproliferation

Finally, I would like to highlight a worrying trend. Modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile has come at the expense of nonproliferation activities.

Last week, NNSA removed the last remaining weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium from Hungary. Hungary is 12th country to have its highly enriched uranium removed since the president’s April 2009 Prague speech, which set a 4 year goal to remove the most vulnerable nuclear materials from around the world.

The cost of cleaning out these 12 countries was $320 million. That is less than funding a single year of the B61 life-extension program, but with far greater national security benefits and far greater cost-benefit.

The success of the program helped bring attention to the dangers of loose nuclear materials around the world and accelerated efforts to secure the material. The world is more secure because another 1,500 kilograms of fissile material no longer poses a threat.

However, more work remains.

More than 2,700 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is sitting in a handful of countries. 400 kilograms of plutonium, or about 50 weapons worth, remains at risk. And more than 100 reactors still need to be converted to low-enriched uranium.

Further, thousands of unused radiological sources in the United States are not secured and could be used for dirty bombs. Consider the tragedy at the Boston Marathon. What if the explosive devices had contained radioactive material stolen from a hospital?

I am very disappointed in the administration’s budget request. Rather than accelerate efforts to secure and remove these materials, the fiscal year 2014 budget request made significant cuts to nuclear and radiological non-proliferation programs, including $13 million in cuts to domestic radiological programs.

And, the budget request abandons the goal of securing 8,500 storage sites by 2025. Instead, it delays completion of these activities until 2044.

Given the low cost and high risks to national security, our committee restored this funding in the fiscal year 2014 budget.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say this: The Cold War is over and the superiority of U.S. conventional weapons is unquestioned. The risks of maintaining a large nuclear arsenal far outweigh the national security benefits. Large quantities of nuclear material continue to pose a proliferation risk as nonstate actors are still determined to acquire these materials for nuclear devices.

Since nuclear forces are larger than needed for current military missions, it is time to think more creatively about how to maintain a much smaller nuclear deterrent at an affordable cost.

I hope the panel today will help further that creative thinking.

UN Nuclear Watchdog: No Growth in Iranian Nuclear Activity Since August

Iranian nuclear activity has not significantly grown in the three months since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took office according to a report released yesterday to the UN Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

Expansion of Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity has virtually come to a halt.
•    Only four new first-generation IR-1 model centrifuges, devices used to enrich uranium, were installed at Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz since August. By comparison, 1,861 centrifuges had been installed in the three months previous to Rouhani’s election. While this expansion brings the total number of IR-1 centrifuges to 15,240, many of the centrifuges are not operating.
•    No advanced IR-2M model centrifuges were installed over this same period. None of the existing 1,008 IR-2Ms are currently in operation.
•    Iran’s previous installation of IR-2M centrifuges were of particular concern to the international community due to the fact that they enrich uranium at a much faster rate than first-generation IR-1 centrifuges. As such, they could potentially shorten the amount of time required for the construction of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Increases in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has been marginal.
•    Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium rose by 5 percent from 185.8 kilograms to 196 kilograms between August and November.
•    410 kilograms of 20 percent uranium has been enriched in total. Nearly half of this enriched uranium has been converted into metal. The converted metal produced is far more difficult to purify than the original uranium.
•    250 kilograms of 20 percent uranium is the approximate amount required to build a nuclear bomb, and forms Israel’s “red line” for taking military action against the Islamic Republic.
•    Iran’s stockpile of 5 percent enriched uranium rose by 6.3 percent from 9,704 kilograms to 10,357 kilograms.

Construction at Iran’s main heavy water reactor at Arak, a facility that could produce spent fuel that with additional reprocessing could provide Iran a plutonium pathway to the bomb, has “more or less frozen”.
•    The IR-40 heavy water facility at Arak has been a major concern to many Western observers due to the plants ability to produce spent fuel that could be further processed to make weapons-grade plutonium. If produced, this plutonium could provide an alternative to Iran’s enriched uranium in the construction of a nuclear weapon.
•    The report states that “no major components … had been installed” at the facility since August.

The IAEA findings, released only a week before the P5+1 (Russia, China, France, the UK, the US and Germany) are set to resume talks with Iran in Geneva, will likely provide a boost for ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Since coming to office, President Rouhani has attempted to present himself as a moderate willing to negotiate a diplomatic solution with the P5+1 over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The report’s findings will likely strengthen his credibility in next week’s talks by providing hard evidence of Iran’s willingness to draw down its nuclear activity in line with P5+1 demands.

Furthermore, the findings could dampen some specific P5+1 concerns that caused the last round of talks, held in early November, to fail to produce a deal.  According to reports, France was deeply concerned about ongoing construction at the Arak heavy water reactor. While the halting of construction may not fully alleviate this concern, it could ease French fears enough to allow for a phase one deal to be made.

Unfortunately, staunch critics of Iran and efforts to diplomatically engage the country may remain unfazed by the IAEA findings.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a group of journalists that he was “unimpressed” with the report on the grounds that Iran could still produce the necessary fissile material to build a nuclear weapon with existing capacities. Count on a number of Iran hawks within Congress to make similar comments in the next week as they attempt to pass a new round of sanctions on Iran.

Critics aside, the report’s findings are a positive development going forward and provide good grounds to be optimistic about the chances for a more successful round of talks next week in Geneva.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Buildup: The End of US ‘Strategic Silence’?

While most nuclear weapons states around the world have reduced their nuclear weapons stockpiles in recent years, Pakistan has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. Current estimates place the country’s stockpile at 100-120 nuclear warheads, up from 70-90 in 2010. If this trend continues, the country will have a larger nuclear weapons stockpile than the United Kingdom, which has approximately 225 warheads, by 2021.

Of particular concern is the country’s build up of its short-range tactical nuclear missiles; a response to Indian conventional superiority. Due to their design and deployment, these tactical nuclear weapons could potentially aggravate an already dangerous decade-long standoff between Pakistan and India.

Firstly, tactical nuclear weapons are less destructive than strategic nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and, almost exclusively target an enemy’s conventional forces. Because of their lower-yield and designated deployment, they may be launched in the belief that they constitute a more legitimate use of force than more destructive higher-yield weapons. This risk is especially high if ground commanders believe the weapon will stop an enemy’s conventional advances. However, the conflict could easily escalate as states respond to the use of tactical weapons with strategic weapons.

Secondly, because tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on the battlefield, the risk of an inadvertent launch due to misperception and/or miscommunication is relatively high. A battlefield commander in charge of a tactical missile unit could receive wrong information or misjudge the overall situation, which could easily lead to a nuclear launch. Considering these weapons would be deployed along the already fragile militarized Pakistan-India border, the danger of misperception in the Pakistani context is particularly real.

These inherent risks of tactical weapons have the potential to further destabilize an already unstable region. Relations between Pakistan and India worsened considerably following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks by Pakistani militants and little progress has been made in repairing the rift. Instead, both countries have developed new strategies and weapon systems primarily designed for a military conflict with the other side.

The Obama administration most likely realizes the dangers of Pakistan’s buildup; however it has remained largely silent on the issue. Following a recent meeting between President Obama and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif three weeks ago, both sides issued a joint statement outlining their agreement on an array of issues. Aside from a relatively vague section on Pakistani nuclear security, nothing was mentioned about Pakistan’s nuclear arms growth or the wider military situation in South Asia.

This silence is primarily due to concerns about the larger US-Pakistan strategic relationship. The administration is aware of the national prestige associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons along with the pervasive belief within wider Pakistani society that the US wishes to acquire and destroy Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Weary of this, and weary of its problematic relationship with Pakistan since the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, the administration has avoided the issue in an attempt to keep Pakistani support for more immediate U.S. strategic interests. Chief among these are Afghanistan and the wider war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Going forward, it is unclear whether the US will maintain this ‘strategic silence’ policy towards Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear buildup. Next year, US forces are set to leave Afghanistan, which will entail a reduction in Pakistan’s strategic value to Washington. As the administration’s regional interest shifts from the immediate to the long-term, it may find it difficult to ignore Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal.

How exactly this problem will be tackled is a significant challenge if the US does indeed decide to take action. Issuing sanctions in a manner analogous to those issued against Iran is unlikely to be pursued. Previous US sanctions against Pakistan while it was developing a nuclear capability did not stop the country from developing a nuclear weapon. Instead, these sanctions damaged US-Pakistani relations and caused widespread resentment among its population.

A more likely policy would be one where the US attempts to bring Pakistan and India into formal talks with one another. The negotiating table would serve as a confidence building measure for both sides, while at the same time providing a forum in which a formal arrangement that dampens mutual concerns could be worked out. On the Pakistani side, this dampening could persuade it to limit its tactical nuclear buildup. At the same time, the US would play the role of mediator, thereby avoiding the potentially negative consequences of sanctions.

Whatever the policy response will be, it is clear that Pakistan’s build up demands some form of US action. The distressing implications of Pakistan’s policy will become too great for the current US silence to be maintained – or at least it should.

Iran, United States Finally Learning to Talk

This week, talks between Iran and the P5+1 regarding Iran’s nuclear program will resume. All eyes are on Geneva, given that the first series of talks was reportedly the most productive and positive that the two sides have had in quite some time.

To help us better understand why the last round of Geneva talks was significant, I’ve written a piece in The National Interest analyzing that negotiation. I focus on the ways in which these talks represented a welcome improvement over the past decade of negotiations with Iran, which have too often been characterized by unrealistic demands, an unwillingness to focus on the most important issues, and an inability to link interim progress with long-term goals.

Here’s an excerpt:

“Finally, a crucial, if subtle, shift in the two sides’ approaches has been a greater willingness to look at the ultimate goals of the talks—what commentators like to call the ‘endgame’—and to work backwards from there to determine interim steps. To an outside observer, this may seem like an obvious way to negotiate, but as Trita Parsi pointed out, the West in particular has studiously avoided discussions of the ‘endgame’ in an effort to maintain the upper hand in past negotiations. Now, that could be about to change.”

Have a look at the full piece, here.