Yesterday, we marked the 10th anniversary of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the 10 years since tanks rolled into Baghdad, much has, of course, changed. One particularly notable shift is the American public’s increasing aversion to large-scale military i…
Exchange of the Day: Gen. Kehler and further reductions edition
General Kehler, in June of 2010 as the Senate was considering the New START Treaty, your predecessor, General Chilton, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that force level under that treaty, meaning 1,550 warheads on 700 delivery vehicles, was, quote, “exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent,” close quote.
Thoughts on Strengthening Senate Oversight of Nuclear Arms Control
Last week, I co-authored a piece on “The Hill Congress Blog” that argued for revitalizing a bipartisan organization in the Senate called the Arms Control Observer Group. To summarize, the Observer Group assumed the responsibility of overseeing the Executive Branch’s negotiation of arms control treaties like the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, the Strategic Arms Reduction, Conventional Forces in Europe, and Chemical Weapons Convention treaties. It also oversaw U.S. and Russian Defense and Space talks and, negotiation on confidence and security-building measures.
The Observer Group was a joint idea between Senate Republican and Democratic leadership, but was also welcomed whole-heartedly by the Reagan administration. Senators Dole and Byrd created the Observer Group partially in response to the failures of arms control treaties during the 1970s, such as the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, which were all signed, but never ratified. Through the Observer Group, the Reagan administration was able to build support for the arms control treaty negotiating process, which eventually lead to treaty ratification. As members of the Observer Group, Senators gained knowledge that they may not otherwise have acquired about a broad range of issues related to arms control.
At this point, I think it is useful to respond to a couple comments I am receiving regarding the Hill piece. There are several people who have made the argument that ‘things are different than they were in the 1980s. Senators would not be interested in something like this today. You would not be able to get Senators interested in arms control in a bipartisan way.’
I concede that things are certainly different than they were in the 1980s. For example, I (sadly) doubt that the “Power of Love” by Huey Lewis and the News would have be a top 10 hit today. However, bipartisan support for arms control is not one of those things, as long as the right circumstances exist.
I agree that partisanship, a decline in knowledge of nuclear policy, and the end of the Cold War makes creating something like the Observer Group more difficult. However, there were a number of factors that made it successful, only some of which were unique to the era.
For one, there was no immediate hurry for a vote on a treaty, as there was in the 2009-2010 timeframe with New START. This allows plenty of time to build support for the arms control process, eventually leading to a treaty. It also minimizes the likelihood that the group would become overly politicized. Also, Observer Group organizers were deliberate in making participants feel like they were part of the process. Senators were allowed to feel like negotiators were taking their concerns seriously. The Arms Control Observer Group was not as much a mechanism to organize support that already existed for arms control. It was more of a venue to slowly foster support as the administration moved forward.
Following the New START debate, there are a number of Senators who are still interested in the outcome of the treaty and the items articulated in the resolution of ratification. They would be a good place to start for Arms Control Observer Group membership.
Another comment I have received has to do with the National Security Working Group. Some have asked whether that was the same group Senator Kyl used to interfere with negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. While it is true that Senator Kyl used the National Security Working Group (NSWG) as a tool to achieve his own political goals, he was partially able to do so because Senators were not taking the NSWG seriously in the same way that they did the Observer Group. Although this is speculation, I doubt he would have been able to do this if the Observer Group was still in existence.
Supporters of New START were able to use Kyl’s interest in the treaty as a means of convincing other Republicans to support the treaty. As Supporters of the Treaty negotiated with Kyl, they were able to demonstrate how New START was in the United States’ best interest and also demonstrate their commitment to maintaining the nuclear stockpile. One of the ways Kyl was able to demonstrate his bona fides and interest in nuclear policy to other Republicans was through the NSWG.
Finally, Kyl’s example is a good cautionary tale as to why the Senate needs to choose the “right” people for the Observer Group. The Senate doesn’t need to be rubber stamps for arms control, but they need to be serious about the process. When Republican and Democratic leadership choose members for the newly formed ACOG, they should pick Senators who are serious about the process and about strengthening U.S. national security.
Responsibility Beyond Rules: NSGEG Releases Report on Future of Nuclear Security
Today in the Hague, the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG), an organization made up of experts from around the world, released a new report on the future of nuclear security. The group lays out five steps and 30 recommendations that global leaders must take to improve the nuclear security regime by 2020, focusing on improving regime cohesion, promoting greater transparency, and building international confidence in nuclear security governance.
The report, Responsibility Beyond Rules: Leadership for a Secure Nuclear Future, identifies the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands as a critical opportunity to begin modernizing the global nuclear security regime and provides three criteria for measuring the 2014 summit’s success.
According to NSGEG experts:
The current nuclear security regime is not robust, adaptable, or coherent enough to adequately protect against the intensifying and evolving threats posed by nuclear terrorism in the 21st century…The governance structure of the current regime cannot be reformed overnight, but the process must be initiated by 2014.
The NSGEG is holding two events in Europe this week to launch the report and start a discussion of how to best take advantage of The Hague summit next year and push the nuclear security agenda forward. On April 10th, 2013 the group will host a panel discussion at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace featuring key authors of the report.
*****
The NSGEG is a globally diverse group of experts assessing the current state of nuclear security governance. It is a project of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Partnership for Global Security, and the Stanley Foundation.
The Missile Defense Announcement
On Friday afternoon, March 15, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made a major announcement about US missile defense policy. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Winnefeld took questions from reporters after Hagel’s opening remarks. According to Hagel, the Pentagon plans to implement the following steps to improve the defense of the US homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack:
- Deploy 14 additional ground based interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska. This will increase the number of deployed GBIs from the 30 that are currently deployed to 44. Undersecretary Miller stated that the additional interceptors are scheduled to be deployed by 2017, at an estimated cost of just under $1 billion. The interceptors will contain a newer kill vehicle, known as the Capability Enhancement (CE) – II, which has not yet had a successful flight intercept test. Miller said that their deployment will not begin until the CE-II has been successfully tested.
- Deploy an additional radar to Japan to improve early warning and tracking of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States or Japan.
- At the direction of Congress, conduct Environmental Impact Studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States.
- Cancel the fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The idea behind this phase was to provide additional protection to the US homeland – not Europe – by deploying an advanced version of the SM-3 missile, the SM-3 IIB, to counter long-range missiles launched from Iran. Deployment of the SM-3 IIB had been delayed until 2022 at the earliest. The administration plans to move forward with the first three phases of the EPAA, including a site in Poland, to provide protection of Europe.
Below are a few initial comments on the announcement:
Cancelling Phase IV of the EPPA, by far the biggest announcement of the day, was the right decision. Phase IV was never more than a paper system. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a number of technical and operational problems with the proposed interceptor. A National Academy of Sciences report released last year recommended that the system be cancelled because it was unlikely to be effective and because it was unnecessary for the defense of Europe. In addition, Iran does not currently possess a ballistic missile capable of hitting the US homeland and may not acquire the capability for some time, if ever.
Phase IV has been hurting U.S.-Russia relations, but for no good reason. Russia objected to the system on the grounds that it could threaten its strategic deterrent. It will be interesting to observe how Russia reacts to this decision and whether it will make Moscow more willing to discuss a further round nuclear weapons reductions.
Hagel pointed to North Korea’s third nuclear test and its development of long-range missiles as justification for expanding the ground based midcourse defense system. But the addition of 14 GBIs in Alaska is unlikely to significantly increase the defensive capability of the ground based midcourse defense system. Even though the Defense Department has invested approximately $39 billion in this system since 1996, it remains troubled. For example, the 2012 National Academy of Sciences study cited above said that the system “lacks fundamental features long known to maximize the effectiveness of a midcourse hit-to-kill defense capability against even limited threats.” The GBIs have never been tested against a target with an ICBM range, and the CE-II, the newest version of the GBI kill vehicle, failed in its first two flight intercept tests in 2010. The system has also yet to prove effective against decoys and countermeasures that an adversary could deploy to fool our defenses.
The United States should not spend money to deploy additional GBIs until they are demonstrated to be effective and suitable in successful, operationally realistic tests. To the Pentagon’s credit, it has stated that it will not deploy the newer CE-II interceptors until they have been successfully tested, but these tests should be operationally realistic, not highly scripted as previous tests have been.
Part of the administration’s rationale for deploying more GBIs was to send a signal to South Korea that Washington is taking the North Korean threat seriously. But the addition of 14 GBIs is unlikely to strengthen the credibility of deterrence against North Korea. If US nuclear and conventional capabilities are insufficient to deter North Korea from attacking the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons, it is not clear how deploying more imperfect missile defenses would alter Pyongyang’s calculus. Moreover, if 30 GBIs could not dissuade North Korea from continuing to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, neither will 44.
As I’ve written elsewhere, the combination of deterrence and diplomacy has been and will continue to be the most effective strategy to protect the United States against nuclear weapons. As difficult and frustrating as it may be, we must continue to constructively engage North Korea and Iran to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieve a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula.
