Did you ever wonder where all the parts of the U.S.’s massive nuclear arsenal were housed? Ever curious about the location of the laboratories that produce these weapons? Have a burning to desire to know if it is near your home, your school, your bus…
Jersey Shore 2.0: An East Coast Missile-Defense Site
The House Armed Services Committee will write its version of the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) tomorrow. For those of you keeping score at home, here’s what we know so far: The bill completely ignores sequestration, includes nearly half a billion dollars for nuclear weapons and missile defense programs the Pentagon did not ask for, and blocks funding to implement the New START treaty.
Expect Republicans to offer more amendments along these lines – and Democrats to counter, at tomorrow’s full Committee mark. Nearly all of the amendments offered and debated will rise or fall on party line votes.
The biggest attention grabber will be the debate over building a third US national missile defense site on the East Coast. HASC Chairman Buck McKeon’s (R-CA) mark of the NDAA includes an additional $247 million for the ground based midcourse defense system above the budget request. Apparently Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) will offer an amendment(s?) during the full Committee mark that allows some (or all?) of this money to be used to fund an East Coast site.
For more on the folly of the East Coast gambit, you can read my take published in Time today. Here’s an excerpt:
Rushing to build a national missile defense site on the East Coast was a bad idea last year. It remains a bad idea now.
At a recent congressional hearing, Vice Admiral James Syring, the head of the Pentagon agency responsible for missile defense, was asked point-blank if Republican proposals to add $250 million for an East Coast site this year would be of use. “Not at this time,” he responded. The Pentagon has just begun studies on the idea, which will take two or three years to complete.
This is not just a case of “buy before you fly.” Rather, it’s a case of “buy before you study before you fly.”
J. Douglas Beason’s Misguided Paean to the Nuclear Weaponeer
In an editorial published in last Friday’s edition of the Wall Street Journal (“Our Endangered Nuclear Weaponeers”) Dr. J. Douglas Beason argues against eliminating America’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. Certainly, there are reasonable arguments to be made about the feasibility and desirability of large-scale nuclear arms reductions. Beason’s editorial, however, is not an example of such an argument.
First, Beason seems to base his editorial on the curious assumption that the ultimate elimination of the American nuclear arsenal would also result in the demise of the class of professionals who “build the sensors that can detect nuclear explosions from space” and “know whether to ‘cut the red or blue wire’ in a terrorist device.” Obviously, in a world without nuclear weapons, the “nuclear weaponeer,” per se, would not exist. However, the world would still need people with nuclear expertise to serve as inspectors and verifiers, in order to ensure that nuclear weapons are not being developed, tested, or used. In other words, a world free of nuclear weapons would still require individuals with many of the skills of a nuclear weaponeer.
More problematic for Beason’s argument, however, is the fact that, rather than engaging with the actual arguments put forth by arms control experts, Beason chooses to argue against a flimsy, straw-man version of the Global Zero argument. Throughout his editorial, Beason makes it clear that he lacks a basic understanding of the positions taken by arms control advocates. Yes, it is true that foreign policy heavyweights, such as William Perry and George Shultz, have called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. And yes, in 2009, President Obama did make reference to “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” But, what these arms control advocates have also made clear is that the goal of Global Zero will not be realized overnight, and cannot be accomplished through American efforts alone.
Beason, however, does not seem to grasp these nuances. In his mind, the vision of Obama, Perry, Shultz, and others involves the United States unilaterally eliminating its nuclear stockpile, in the hope that others countries will then follow suit. Beason views such a policy as reckless and dangerous. On this point, I absolutely agree with him – it would be extremely ill-advised for the US to destroy its nuclear stockpile without similar moves by other nuclear weapons states. President Obama agrees, too – in a 2009 speech, he declared that, “As long as [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies”
Unfortunately for Beason, his conception of the argument for nuclear arms control could not be farther from the truth. Since taking office, President Obama has decreased the size of the US nuclear arsenal – however, most of these reductions have taken place in the context of bilateral efforts with Russia via the New START treaty of 2010. It is true that the Obama administration has made some unilateral nuclear cuts, such as its retirement of the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM-N). However, the concept of US Presidents making unilateral nuclear reductions, as the Brookings Institution’s Steven Pifer has pointed out, is one with a strong historical precedent. Most importantly, the notion of unilaterally eliminating the American nuclear stockpile is not one that has been entertained by any serious policymakers, contrary to what Beason seems to believe. Essentially, he is arguing against an idea that no one is arguing for.
Are Sanctions on Iran Working?
Yesterday, Center Scoville Fellow Usha Sahay and I released a report that examines the impact of sanctions on Iran and the effect those sanctions are having on nuclear negotiations. Some excerpts are below…
Sanctions have served as a useful tool for exerting pressure on Iran and demonstrating resolve against its proliferation activities. The signs of progress seen in negotiations in February indicated that sanctions can be an effective tool of leverage, but only when sanctioners exhibit a corresponding willingness to lift sanctions. However, the promise of sanctions relief becomes increasingly difficult to deliver on when sanctions begin to overlap and their objectives become unclear.
[snip]
A key way in which sanctions have succeeded is as a signaling mechanism: sanctions show that the international community is united against Iran’s continued defiance, and that it is willing to take significant action to facilitate a negotiated solution. The unprecedented degree of international unity against Iran’s nuclear program can be seen in the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions, which require approval by Russia and China, nations which have previously been reluctant to sanction Iran.
[snip]
Sanctions have increased in both scope and number, and the sanctioners’ willingness to lift the measures has appeared dubious, with the recent limited exception of the first round of Almaty talks in February. In this way, the complexity of the set of sanctions may be impeding negotiations by creating doubts in Iran about whether negotiations in fact will lead to significant reductions.
Could a nuclear-armed Iran be contained?
If Iran cannot be peacefully convinced to curtail its nuclear program, the president could soon be faced with a hugely consequential decision: attack Iran in an attempt to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, or recognize that it could do so and embrace deterrence and containment instead. By staking American credibility on a policy of prevention at all costs, Obama may end up believing he has to choose war. But he would be wrong, because deterrence (threatening devastating retaliation) and containment (blunting the spread of Iranian power and influence) may in fact be more prudent than preventive attack.
