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The Meaning of Rowhani’s Election in Iran

Though no guarantee that change will come, the election of Hassan Rowhani as president of Iran is cause for cautious optimism over ongoing efforts to reign in the state’s controversial nuclear program.  From a Western perspective, the 64-year-old moderate cleric’s election came as a pleasant surprise.  Although Rowhani was the most moderate candidate of those allowed to run, there is reason to believe he may be given some degree of latitude with regard to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program because of his status as a longtime regime insider as well as his promises to improve the Iranian economy through sanctions relief. For this reason, the U.S. and its partners  should be willing to seize this moment as a potential opportunity, but should approach the situation carefully and realistically, keeping in mind that the failure to capitalize now to move toward a nuclear deal could result in a loss of momentum that would be hard to replace.

The Guardian Council’s choice to allow Rowhani to compete in the 2013 election demonstrates that while he may not have been the regime’s first choice for president, he also was not considered an entirely unattractive candidate.  We can conclude from this that Rowhani enjoys a relatively high level of trust from the elite –critically, that of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  After all, even Iran’s former president was barred from the final cut.  Rowhani’s participation in regime politics dates back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  He was one of two representatives of the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for 16 years.  Held in high regard, Rowhani became the regime’s first nuclear envoy in 2003.  Further illustrating his trust of the new president, the Supreme Leader recently urged all government bodies to support Rowhani.  Rowhani and Khamenei have largely echoed each other in the past few months – each decrying the state of the floundering Iranian economy and the need for sanctions relief to improve it.

If Rowhani is given the leeway to negotiate on his own terms, however, do not expect the new president and his team to voluntarily make concessions.  Rowhani is a seasoned diplomat who is committed to preserving Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.  In a 2004 speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, Rowhani declared that Iran’s nuclear program “is good for our international reputation and shows that we…have been successful in the area of technology…”  Rowhani’s legacy as the individual who “sold out” Iran’s nuclear interests in 2003 by agreeing to a freeze of uranium enrichment may further constrain his ability to offer serious concessions, especially as anti-Americanism is a pillar of the regime’s ideology.  Also, although the Supreme Leader and Rowhani appear in concert at the moment, all final decisions on the regime’s nuclear program rest with the former.  

Yet there is reason for optimism.  International sanctions, led by the U.S., have enacted a heavy toll on Iran, as Iranian oil exports have been curbed, the country is increasingly isolated from the international banking system, and the Iranian currency has plummeted in value.  A new round of sanctions, designed to further “isolate Iran from the global economy” was signed on in a June executive order and set to begin July 1.  A bill currently in the House, H.R. 850 introduced in February, would add another batch of sanctions.  Perhaps the best evidence that sanctions are beginning to put pressure on the regime was the Ayatollah’s instructing of candidates to “pay due attention to the economy which has turned into a scene of imposed challenge with aliens.”  Importantly, Khamenei does seem to believe that the solution to this challenge is through negotiations.

Even more optimism can be gleaned from Rowhani’s previous statements and background.  In a 2006 letter to Time magazine, the cleric declared that a “nuclear weaponized Iran destabilizes the region, prompts a regional arms race, and wastes the scarce resources in the region. And…an Iranian bomb will accord Iran no security dividends.”   Similarly, during a presidential debate, Rowhani argued, “It is good to have centrifuges running – provided people’s lives and livelihoods are also running.”  More important than words, Rowhani’s former nuclear negotiating team was “Western-educated, came from merchant backgrounds, and favored improved ties with America.”  Rowhani, with the Ayatollah’s support, has proposed one-on-one talks with the U.S. to obtain sanctions relief.

The recent statements of Rowhani and Khamenei signal the Iranian regime’s willingness to come back to the table with the intent to strike a deal for sanctions relief.  While constrained, Rowhani, as a familiar face in regime politics, appears to have the Supreme Leader’s support.  This fact, paired with the president-elect’s determination to obtain sanctions relief breathes new hope into the possibility of striking a deal to curb Iranian nuclear activities.  Rowhani will look to balance his society’s need for sanctions relief with the regime’s nuclear ambitions.  For this reason, the U.S. and its partners must offer quick and substantial sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful concessions on the part of Iran.  The Obama administration as well as Congress should wait to pass any additional sanctions and demonstrate their intention to engage seriously with Iran.  Further, the international community will have to be prepared to accept Iranian self-enrichment of uranium in return for a lesser degree of enrichment plus inspections.  Rhetoric of regime change by some elements in the West will have to be put on the backburner so as to not damage Rowhani’s political standing.  While Rowhani is no Gorbachev, he is no Ahmadinejad either.  This president may be someone we can work with to eliminate the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.  

Kroenig’s "Case for Overkill" Misses the Mark

Last week, Georgetown professor Matthew Kroenig, no stranger to taking provocative stances on nuclear issues, stepped into the fray surrounding President’s Obama speech in Berlin.  In an article for Foreign Policy, he argued that the nuclear reductions proposed by the President “could potentially be highly damaging to US interests.” Though Kroenig has undoubtedly put more thought into his criticism than can be said of most of the President’s knee-jerk detractors, his argument against further cuts to the US arsenal fails to stand up to scrutiny.

Like many opponents of nuclear reductions, Kroenig uses the specter of rival nuclear powers, particularly Russia and China, to justify his opposition to cuts in the US arsenal. For instance, he claims that the President’s proposed cuts would “attenuate our advantages vis-à-vis Russia” and counsels that the United States should not reduce below the New START level of 1,550 warheads, which Washington must do by 2018. In making this claim, he appears to have forgotten the fact that, though the US currentlyhas more deployed strategic warheads than Russia, the New START treaty imposes equal limits on both the United States and Russia. This raises the question of how, exactly, pushing that equilibrium down from 1,550 to 1,000 would harm US interests.

Which brings us to China. It is technically true, as Kroenig argues, that further nuclear reductions would diminish the quantitative advantage of the US arsenal vis-à-vis China. The important question to ask here, however, is whether that advantage would be diminished in any qualitative (i.e. meaningful) way.  Currently, China’s total arsenal is composed of 250 warheads, which would place the PRC at a significant numerical disadvantage even if the US reduced its deployed arsenal to 1,000 (and don’t forget the additional hundreds of warheads the United States will continue to retain in reserve). Of course, China’s arsenal is likely to undergo some expansion in the coming decades, but given Beijing’s traditional nuclear doctrine (which has historically stressed the concept of “minimal deterrence”), the prospect of the PRC achieving nuclear parity with the US at any point in the foreseeable future is based on conjecture rather than fact. Moreover, further US and Russian nuclear weapons reductions are a necessary condition to eventually bring China into the arms control process.

Kroenig also rejects the notion that President Obama’s proposed reductions would help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, arguing that previous US arsenal cuts have not “contributed to any breakthroughs on important nonproliferation problems.” However, this contention ignores the positive effect that the NPT regime has had in stemming the tide of global nuclear proliferation, and the key role that US actions play in maintaining this regime’s legitimacy. In 1963 – five years before the NPT was signed – President Kennedy predicted that, by 1975, there may be as many as 20 nuclear weapons states. That frightful vision has not come to pass, and the NPT is undoubtedly a major reason why. However, the legitimacy of the NPT is based, in large part, on a bargain between the five recognized nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia, UK, France, China), and non-nuclear weapons states: namely, that the former will take steps to rid themselves of nuclear weapons if the latter vow never to pursue them. By further reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal, the US would demonstrate its commitment to the NPT, and help to ensure that the treaty continues to remain an effective component of the global nonproliferation regime. The notion of a linkage between US actions and the continued viability of the NPT is not a particularly radical notion, either – in 2009, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States asserted that “some other nations may not show the nuclear restraint the United States desires or support nonproliferation efforts if the nuclear weapon states take no further agreed steps to decrease their reliance on nuclear arms.”

Finally, Kroenig takes issue with the argument that nuclear reductions would lead to cost savings for the US, citing the short-term expenditures inherent in “pulling missiles out of silos…dismantling retired warheads, and decommissioning nuclear facilities.” Kroenig is right to point out that, in the short term, some nuclear reductions might require cost increases. However, in doing this, he disregards the long-term savings that would be brought about by a smaller arsenal and the near-term savings that further reductions would bring by reducing the need to build as many new replacement nuclear delivery systems. For instance, according to a recent estimate, the United States could save nearly $20 billion over the next decade alone by reducing our fleet of ballistic missile submarines from 12 to 8.  Further reductions could also reduce the planned scope of warhead life extension programs, which would entail significant cost savings.

Kroenig’s central argument is that America’s nuclear overkill is a vital asset. It is not. The President’s proposed reductions would pose no threat to US national security, would enhance the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime, and would result in long-term financial savings for the US. In the end, the arsenal’s overkill is precisely that – overkill.

Obama in Berlin

President Obama gave a high-profile speech in Berlin last week, approximately 300 words of which was devoted to articulating his 2nd term priorities on nuclear weapons. In particular the President proposed to:  

  • Reshape America’s obsolete nuclear strategy, paving the way for up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear warheads with Russia below the New START levels;
  • Work to diminish the numbers of US and Russian tactical or short range nuclear weapons;
  • Build bipartisan support in favor of US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
  • Stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other states; and
  • Secure nuclear materials, prevent nuclear terrorism, and host a 4th Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in 2016

For our press release in response to the speech see here. For my pre-speech preview (in the form of my June Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column), see here. And for my quick reaction to the speech, see here.

While I commend the President for taking an important step to update nuclear policy guidance and stating that the United States is ready to seek a 1/3 reduction in deployed strategic warheads below New START, the speech was less ambitious than I hoped it would be and didn’t propose much in the way of a plan of action to move the agenda forward.

The directives the new guidance gives to the military will further reduce the diminishing emphasis the departments place on nuclear weapons. But given that the lower bound of our New START negotiating position in 2009/10 appears to have been 1,300 deployed warheads, last week’s announcement hardly seems like that radical of a change. As Hans Kristensen notes, “the official descriptions of the new guidance show that its retains much of the Cold War thinking that President Obama said in Prague four years ago that he wanted to put an end to.”

Perhaps the biggest head scratcher from the guidance is the administration’s new plan to sustain US nuclear warheads and their supporting infrastructure at an estimated cost of at least $300 billion over the next 25 years. Overall, Obama failed to address the immense costs required to maintain an excessive arsenal, and that our policy should reflect need and affordability. Something along the lines of “strategy wears a dollar sign” would have been a great place to start.

Moreover, the President conditioned additional reductions on Russian reciprocity. On the one hand, our willingness to go lower puts the ball in Russia’s court. On the other hand, Russian reciprocity might not be forthcoming anytime soon. In the months ahead the administration should direct the Pentagon to explore other initiatives pursuant to the new guidance that do not require the immediate cooperation of others.

While Obama reaffirmed his support for the CTBT, he didn’t make the national security case for the treaty nor did he outline how he plans to advance the prospects for the treaty’s ratification. Likewise, it is good news that the United States will host a 4th Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, but the President did not provide an update on the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years nor did he describe the great deal of work that remains to be done over the next four years. Meanwhile, the growing budget for nuclear weapons sustainment and modernization continues to eat into the budget for vital nuclear and radiological material security programs.

In short, I think the President identified the right nuclear security objectives and sent the message that this agenda will remain a top priority in his second term. However, Joe Cirincione nicely captured the shortcomings of the speech in a recent tweet: “Obama devoted 280 words to nuclear policy in Berlin, about 35 more than he devoted to saying hello. I hope he has more to say soon.”

While Obama’s speech and the new policy guidance that accompanied it outlined important, albeit relatively modest changes to US nuclear strategy, the Republican reaction to these initiatives has been predictably shrill, obstructionist, and unhinged. (I chalk the ICBM caucus’ reaction up to classic pork barrel politics.) Stay tuned to this space in the coming days for responses to those who argue that the United States must continue to maintain a redundant and unaffordable nuclear arsenal.

The Sun Sets on Nunn-Lugar in Russia

Nunn-Lugar in Russia, we hardly knew ye.

Well, that’s not entirely true – in fact, we knew ye fairly well. For more than twenty years, under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the United States partnered with Russia to secure, protect, and dismantle weapons of mass destruction throughout the former Soviet Union. However, this past Sunday saw the expiration of the US-Russian “umbrella agreement” that made this program possible.

In its stead the two sides have negotiated a successor agreement that will discontinue some US-Russian WMD cooperative efforts while allowing others to continue.

CTR in Russia arose in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, when Russia inherited most of the former Soviet Union’s massive nuclear weapons complex. However, in this chaotic period, the Russian government lacked the funds to maintain the security of its nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons. What resulted was the stuff of WMD security nightmares – accounts of this period reveal stories of vital security upgrades being ignored, salaries for personnel going unpaid, and “sheds [of] world-ending supplies of [highly-enriched uranium] protected by padlock only.”

Enter CTR. Founded in 1991, through legislation sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, CTR saw significant success in securing and dismantling excess Russian nuclear weapons. US-Russian cooperation resulted in the elimination of more than 7,600 warheads, 900 ICBMs, and 680 SLBMs from the Russian nuclear complex, as well as the implementation of important security upgrades at more than two dozen nuclear weapons facilities.

Since its inception, CTR has expanded beyond the realm of former Soviet states, broadening its mandate in order to to provide assistance to governments in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, under the terms of legislation proposed by Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) in May 2013, the program’s presence in the latter two regions would be stepped up significantly, in an effort to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of non-state actors.

Why, then, did the US and Russia allow the aforementioned “umbrella agreement” to expire? In October 2012, the Russian government announced that it would not seek to renew the pact, citing fundamental disagreements with the agreement extension proposed by US negotiators.

Analysts have highlighted a variety of potential reasons for the Russian withdrawal. Several have pointed to the embarrassment felt by many Russian officials about having to rely on a foreign power for domestic security concerns, with the Stimson Center’s Brian Finlay describing Nunn-Lugar as “an enduring political embarrassment for Moscow.” More specifically, the liability provisions of Nunn-Lugar, under which US representatives and contractors were essentially protected from all legal liability for CTR-related incidents, were a constant sticking point for the Russian government.

Despite the end of Nunn-Lugar, US-Russia WMD-security cooperation will continue, albeit in a truncated form. This past Monday, on the sidelines of the G-8 summit, President Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an agreement to continue the US-Russia partnership under a new framework, which our friends over at Arms Control Wonk have cleverly dubbed “non-Lugar.” Within the context of this new arrangement, the US will no longer be assisting Russian officials with the dismantlement of missiles, bombers, and chemical weapons, but, according to a senior US official, will be able to continue most of its nuclear security-related work without issue under the 2003 “Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation,” and a related protocol signed on June 14, 2013. Former senators Nunn and Lugar have come out in support for this new arrangement, though other analysts have expressed a bit more skepticism.

The end of US assistance in dismantling the Russian chemical weapons arsenal is particularly troubling, given that Russia is estimated to have thousands of tons of chemical agent still awaiting destruction. With the end of Nunn-Lugar, Russia will be left with the responsibility of ensuring that this important arms control mission is fulfilled. As David E. Hoffman pointed out in an October 2012 post for Foreign Policy, the Russian government, buoyed by a resurgent economy, certainly has the means to carry out this task – the more salient question is whether it will actually do so.

Such concerns about Russia’s commitment to Nunn-Lugar’s objectives are nothing new. Back in 2006, in a feature for The Atlantic, William Langewiesche detailed how many National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) technicians, sent abroad to help their Russian counterparts enhance the security of Russian nuclear facilities, questioned Moscow’s commitment to nuclear security, and expressed concerns that the CTR-funded upgrades would “slip into disrepair” upon the termination of US funding.

Though the US will apparently still have a hand in ensuring the security of Russia’s nuclear materials, its involvement in other aspects of the Nunn-Lugar agenda will be more limited. What this means for Russia’s WMD security remains to be seen.