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Ramping Up the Rhetoric: Does the Israeli Public Support the Claims its Leaders Are Making?

Despite the fact that most experts, including U.S. military leaders, are clear that Iran has not yet made the decision to pursue nuclear weapons, there has of late been a great deal of speculation as to when (not if) there will be a military attack on Iran. The hysteria was only enhanced by President Obama’s recent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

When considering this hype, however, one should examine the views of the Israeli public on military action. Shibley Telhami, a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and a professor at the University of Maryland, has conducted a poll, in partnership with the Dahaf Institute in Israel on Israeli public opinion with regard to Iran.

According to the results of the poll, which was concluded on February 26, 2012, only 19% of Israelis surveyed believed that Israel should strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, even without the support of the U.S. This number increased to 42% when the question was whether Israel should strike Iran with the support of the United States. However, a significant percentage of respondents – 34% – responded that Israel should not strike Iran.

Only 22% of respondents agreed that a strike on Iran’s nuclear program would delay the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon by more than 5 years. Nearly the same number – 19% – believed that an Israeli strike would have no effect on Iran’s nuclear program. These results show us that while the Israeli government is trying to ramp up its rhetoric on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Israeli people appear to be less sure about whether the military option is the best course of action.  

At a Brookings Institution event on February 29, 2012, Telhami presented the poll data and discussed the political situation in Israel. Commenting on the data was Natan Sachs, a Fellow at Brookings. Sachs noted that although Israeli elections aren’t due until 2013, Netanyahu would almost certainly want elections to be concluded before considering a military strike on Iran. In other words, he would want a clear demonstration of support from the Israeli public, rather than try to win an election while at the same time coordinating a military attack on Iran.

Therefore, it will be critical to watch when Netanyahu calls for elections in Israel, because this could be a sign that he is considering a military strike soon after these electoral questions are resolved, assuming of course he remains Prime Minister.

And if it seems like there’s discord in Israel over this issue, it’s even worse in the United States. A CNN/ORC Poll conducted between February 10-13, 2012 found that an overwhelming 60% of those polled agreed that the U.S. should engage in strong diplomatic and economic efforts in response to the current Iranian nuclear program. Only 17% of respondents would attack Iran right now. Interestingly, during the same time (February 12-15) in 2010, the number of Americans who would attack Iran was even higher than it is now. Additionally, a poll conducted by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) found that the American public is strongly opposed to a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities.

It is worth noting that since the rhetoric on Iran has ramped up, so has the amount of polling that has been done on this issue. These polls, however, have yielded contrasting results. For an explanation of why you may have seen poll results that contradict the polls I am presenting here, check out this article.

So it is clear that while the Iran war hype might make for good media, it’s not representative of current public opinion trends. And we do know that public opinion is a factor that leaders consider in their decision-making process. So hopefully, the voices of their constituents will give them a reason to think carefully before acting.

NNSA Nuclear/Radiological Material Security Budget Doesn’t Make the Grade

On March 14 the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia held a hearing titled “Managing Interagency Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts: Are We Effectively Securing Nuclear Materials Around the World?”

The hearing focused on the status of the U.S.-led effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. Of particular interest was a question asked by Subcommittee Chairman Daniel Akaka on the FY 2013 budget request for nuclear material security programs.  Below is Sen. Akaka’s exchange with Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Anne Harrington on the request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s material security activities.

SEN. AKAKA: …

Ken Luongo, who is president of the Partnership for Global Security, has raised concerns that this budget is inadequate to meet the nuclear threat to American and international security and could undermine the four-year nuclear security agenda. Others likely will argue that we cannot fully fund the president’s requests.

Please respond to Mr. Luongo’s view that more funding is needed, and address what affect less funding would have on our ability to effectively secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials.

Ms. Harrington.

MS. HARRINGTON: I noticed that Mr. Handelman is letting me take this question first, thank you.

If you look at budget projections that were presented several years ago for where we would be in the 2013-2014 space, they’re quite different from where we are right now. But that is very much a reflection of fiscal realities in the United States. The Budget Control Act governs what our limits are going to be. The Budget Committees are very constrained overall. And so across the government, every agency every program is looking at how it can continue to meet mission goals, but with less resource.

We are no exception. And we are confident that the 2013 budget as presented will allow us to continue to meet our four-year goals. That does not mean that it’s only the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Program, but we have to maintain the funding in other programs that are also part of this overall effort. There are at least four different program areas that support the four-year effort, in my office. So we have done our best to balance across those programs to make some tough decisions, but we believe they were the right decisions to be able to carry this effort forward. Thank you.

Harrington is correct that the current budget environment requires difficult budgetary tradeoffs and that an appropriate balance must be struck. However, while the budget request for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Materials Protection and Cooperation program (INMPC), the two core NNSA programs in the effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials at an accelerated rate were cut by $291 million relative to last year’s appropriated level, the request for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program is $229 million more than last year’s level.

In addition, the FY 2013 budget includes a onetime request of $150 million for USEC. Formerly the U.S. Enrichment Corp., USEC is a privately owned company that is attempting to build a new gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant to produce fuel for nuclear power plants at Piketon, near Portsmouth in southern Ohio.

Neither the MOX program nor USEC are core material security programs or contribute to the mission of the four year goal. Last year the House Energy and Water appropriations subcommittee noted that the rising costs of the MOX program’s construction projects are a “threat…to the progress of core nonproliferation activities.” The Senate expressed similar concerns.

There’s of course more to the story than just the topline budget numbers. In short, as Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-IN), ranking member on the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, noted at the subcommittee’s March 6 hearing on the NNSA nonproliferation budget, it’s difficult to conclude that NNSA struck the right balance within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account.

For more on the shortcomings of the FY 2013 budget request not only at NNSA, but across the government, see Ken Luongo’s opening statement at the March 14 hearing’s second panel here.

Understatement of the Day: Nuclear Weapons Funding Edition

“Realistically,” in that the Obama nuclear spending pledge was made “nine months before the Budget Control Act became law, falling 4 percent short of the $7.9 billion target is reasonable given the fiscal reality facing us today.”

Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE), Chairman of the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, March 14, 2012.

For more background on Republican criticisms of the FY 2013 request for nuclear weapons programs, see here. We’ll have a more detailed response to the recent Republican Policy Committee memo on nuclear weapons funding and the text of Rep. Michael Turner’s (R-OH) “Maintaining the President’s Commitment to our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security Act of 2012” soon.

"When less is not more"

My March Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column is now online and I tried to tackle the issue of whether it makes sense for the U.S. to place greater emphasis on counterforce (i.e. targeting an adversary’s leadership and strategic forces) in its nucl…