Washington appears to be anticipating some answers from Pyongyang in talks this week in Geneva, but it might have already gotten a response – from the Dear Leader himself. (Click ‘Read More’)

A senior State Department official told reporters on background on October 19: “They (North Korea) needed to absorb the message (from July). They’ve had some time to think about it. I think we’ll see if they come with anything new in Geneva, and that will be a factor in whether we can move forward.”

In a rare written interview with the foreign press, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told Russia’s Itar-Tass that same day that “There is no change in our position that the Six Party Talks must resume without preconditions and that denuclearization must be realized by implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement based on the principle of action-for-action.”

So his message seems clear: 1. no change in North Korea’s position, 2. six-party talks without preconditions, 3. action-for-action. In other words, there probably won’t be “anything new.”

In a land where Kim Jong-il’s words are the law, it seems he has publically given his envoys crystal clear orders for this week’s bilateral discussion.

The interview was the first of its kind in nine years, and appears to be Kim Jong-il’s way of trying to gain the upper hand in this week’s talks. In doing so, he has essentially concluded talks before envoys boarded their flights.

Washington and Seoul’s positions are just as clear and firm – Pyongyang must take concrete steps prior to the six-party talks: Shut down its uranium enrichment program, invite IAEA inspectors back to Yongbyon, issue a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests, and pledge not to attack South Korea among others.

This raises the question of what can be accomplished in the near term. Simultaneous actions have been tried before, but in this case, Pyongyang has too many tasks to complete prior to the resumption of six-party talks.  

The North may want to negotiate its uranium enrichment program, unveiled to an American scientist last November, during this week’s Geneva talks but Washington and Seoul have been clear on the steps Pyongyang needs to take. Meanwhile, a looming contentious issue is food aid, which may in practical terms eventually be the dealmaker.

Although it appears the North walked into the bilateral meeting with a firm position, one curious development is Ri Yong-ho who, at a closed-door Beijing seminar last month on the sixth anniversary of the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement, reportedly mentioned a “package deal” to settle all outstanding issues.

Meanwhile, the same unnamed U.S. official last Wednesday also acknowledged that “This (bilateral talks) is, at this stage, an exploratory phase, and frankly, it’s a management strategy.”

This “management strategy” comes from the apparent U.S. belief that North Korea will refrain from provocations if it is engaged in dialogue. Not so fast – this is only partially true. History has shown that Pyongyang will unleash provocations even during dialogue if talks do not go their way.

Dialogue has not ended provocations – provocations have ended dialogue. The mere resumption of talks does not guarantee complete crisis management. North Korean provocations are like a ticking time bomb contingent upon their mood. It’s a tactic the U.S. must consider in every game plan.

Still, dialogue is surely better than no dialogue, especially as we approach an election year. Frequent contacts can help relieve public anxieties while building confidence and understanding, if done skillfully, could lead North Korea to meet some small conditions – even if it doesn’t lead swiftly to denuclearization.

The rest of Kim Jong-il’s interview reiterates his usual claims that nuclear weapons were developed to deter the U.S. and that he remains willing to normalize relations upon the abolition of a U.S. hostile policy. But one curious comment is a reference to his father and founder of the regime Kim Il-sung’s dying wish for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Kim Jong-il’s public message could also be another attempt at a charm offensive to steer international criticism away from its transgressions and intransigence and instead shift the blame toward Washington and Seoul.

Pyongyang’s intention is not all that is uncertain. The Geneva talks will convene amid a changing of the guards for Washington’s head envoy – a full-time diplomat this time – who, like his newly appointed deputy, has no prior experience with North Korea. A telling sign about Glyn Davies appointment could be his nuclear specialty as a functional expert having served as the U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, particularly when Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program could be the main sticking point in the Geneva talks and beyond.

Amid many uncertainties, perhaps Washington’s game plan is actually quite certain – that “frankly, it’s a management strategy.”

Muammar Qaddafi has been killed and his forty-two year dictatorship in Libya is over.

After seizing power in Libya by a military coup, Qaddafi renounced the Libyan constitution and upheld his rule through a combination of force and admiration from his cult-like following.  He amassed wealth with Libya’s oil, waged wars with neighboring states and was behind the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1994 that killed 270 people, including 189 Americans.  

When Libyans began to call for the ouster of Qaddafi seven months ago and NATO jets joined their campaign, it was unclear how this revolution would end.  In the nuclear non-proliferation community, however, there was a collective sigh of relief because Libya had given up its nuclear weapons program in2004.  Qaddafi could not use them against his people in revolt.

Under an agreement with the U.S. and U.K. that promised normalized relations with Libya, Qaddafi relinquished his entire nuclear weapons program.  The U.S. and U.K. dismantled, destroyed and airlifted out key components and documents on the program, Russia removed highly enriched uranium that it had supplied and the International Atomic Energy Agency began verification of nuclear sites.  Qaddafi did not have the nuclear option thanks to the tireless work of U.S. diplomacy and international non-proliferation organizations.

In Qaddafi’s death, the rebels achieved the goal that unified them, but the future is unclear.  Libya will face great challenges to cement a traditionally divided society, create a state with institutions and peacefully transition power.  Even if there is post-Qaddafi chaos, however, there is no opportunity to use nuclear weapons and no danger of the loss or theft of the remnants of the nuclear program.  

American military involvement in Libya through NATO was and remains controversial, particularly because the President declined to request authorization from Congress. Recently, the Administration sent another 100 soldiers to Uganda to defeat a powerful, violent rebel army.  And the neo-conservatives remain disappointed that the United States was not more aggressive militarily in protecting human rights.

However, we give thanks for the end of Qaddafi’s rule, the closure of a nuclear weapons program and continue to support the will of the Libyan people.

As Nick Roth and Ulrika Grufman documented last week, House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) recently sent a letter signed by the Republican members of the Subcommittee to Senate appropriators asking that they fully fund the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) weapons activities account.  Turner also sent a letter to the Supercommittee with the same message.  

Nick and Ulrika have already done a neat and clean job of rebutting many of Turner’s arguments.  One area that deserves further exploration, however, is the issue of where exactly money to offset reductions in weapons funding would come from.  

I examine this question in a new article over at the mothership.  Here’s the bottom line:

On Thursday, October 20 the San Antonio Express ran my Op-Ed calling on the Super Committee and Congress to make real changes in government spending, read- the defense budget. You can find it here. Below is an excerpt: Both the “supercommittee,” a gr…

STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler spoke to the Defense Writers Group yesterday and according to GSN’s Elaine Grossman, raised some interesting albeit vague questions about the future of the triad.  He also repeated an oft-heard argument about the likely impact of further reductions below New START levels on the triad:

 In a September interview with Arms Control Today, White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction terrorism Gary Samore stated that “we’ve reached the level in our forces where further reductions will raise questions about whether we retain the triad or whether we go to a system that only is a dyad.”  He didn’t elaborate as to why he believes this to be the case.

Is the conventional wisdom correct?  

In their now well-known article arguing that the U.S. can maintain stable deterrence with a nuclear force of 311 nuclear weapons deployed on a triad of delivery vehicles, Col B. Chance Saltzman, chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters Air Force, and two professors at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama stated that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “should be based primarily on the requirements for a stable, reliable, nuclear deterrent, with support issues like industrial base support, crew force management, and training only weighing in as secondary considerations.”  

In a follow-up article responding to their critics, Saltzman et al., go into greater detail:

The authors don’t appear to deny that maintenance of the triad at lower levels may not be cost-effective (particularly if the Pentagon is forced to make significant spending reductions).  Moreover, they don’t address the potential impact on strategic stability of maintaining a triad at lower numbers or building new systems. They also don’t offer much in the way of advice as to how to circumvent entrenched political interests calling for the maintenance of the triad at or near current levels (i.e. the ICBM caucus).

Nonetheless, its interesting food for thought, especially their claim that its possible to sustain expertise and a motivated work force with fewer nuclear weapons.