By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this Friday’s in the weeds theoretical/conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Sigal, L. V., 2011. Political Prospects for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia. Pacific Focus. XXXVI: 1, April 2011. pp22-36.

“A Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) or a Japan–South Korea NWFZ could help entice the DPRK to carry out its commitment in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs”. (p.22).

In this article, Leon Sigal, makes the argument that a Northeast Asian or a Japan-South Korea nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) would be beneficial for security in the region. In his opinion, there are two possible scenarios for the nuclear future of North Korea: containment or gradual rapprochement with its neighbours and the US. A regional NWFZ would be favourable could support either scenario. Political, economic and military containment is the strategy which the US and its allies have used against North Korea since the end of the Cold War. If this strategy, which has proven not to be very successful since North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, continues then a NWFZ between Japan and South Korea would strengthen containment. However, it could also lead the way to rapprochement since it would move in the direction of satisfying “Pyongyang’s longstanding demand for nuclear reassurances”. Sigal concludes that the NWFZ would be more viable if China and Russia join the pact, but that they probably will not do so without a commitment from the US. Although Sigal appears to doubt that this will happen soon, he believes that we are moving in the right direction and that beginning discussions between South Korea and Japan would be an advantageous starting point.

Fravel, T.M. & Medeiros, E.S., 2010. China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: the Evolution of Chinese Force Structure. International Security.  XXXV:2 Fall 2010. Pp 48-87.

“China’s leaders have never equated the size of their arsenal with China’s national power. Instead, to be seen as powerful and to deter attacks against it, China needs only a small number of nuclear weapons.”

In the article “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation the Evolution of Chinese Force Structure” M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros attempt to determine why China has not built a larger nuclear force.  They determine that China’s leaders have simple views of the role of nuclear weapons (2010, 85).  China’s leaders lacked the experience needed to fully utilize nuclear weapons in their national strategy.  Fravel and Medeiros found that while China has put more attention into developing their nuclear program, they still hold to their early leader’s belief in an assured second strike capability and the importance of conventional land forces.  Instead of increasing the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, Chinese leaders have focused on making their nuclear deterrent more difficult to destroy by emphasizing mobile launchers.    

Zhang, B., 2011. U.S. missile defence and China’s nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence-defence arms race. International Affairs.  LXXXVII: 3 May 2011. Pp. 555-569.

“The rise of U.S. missile defence has altered the rationale for the force development of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. (2010, pg. 561)”

In the article “U.S. missile defence and China’s nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race” Baohui Zhang explores the consequences of increasing the capability of the United States’ missile defence capabilities on China’s nuclear force.  Zhang finds that China’s current force structure is designed for a limited second strike capability, allowing it to have a smaller, more mobile nuclear force.  If the United States increases its ability to find and neutralize China’s nuclear missiles, then China will need to expand its nuclear force in order to be able to overcome the United States’ new defensive capability.  Zhang believes that increased dialogue between the United States and China may help to reduce China’s concerns and prevent an arms race with China.  

Jeffrey Lewis (aka Armscontrolwonk) and Elbridge Colby recently penned a provocative article calling on the Obama administration to modify the B83 gravity bomb in order to hold certain hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) in North Korea at risk.  

According to Jeffrey and Bridge, this capability would threaten underground bunkers where Kim Jong-Il might seek refuge or hide some of his nuclear forces that cannot be targeted by existing conventional earth penetrators or nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing deterrence and our ability to reassure South Korea.  In addition, they argue that such a weapon wouldn’t violate the Nuclear Posture Review’s prohibition on the design and construction of new nuclear weapons with new military capabilities.

The piece has prompted many reactions and in response Jeffrey wrote a follow-up post over at Armscontrolwonk expanding on and clarifying some of their arguments.  I think Jeffrey and Bridge highlight a very serious issue (how to deter North Korea), but I disagree with their proposed solution.  I laid out my objections in a comment on Armscontrolwonk, which I’m crossposting below the jumb.  Be sure to check out the other comments, as well as Jeffrey’s responses, over at his blog here.  It’s a fascinating and important debate.

Jeffrey-

Thanks for the follow up post. A few thoughts:

I don’t really disagree with your point that a modified B83 would not be considered a new weapon under the Nuclear Posture Review – for better or for worse. However, in my view that’s not what this debate should be about.

For me the issue is whether your proposal makes sense for U.S. and South Korean security. I don’t think it does for the following reasons.

First, you write:

“there is some deterrent benefit to being able to hold at risk Kim Jong Il’s leadership facilities and nuclear forces, some of which are likely located in hard and deeply buried facilities immune to conventional attack. Or, to be more precise, I believe deterrence suffers some difficult-to-measure harm from not being able to hold those targets at risk and that steps to remedy that gap may be more reassuring to South Korea than other proposals, such as the deployment of fighter-delivered tactical nuclear weapons that Gary Samore mentioned.”

As you note, this is hardly a ringing endorsement, and still I think it overstates the ability of earth penetrating weapons to hold HDBTs at risk. As others have already pointed out, reliable intelligence about the location of underground targets (and whatever is inside them at a given point in time) is difficult to come by, North Korea could build deeper facilities or shift more assets to mobile facilities, and the collateral damage from an earth penetrating weapon would be extreme, further undermining its credibility. Moreover, an additional earth penetrator would give North Korea a convenient excuse to accelerate its nuclear program, thereby undermining U.S. and South Korean efforts to denuclearize the peninsula. Of course without access to all the relevant classified intelligence information, I can’t rule out that some targets might be susceptible to destruction by a modified B83, but given that North Korea could simply dig deeper in response to the U.S. deployment of such a weapon, I still doubt its’ deterrent benefit.

I also think you could be more precise about what exactly it is you mean to deter. Are you trying to deter North Korea from engaging in limited “peacetime” conventional provocations against the U.S. or U.S. allies, in light of mutual deterrence at the nuclear level (also known as the stability-instability paradox)? Put in another way, are you seeking to enhance deterrence of low-level conventional conflict by denying Kim Jong-Il a nuclear retaliatory capability (and a secure place to hide), such that the U.S. would have less fear of escalating in response to North Korean conventional provocations?

If so, I don’t think a modified B83 would do the heavy lifting you want it to do, for the reasons I’ve already laid out: namely, it can’t effectively hold HDBTs at risk. Furthermore, given Pyongyang’s ability to wreak terrible destruction on Seoul with its conventional forces, I imagine the U.S. would be wary of escalating even if North Korea didn’t have nuclear weapons.

If you’re trying to deter North Korea from launching a large-scale conventional attack against South Korea or threatening to use or using nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with the U.S. or South Korea (i.e. all-out war), I doubt a modified B83 would add anything to deterrence, as the U.S. already possesses robust nuclear and conventional capabilities with which to eliminate the North Korean regime.

Moreover, I think you also need to consider the implications of a modified B83 for crisis stability. In the event of a severe crisis or once a conventional war has begun, enhanced U.S. counterforce capabilities could prompt North Korea to take destabilizing measures to enhance the survivability of its forces by, for example, predelegating launch authority to field commanders. Likewise, the perceived ability to take out Kim Jong-Il in a hardened underground bunker could also create strong incentives for the U.S. to attack early in a conflict, lest the Dear Leader take steps to increase the survivability of his bunkers and forces, thereby closing the U.S. window of opportunity. While some of these crisis pressures would exist even in the absence of a modified B83, the additional capability would exacerbate them.

Regarding the reassurance of South Korea, I agree that a modified B83 is a better alternative than redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Peninsula. However, that’s the wrong standard by which to judge your proposal, especially since (as far as I can tell) the constituency in South Korea in favor of redeployment is confined to a small number of conservative Korean officials and academics.

I don’t doubt that North Korea’s recent provocations present real security challenges, but I don’t see how the deployment of a small number of modified B83s would be anything more than a temporary means of reassurance – North Korea can simply build deeper bunkers.

In addition, I think there’s a risk to relying on a nuclear capability of highly questionable utility as a measure of the strength and vitality of the U.S. commitment to South Korea’s security. The more the U.S. and South Korea lean on such capabilities as a crutch, the easier it is to avoid difficult but much needed discussions about how the U.S. can continue to guarantee South Korea’s security even as we continue to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. I think the extensive discussions among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan that ultimately led to the retirement of the TLAM-N provide an excellent model as to how this can be achieved.

I also weigh the balance of nonproliferation and deterrence goals differently than you do. Regardless of an existing mid-1990s era requirement for a hard rock penetrator, a modified B83 (particularly to deter limited conventional attacks) would signal a step back in the U.S. effort to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, thereby undermining U.S. nonproliferation objectives. I think this cost (along with the others I’ve highlighted above) outweighs the very minimal (at best) deterrence benefit a modified B83 might provide.

Finally, given the current economic environment, I think you need to at least offer an estimated cost of the modification you’re proposing. Given that you don’t envision this as anything more than a niche capability, perhaps the cost would be minimal, but it would be helpful in assessing its affordability and opportunity costs.

For all you Korea watchers — Keep an eye out for the news this week and next. South Korea’s newly appointed chief nuclear envoy Lim Sung-nam touched down in Washington today for talks with senior U.S. officials. He’s expected to discuss the results of…

Prime Minster Vladimir Putin is running for President again, confirming suspicions that the plan to put Russia’s eight year president back in the saddle has been long in the making.  Current President Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s protégé, announced that he fully supports Putin’s candidacy and will not run for a second term, but take up the post of Prime Minister held by Putin.

Better than swapping wives, but not much.

In his political career, Putin has romanticized the superpower Soviet Union of his youth, reprimanded Secretary of State Clinton in public and, generally, warmed less to the West than his protégé. However, despite fears that Putin’s guaranteed victory will change U.S.-Russian relations, evidence points instead to the maintenance of the status quo.  

First, those concerned about that modernization or democratic reforms will be rolled back in Russia should remember that Russia’s democratic accountability decreased, corruption continued unchecked and civil society and judicial independence diminished under Medvedev.  

Second, personal relations between President Putin and President Obama will certainly be different, but U.S.-Russia relations are unlikely to sour because of the change.  Putin is too pragmatic a leader to damage relationships, such as that with the U.S., that benefit Russia.  Moreover, the interaction between Russia and the U.S. is not based on personalities, but national interests.  

Third, national interests will not change dramatically with the change of presidents because for the past four years, Putin has made or supported key policy decisions by his protégé.  U.S.-Russian cooperation on U.N. sanctions on Iran, Russian-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan and implementation of the New START treaty are likely to continue.  

In terms of arms control, the prognosis for progress on future nuclear weapons reductions does not hinge on whether Putin or Medvedev is behind decision-making.  As the Brookings Institution’s Steve Pifer recently wrote, “Russia’s strategic approach to arms control with the United States likely will not change.’  Future negotiations with Russia will be challenging because the U.S. and Russia currently appear to want different things, but that would be true under either leader.

When elected, Vladimir Putin could hold the presidency from 2012 to 2024. Thus, it would serve U.S. relations to make the best of the situation while focusing on improving relations and upholding the reset policy.  

September 24 marked the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since then, little progress has been made on the treaty’s entry into force. In a creative attempt to ensure the permanence of some of the CTBT’s essential functions, some observers are calling on states to remove the provisional status of the treaty’s key institutions.

The CTBT has been signed by 182 nations and ratified by 155. However, it will not enter into force until the remaining nine states from the list of 44 so-called Annex 2 states have ratified the treaty, including the U.S. and China. Despite the CTBT not having entered into force, the treaty’s Preparatory Commission and Provisional Secretariat provide invaluable services to many countries through an extensive monitoring network which not only detects nuclear testing but also provides early warning for tsunamis and tracks the fallout from nuclear accidents.

In other words, the CTBT offers much more than a ban on nuclear testing.

So long as the treaty remains in limbo, the benefits highlighted above are in danger. The biggest concern is that some countries will not want to keep funding treaty related activities unless they believe that the treaty will one day enter into force.

At a Stimson Center event on September 22, 2011, a panel of experts discussed options for securing the benefits of the CTBT.  Out of the four ‘legal’ options presented by David Koplow, an international legal scholar at the Georgetown University Law Center, simply changing how we refer to the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Secretariat appeared to be the favoured option. This solution would entail eliminating the Preparatory in front of Commission and the Provisional in front of Secretariat when referring to these organs.

An objection to this proposal is that it would be merely symbolic and akin to accepting that entry into force may not be possible. Michael Krepon, Co-Founder and Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, addressed this concern over at Armscontrolwonk:

“Some treaty supporters will argue that these steps are insufficient and poor substitutes for the treaty’s entry into force. They are correct. But they are also unable to persuade enough Republican Senators in the United States to vote for the Treaty, or to convince states like Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan and North Korea to come on board.”

While the entry into force of the treaty currently feels quite far away, changes to the way we think and talk about some of the CTBT’s key institutions could further entrench the key activities of treaty institutions as part of the taken-for-granted of international politics, thereby strengthening the case for the agreement’s entry into force.

Securing the benefits of the CTBT should be an imminent goal, not in conflict with other CTBT objectives.