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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

December 21, 2011

What the super committee’s failure means for nuclear weapons

Last week I debuted as a regular columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  I wrote my first column on the implications of the Supercommitee’s failure for U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  Here’s a taste: Fortunately, scaling back plan…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 19, 2011

North Korea After Kim Jong-il

As most readers are by now aware, North Korean media announced its leader Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011. Questions remain about North Korea after Kim Jong-il.  Center Deputy Director Duyeon Kim has posted some initial thoughts about the Dear Leader’s passing and what to expect from the upcoming leadership transition over at the mothership.  You can read it there or below the jump.

North Korea After Kim Jong-il

By Duyeon Kim

North Korea’s official media today announced the death of its leader Kim Jong-il. While the consequences of his death are difficult to predict at this early stage, immediate chaos and turmoil on the ground appears unlikely. The North has been preparing for this day since Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008 and the naming of his son Kim Jong-un as successor last year. The next leader is technically already in place. While details of the next leadership structure are uncertain, though a collective leadership is possible, a relatively stable situation and transition is expected in the near term.

The international community should remain calm, cautious and patient while preparing for unexpected scenarios, but it is important to refrain from aggravating the North at this time. Close consultations among the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and Russia are important to ensure stability in the region during the leadership transition and prevent possible miscalculations.

One variable to keep an eye on is the handling of the transition by the new and old ruling elite and the possibility of a power struggle, though this scenario appears unlikely immediately. It remains to be seen if and how Kim Jong-un will bring about unity and cohesion among the various factions of the regime, and whether the young Kim will receive the loyalty and support critical for a leader. It is also unclear how the next leadership will manage relations with China.

Provocations have always been an integral part of North Korean tactics unleashed depending on circumstance and timing. If the new leader determines he must display strength to win the support of the North’s military and elite, another round of provocations cannot be ruled out in the future, especially with celebrations in 2012 aimed at opening the doors to becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.”

An immediate uprising by the North Korean populace as witnessed with the Arab Spring appears unlikely. There have been reports of discontent among North Koreans, but they do not have the same types of communications methods as the outside world and they would need someone prominent to lead such an uprising. However, the possibility of a coup d’état at some point remains uncertain.

Nuclear talks will likely be put on hold for the time being, particularly the U.S.-North Korea bilateral that was slated for this week, as the North will be in a period of mourning at least until December 29th. When the North’s founder Kim Il-sung died in 1994, U.S.-North Korea talks were halted for three months.

Still, the U.S. and its allies should remain open to continue engagement with the North as seen in recent weeks.

A change in North Korea’s leadership does not necessarily mean a major change in key policies, particularly the regime’s nuclear policy. Kim Jong-un is likely to implement his father’s policies without major changes in the near term. Since Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs are perceived to be the crux of the regime’s survival, it seems unlikely they will readily abandon their nuclear stockpiles. This means Kim Jong-il’s death may not change the key sticking points in six-way nuclear talks.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 15, 2011

House Republicans Push Spending Bill Ahead

Late last night (about 11:40pm) House Republicans introduced a $915 billion spending bill in a power play that would keep the government in operation beyond the weekend.  The maneuver comes as a response to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s attempt, in conjunction with the White House, to put off movement on nine unfinished 2012 appropriations bills until Congress has agreed upon a separate package to extend a payroll tax break and jobless benefits.  

Senate leaders fear, with good reason, that the House will simply pass its version of key measures and adjourn for the year, leaving the Senate a take-it-or-leave it choice.

The White House has asked Congress to pass a stop-gap spending bill to provide more time to work out a compromise on some controversial provisions included in the spending package, but Republicans have not indicated they would advance such a bill.

Despite some controversial provisions, however, including those on travel to Cuba, the measure is understood to be relatively close to the expected conference agreement.

“We’ve got an agreement between appropriators in the House and the Senate – Democrats and Republicans – on a bipartisan bill to fund our government. We believe that the responsible thing to do is to move this,” said House Speaker John Boehner.

The defense bill advanced by House Republicans would provide $518.1 billion for the Pentagon base budget, an increase of $5.1 billion over fiscal year 2011 (fy11) and a reduction of $20.8 billion below the President’s request.  Senate Appropriations Committee-approved language would provide $513 billion, a number achieved largely through the shifting of funds from the base account to the war account.

In addition, the bill would provide $115.1 billion for ongoing war operations largely in Afghanistan, $2.8 billion below the President’s request and $43 billion below fy11 appropriations.  The Senate Appropriations Committee would fund the wars at $117.5 billion.

A final agreement is expected in the coming days.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 14, 2011

GOP Presidential Candidates on Foreign Policy

The U.S. presidential election is less than a year away and the media is currently filled with news regarding the Republican presidential candidates. The week after Thanksgiving, Project for Excellence in Journalism reported that the 2012 election rece…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 13, 2011

Summary of FY 2012 NDAA Conference provisions on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Missile Defense

On December 12 the Senate and House Armed Services Committees filed the Conference report on the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.  Congress is expected to send the measure to the President’s desk before the end of the year.  

We’ll have a more comprehensive summary out soon, but our early verdict on the bill’s nuclear weapons policy and missile defense provisions is that Senate and House conferees deserve credit for responsibly bridging the differences between the two versions of the bill.

The original House version of the defense bill (H.R. 1540) included many objectionable limitations on nuclear and missile defense policy matters that would 1) constrain the Pentagon’s ability to implement the New START treaty and 2) undercut the Constitutional authority of the President and senior military leaders to determine U.S. nuclear force structure and engage in discussions with the Russians on missile defense cooperation. The White House threatened to veto the final bill if it included such constraints. You can read our full analysis of the House version of the bill here.

In contrast the Senate bill (S. 1253) contained a number of reporting requirements on nuclear policy issues, but it does not impose policy or funding limitations. You can read our full analysis of the Senate versions of the bill here and here.

The Conference Committee report largely follows in the footsteps of the Senate bill.  It requires a number of reports and includes several Sense of Congress provisions, but it eliminates or significantly scales back the objectionable House provisions without compromising Congress’ important oversight responsibilities over U.S. nuclear policy.  

You can read the longer analysis here.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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