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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

April 24, 2013

US vs. Global Military Spending

How much does the U.S. spend on its military compared to other countries?  A whole lot.

Head on over to the Center’s site to see our latest analysis — including lots of charts and graphs.

Here’s a snippet of what you’ll find…

Though China is often cited as the country’s next great military adversary, U.S. military spending currently doubles that of all of the countries in Asia combined. In 2012, the U.S. consumed 41 percent of total global military spending. The U.S. also remained in the top 10 highest spending countries as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), one widespread measure of military spending, trailing behind countries such as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, all of which have a significantly lower total military expenditure as well as a lower total GDP.

Posted in: Asia, China, North Korea, Nukes of Hazard blog, Security Spending

April 22, 2013

A Tale of Two Outliers: Comparing Options on Iran and North Korea

Over at LobeLog, I’ve published a piece exploring how the U.S. should deal with what Robert Litwak calls “nuclear outliers” – namely, Iran and North Korea. I argue that both countries present tough challenges for U.S. foreign policy as well as worldwid…

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Non-Proliferation, Nukes of Hazard blog

April 18, 2013

Senate Budget Signals Commitment to Ending War in Afghanistan Promptly

A little-noticed provision in the Senate budget resolution is an interesting example of setting political priorities through budgeting.

Due to the protracted showdown over sequestration and the federal budget, this year the House and Senate budget committees drafted budget resolutions before the White House did (usually the President’s budget comes first). These congressional budgets can be an important reflection of congressional priorities and sentiment – particularly this year, when there was no presidential budget from which to take cues.

For Fiscal Year 2014, the Senate’s budget provides $50 billion for the war in Afghanistan, through an account known as ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’ or OCO (which is separate from the base budget, since war is treated as a special contingency rather than a standard expenditure).

Several weeks later, the Obama administration’s budget requested a much larger  sum for FY 2014, asking for $88.5 billion as a placeholder until it settles on its withdrawal plans.

For 2015, the Senate halves the 2014 amount to $25 billion. After that, the Senate budget provides no war funding at all.. The budget resolution does clarify that reserve funding may be provided after 2015 as needed, but it seems that the preference is for any post-2015 war funding to come out of the base budget.

This is a telling provision, signaling the Senate’s rejection of the “endless war” that has become an American norm over the past decade. The fact that a special ‘contingency’ account for war has become a standard part of the defense budget shows that the federal budget takes war for granted – just like, unfortunately, much of the American public. Now, however, the Senate is using its budgetary priorities to indicate a welcome shift in political priorities.

For its part, the Republican-led House budget provided $90 billion in OCO funding for FY 2014 and $35 billion annually through FY 2023. The $35 billion is likely a placeholder, but it does suggest that the House is willing to continue to provide large sums for war funding for the foreseeable future.

It’s clear that the move to zero out OCO funding after 2015 reflects the Senate’s desire to end the war in Afghanistan, and its frustration with the lack of clear strategic objectives for our mission, as well as with the way that the war has been fought largely on ‘autopilot.’ Last year, the Senate voted 62-33 to accelerate the withdrawal from Afghanistan, with 13 Republicans voting aye, showing that it had the political will to support an end to the war. Since funding affects policy just as policy affects funding, the Senate’s latest action on the budget may show that there is now a will and a way to finally bring our involvement in Afghanistan to a close.

Let’s hope the White House is listening.

Posted in: Asia, Nukes of Hazard blog, Pentagon Budget, Security Spending

April 18, 2013

Understanding China’s Nuclear Arsenal – Comments by Maj. General Yao

On April 8, 2013, the Carnegie Endowment hosted their biannual Nuclear Policy Conference.  The first day was marked by a panel featuring U.S. Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, People’s Liberation Army Major General Yao Yunzhu (China,) and former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Alexei Arbatov.

The panel was entitled Prague 2.0? Deterrence, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Obama’s Second Term but the conversation provided an opportunity for General Yao, director of the Center on China-American Defense Relations at the Academy of Military Science, to offer some insights into China’s strategic thoughts and vision for its largely opaque nuclear program.

The major take-away from General Yao’s comments was her articulation of the three underpinnings of Chinese nuclear strategy.  According to General Yao, China’s nuclear arsenal requires three components: survivability, a penetration capacity and a deterrent threat.

General Yao repeatedly highlighted the Chinese no first-use doctrine and that more than ninety percent of the global nuclear arsenal is still controlled by the US and Russia, either as stored or deployed nuclear weapons.  In order to move toward a multilateral framework for arms control, General Yao said that the “U.S. and Russia have to do one or two rounds of negotiations to further reduce” their arsenals.

The panel also discussed further US-Russian bilateral reductions. During this conversation MP Abratov stated that “China is the only state that could quickly build up to level of U.S.-Russian” nuclear arsenal size.  

General Yao responded that, “China will not seek nuclear superiority” and that the smaller Nuclear Weapons States should promise not to enter an arms race with the U.S. or Russia.

MP Abratov called on the Chinese to be more transparent about the size of their nuclear arsenal.  “China is the only serious specter,” according to MP Abratov.  It seems strange for a Russian to criticize the Chinese on a lack of transparency with their arsenal which has been a hallmark of Soviet and Russian policy.

General Yao responded that due to the small size of the Chinese arsenal and its no first-use a “certain amount of opaqueness is necessary” to achieve its three required characteristics..  General Yao also noted the presence of Chinese underground tunnels as part of their survivability strategy. These tunnels have prompted a small number of observers to argue that China could be storing a much larger number of nuclear warheads than US intelligence estimates suggest, though there is little evidence to support this view.  

Undersecretary Gottemoeller did praise the Chinese for their efforts to lead a terminology working group for nuclear weapons that would help to create mutual understanding among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council.  She cited the need to “create fabric, environment for future multilateral negotiations.”  However, Undersecretary Gottemoeller seemed to be the only panelist looking forward to multilateral arms controls talks in the near-term.

Posted in: Asia, China, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, Russia

April 17, 2013

Nukes, Missiles and Feints: The Real Deal on Iran and North Korea

A Conversation about the Current Situation in North Korea and How it Differs from Iran

Washington DC – April 16, 2013– Press Advisory– The rhetoric from North Korea has become increasingly hostile. Last Friday, the country warned that “nuclear war is unavoidable” and declared that Tokyo would be its first target in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. This statement is just the latest in an escalating war of words and rising tensions between North Korean officials and the United State.

Join Truman Project President Rachel Kleinfeld – just back from Japan – and an expert panel as they discuss the current situation in North Korea, how the situation differs from that of Iran, and how we can better understand Asian hard security and the nuclear challenge?

Who:
L. Gordon Flake, executive director, Mansfield Foundation
Laicie Heeley, senior policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Alexandra Toma, founder, Fissile Materials Working Group
Moderator: Rachel Kleinfeld, President of the Truman Project

When: Friday, April 19th, 9:30am-10:45am ET

Where:Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Ave. NW Suite 333
Washington, 20001

Breakfast will be served.

RSVP here

####

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is a Washington-based non-profit think tank working to reduce the number of nuclear weapons stockpiled across the globe, increase international nonproliferation programs targeted at preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, redirect U.S. military spending to address 21st century security threats and halt the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. www.armscontrolcenter.org

Posted in: Asia, Iran Diplomacy, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog

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