By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

National missile defense and (dis)satisfaction
Quackenbush, S.L. & Drury, A. C., 2011. National missile defense and (dis)satisfaction. Journal of Peace Research. 48:4, July 2011. pp.469-480.

“Our empirical analysis finds no support at all for the extant, informal arguments that the development and deployment of missile defense by the United States actually creates dissatisfaction in other states.” (p.479)

This article by Stephen L Quackenbush and A Cooper Drury tries to address the question of whether the development of a U.S. missile defence affects deterrence stability. They take this question a step further by arguing that you first have to establish whether dissatisfaction with a national missile defence causes instability. Secondly, you need to investigate whether the development of a U.S. missile defence has caused dissatisfaction in other states. By using a game-theoretic model of deterrence they conclude that if the development of a national missile defence system causes dissatisfaction in other states, then this can make deterrence more difficult. This is because the dissatisfied states have more reason to challenge the status-quo. However, when examining whether the U.S.’ development of a missile system has caused dissatisfaction in other states, they found that this was not the case. They thus conclude that the development of an American missile defence does not affect deterrence.

To Deter or Not to Deter: Applying Historical Lessons to the Iranian Nuclear Challenge
Graham, C.M., 2011.  To Deter or Not to Deter: Applying Historical Lessons to the Iranian Nuclear Challenge.  Strategic Studies Quarterly. 5:3, Fall 2011. pp. 50-66.

“Mao Zedong was also a much more ruthless and revolutionary figure than Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” (p. 62)

Applying lessons from the United States’ experience with China, Cheryl Graham examines the current situation with Iran’s nuclear program.  Graham begins by examining the relationship the United States had with China in 1964 as China acquired its first nuclear weapon.  When China developed their first nuclear weapon, the relationship between China and the United States was very poor.  Graham found that the United States viewed deterrence with China as untenable and made statements that it would not allow China to develop nuclear weapons.  Graham asserts that China, under Mao Zedong was more of a threat to the United States than Iran.  Yet China developed nuclear weapons, and the United States never experienced a nuclear attack by China.  The article applies these lessons to the situation with Iran, and finds that similar rhetoric is being used to describe a nuclear Iran.  Graham refutes these claims, and by comparing Iran to China finds that a nuclear Iran will still fall under traditional deterrence.    

A Crude Threat: The Limit of an Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil
Itzkowitz, J.R., Priebe, M., 2011. A Crude Threat: The Limit of an Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil. International Security. 36:1, Summer 2011. pp. 167-201.

“Given the presence of redundant facilities, some oil networks may have few, if any, targets that can incapacitate an entire system.” (p. 201)

Authors Joshua Itzkowitz and Miranda Priebe examine Iran’s ballistic missile capability, and the threat these missiles pose to Saudi Arabian oil fields.  They find that at its current state of development, Iran’s ballistic missiles do not pose a serious threat to Saudi Arabian oil production.  Oil production facilities are often spread out, and difficult to completely destroy, and Iran’s ballistic missiles are not accurate enough to make a significant impact.  Saudi Arabia has alternate ports to continue exporting oil if some along the Persian Gulf are damaged, and while oil production may go down, it would not be as significant as originally believed.  The authors find this is important for the United States, as one of the principle reasons that the United States does not take more aggressive action against Iran is because of threats by Iran to attack Saudi Arabian oil facilities.  The authors also find that the U.S. military force structure in the Middle East is heavily influenced by this threat, and that perhaps the U.S. could reorganize its forces more efficiently as the threat is not as significant as conventional wisdom asserts.  

*Note: This post has been updated.

How much does the U.S. spend (and plan to spend) on nuclear weapons?  This important question is finally receiving the public scrutiny that it deserves.

On October 11, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) held a press conference to highlight a letter he sent to the Congressional Supercommittee urging them to reduce nuclear weapons spending and use the resulting savings to invest in higher priority programs.  In the letter, which was signed by 65 Members, Markey argued that the U.S. will spend an estimated $700 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next ten years.

Later that day, Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, disputed Markey’s $700 billion cost-estimate, calling it “not factual.”  According to Turner, “The President submitted to Congress and pledged to fund nuclear modernization programs at $212 billion over ten years, or approximately $21.2 billion a year.”

The debate between Markey and Turner resurfaced at a November 2 Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the current status and future direction for U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  Turner asked the witness panel consisting of administration officials responsible for U.S. nuclear weapons about the accuracy of Rep. Markey’s estimate of nuclear weapons spending.    

In response, Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said:

“I’ve had an opportunity to look at some of the materials that were referenced in those cost estimates just before coming over here and I- without giving this more time than it deserves – suffice it to say there was double counting and some rather curious arithmetic involved.”

Miller went on to state that

“the Section 1251 Report that was submitted by the administration included our best estimate of the total costs [of] the amount of a nuclear enterprise and the delivery systems from FY12 through FY21….was $125.8 billion for the delivery systems and about $88 billion for the NNSA related costs. And my math suggests that that is…a little over $200 billion over that period, close to $214 billion.”

So who’s right?  How much does the U.S. plan to spend on nuclear weapons over the next decade?  It appears that Turner and the administration may only count a portion of the projected cost.

Parsing Rep. Markey’s $700 Billion Estimate

First, it’s important to clarify that Markey’s cost-estimate includes projected spending on nuclear weapons and related programs.  According to the Ploughshares Fund, the source of the $700 billion figure cited by Markey, these related programs include missile defense, nuclear threat reduction, nuclear incident management, and deferred and environmental health costs (see their handy fact sheet explaining their methodology here).  Ploughshares’ estimate of the direct costs of operating, sustaining, and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces is somewhere between $348 and $473 billion over the next decade, depending on how much of the $125 billion in proposed Pentagon spending on nuclear weapons is new money above base budgets, which is still not clear (more on this below).

It’s perfectly legitimate to debate whether the related programs included by Ploughshares should be considered part of a full cost accounting of nuclear weapons. I believe they should.  As Jeffrey Lewis noted recently, these related programs are part of the cost of having nuclear weapons.  However, if Turner wants to debate how much the U.S. spends solely on operating, sustaining, and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons, then the appropriate comparison is between the administration’s estimate of $214 billion and the Ploughshares estimate of $348-$473 billion.  

The Pentagon’s Share of Nuclear Weapons Spending: More than $125 Billion?

The administration’s estimate of $214 billion in spending on nuclear weapons over the next decade includes $88 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) weapons activities account and about $125 million in spending for the Pentagon.  The $88 billion figure is clear and precise.  We know how much the administration plans to request each year and we know what activities this money will support.  

However, this figure probably underestimates the NNSA portion of nuclear weapons spending because it does not appear to include the costs to NNSA of building the new reactor plant for the Ohio-class follow-on ballistic missile submarine, also known as the SSBN(X).  

In contrast, the Pentagon’s estimate of $125 billion in spending on nuclear weapons is far more vague and opaque.  It has not specified what activities and programs this funding supports.

Ploughshares incorporates the administration’s 10-year estimate for NNSA.  However, its estimate for the Pentagon’s share of nuclear spending over the next decade is much higher than $125 billion.  

The Ploughshares estimate of $700 billion in planned spending on nuclear weapons and related activities is based on a January 2009 study by Stephen Schwartz and Deepti Choubey, which used publicly available government documents to estimate the total cost of U.S. nuclear weapons and related programs.  According to Schwartz and Choubey, the U.S. spent at least $52.4 billion on nuclear weapons and related activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 (a similar study performed by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in 2006 estimated total spending to be $54 billion).  Of that amount, the Pentagon devoted at least $22.5 billion to operate and sustain the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  

Based on this estimate (and assuming that Pentagon spending will continue to keep pace with the inflation rate), Ploughshares projects the total base budget for the Pentagon’s share of nuclear weapons spending to be approximately $260 billion over the next decade.  This figure could be even larger given that the Pentagon plans to begin building new delivery systems (such as the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine) that were not part of the budget in FY 2008 – though how much larger is not clear.

Why is the Schwartz and Choubey estimate of the Pentagon’s share of nuclear weapons spending larger than the administration’s estimate?  

Though there is no way to be sure without access to the full Section 1251 report, it appears that the administration may only be counting the Pentagon’s Major Force Program 1, a department-wide accounting system created in 1962 that tracks the cost of strategic nuclear weapons programs.  According to Schwartz and Choubey, Major Force Program 1 includes a significant portion of nuclear weapons spending, but does not count a number of other important activities that directly support the nuclear arsenal.  The omissions include all intelligence-related spending, command, control, and communications costs, research and development spending, operations and support costs, and more. (UPDATE: 11/9: The Section 1251 report likely includes research and development money for the new Ohio-class replacement submarine and the next-generation bomber.)

Schwartz and Choubey estimated the FY 2008 appropriation for Major Forces Program 1 to be approximately $10 billion.  When adjusted for inflation and multiplied over the next decade, this figure does not appear to be that far off from the administration’s estimate of $125 billion in spending over the next decade.

UPDATE (11/11): The FY 2012 request for Major Force Program 1 is $11.4 billion. Between FY 2012 and FY 2016 the Pentagon plans to request $62.2 billion in then-year dollars for the Program. The spike in the rate of growth in FY 15 and FY 16 suggests that spending on Major Force Program 1 may exceed $125 billion (which makes sense given that the budget impact of the Ohio class replacement sub and next generation bomber will start to be felt at that time), meaning there may be some costs still associated with Major Force Program 1 that the Section 1251 report doesn’t include, such as a portion of spending on strategic bombers because only a small portion of their mission today is nuclear. But then this is all further complicated by the fact, as noted above, that the administration likely includes funding from other force programs, such as research and development costs for the Ohio-class replacement submarine. In other words we don’t know what the 1251 report counts. But if Schwartz and Choubey are right, it seems clear that the administration is not counting all the costs necessary to operate, support, sustain, and modernize the force.

Conclusion and Implications

The obvious implication of the debate between Reps. Turner and Markey is that Congress should require the Executive Branch to prepare a full cost accounting of U.S. nuclear weapons and related program spending (at the very least it’d be nice to get a look at what the Section 1251 report is and is not counting).  Congress can’t exercise effective oversight over nuclear weapons programs without accurate information about the cost of these programs.  It’s not even clear that the Pentagon knows exactly how much its spends on nuclear weapons.  As Schwartz and Choubey noted in their 2009 report:

Congress should require the executive branch to prepare and submit annually, in conjunction with the annual budget request, an unclassified and classified accounting of all nuclear weapons–related spending for the previous fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the next fiscal year. The DOD, using its Future Years Defense Program, should project its nuclear weapons–related spending five or six years into the future.

A second important conclusion is that no matter where you come down on the debate between Reps. Turner and Markey, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Pentagon cannot afford its current nuclear weapons spending plans. As former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, said in July: “The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money to do it.”  Many other high-ranking military leaders have expressed similar views, and are looking for ways to reduce costs.

Given these budget realities, Congress should ask the Congressional Budget Office , the Office of Management and Budget, or another appropriate agency to assess the full lifetime costs of the Pentagon’s plans to build new nuclear weapons delivery systems and suggest options for scaling back these programs to reduce costs.

By Kingston Reif and Ulrika Grufman

Last week, Brett Stephens of the Wall Street Journal, published a one-sided piece about China’s ongoing nuclear force modernization, specifically its construction of 3,000 miles of underground tunnels.  According to Stephens, these efforts suggest that:

1.    There is good reason to believe that China has far more than the approximately 250 nuclear weapons most experts believe it possesses
2.    China may be seeking the capability to “win” a nuclear exchange with the U.S.
3.    The U.S. should be wary of further bilateral nuclear reductions with Russia

The Carnegie Endowment’s James Acton has already done an excellent job of exposing the tenuous assumptions that inform Stephens’ analysis and outlining the many ways in which Stephens’ fails to assess the motivations behind China’s nuclear modernization.

As Acton notes, the U.S., which possesses nearly 2,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and many more in reserve, would have little to fear even if China did have far more nuclear weapons than the approximately 250 warheads it is believed to possess.  China on the other hand, does have understandable grounds for believing that the U.S. intention is to undermine the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent, given that the U.S. is improving the lethality of its nuclear forces and refuses to categorically state that it does not seek to negate China’s arsenal.

The Monterey Institute’s Jeffrey Lewis offered a similar view in testimony at an October 14 hearing of the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the nuclear modernization programs of Russia and China:

I believe that the Chinese nuclear program is driven by a very straight desire to have the same technological capabilities, though not the same numbers as Russia and the United States. So they will try to have at least one of whatever we might have a thousand of. And I think further that both Russia and China — although this will sound very strange — do fundamentally fear the United States would use nuclear weapons first. [emphasis ours].

Acton also makes the important point that we should look at our own history before we judge China’s extensive network of underground tunnels. In the late 1970s the U.S. military evaluated over 40 suggestions for how to render the MX missile (the largest missile the U.S. ever built), invulnerable to a Soviet attack. According to a 2005 New York Times article, “The ideas included flying them around on C-5 cargo planes, shuttling them in railroad cars, trucking them down highways, and moving them through tunnels from one silo to another as in an elaborate shell game.”

The suggestion finally adopted by President Carter was a proposal to build 4600 silos for 200 MX missiles; in other words 23 silos for each missile. The plan was never adopted but as Acton reminds us, it doesn’t sound all that different from what the Chinese may be trying to achieve with their underground tunnel system.

Still another problem with Stephens’ article is that it fails to make a compelling connection between what is supposedly happening in China and how this should affect U.S. defence policy. Concerns over Chinese (and Russian) nuclear weapons modernization has been raised by other pro-nuclear weapons advocates, including House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH). At the October 14 Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing referred to above, Turner argued:

We need to understand the potential long-term consequences as Russia and China modernize their nuclear arsenal while we sit back and simply maintain our aging nuclear forces

While the U.S. should clearly be cognizant of and attempt to understand the motivations behind Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization programs, that doesn’t mean America should blindly follow the same path as Russia and China.  As Kingston wrote in a 2009 article,

That Washington doesn’t follow the same approach to maintaining its forces as Russia, China, Britain, or France isn’t a sign of weakness or neglect. After all, constantly churning out new systems isn’t necessarily the mark of a more reliable, credible, or threatening force. In so far as the United States has pursued a different approach from other countries, it is because this approach has proven to be remarkably effective.

Moreover, worst case assumptions about Russian and Chinese modernization efforts could lead to ill-informed decisions about appropriate U.S. nuclear force levels and stockpile maintenance activities. Preventing the use of nuclear weapons by Russia or China “require[s] not “more” deterrence,” Jeffrey Lewis told Rep. Turner, “but continued attention from the United States to ensure that our overwhelming capacity to deter Russia and China is both effective and stable. “

Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was thinking on a related wavelength at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the New START treaty last summer:

Modernization for the sake of modernization, in light of the comments that Senator Lugar has made about the overall defense budget, is a separate question. Some things need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure and reliable. Other things don’t need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key to what we need to — we need to do.

Now that’s sound advice.

Yesterday Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin wrote a story on a recent letter sent by NGO leaders to President Obama encouraging him to play a more active role in defense of his budget for nuclear terrorism prevention programs.

In the past year nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs have been subject to unprecedented reductions. Given the Congressional mandate for significant cuts in federal spending over the next decade, there is a grave danger that the budget for these programs will continue to be at risk, which is exactly why the President’s voice is needed.

The full text of the NGO letter is pasted below the jump.  For more on the nuclear terrorism prevention budget, see our resource center here.

October 27, 2011

The President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We strongly urge you to make every effort to ensure that threat reduction and nonproliferation programs are funded at the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved level in the Fiscal Year 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.

Based on reports from Hill staff, we are concerned that while the final funding level remains unresolved, the Administration is not forcefully making the case for the Senate version of the bill, which in key respects is identical to your request. Put together with bipartisan agreement by Chair Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and ranking member Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and supported by Senators from both parties who want to help the Administration attain its anti-terrorism objectives, the levels in this bill need your active support to be enacted.

In a challenging fiscal environment when so many issues are bitterly partisan, the Senate Committee made difficult choices on a bi-partisan basis while protecting the key non-proliferation programs.

The disparity between the Senate and House levels for two particular programs stands out. The Senate approved the Administration’s request of $508.3 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative while the House cut the program by $85 million.

The Senate also approved the Administration’s request of $571.6 million for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program while the House cut that amount by $75.2 million.

In both cases, the House appropriation is less than the Fiscal Year 2011 levels, damaging the programs.

We highly commend your personal commitment to preventing nuclear terrorism, which has led the global community to take unprecedented action to secure and eliminate weapon-usable nuclear materials around the world.

Thanks to your leadership, the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. was an unprecedented event during which the leaders of 47 nations pledged their support to secure vulnerable nuclear materials on their soil and to work in tandem to decrease threat levels.

As you noted in your State of the Union address, “Because we rallied the world, nuclear materials are being locked down on every continent so they never fall into the hands of terrorists.”

Failure to approve the Senate-passed levels would significantly hamper U.S. efforts to secure vulnerable weapons and materials around the world. For example, NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative could face delays in converting dozens of reactors around the world that use bomb-grade highly enriched uranium to use low enriched uranium, compromise our ability to protect and eliminate radioactive materials at universities and hospitals that could be used in a dirty bomb, and hold up efforts to remove dangerous highly enriched uranium from sites around the globe.

Nuclear terrorism is the ultimate preventable catastrophe. If highly enriched uranium and plutonium are adequately secured or eliminated, they cannot be stolen for use in a nuclear device.

We urge you to ensure that threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Energy and Water Appropriations bill are funded at the FY 2012 requested level. No less than America’s national security is at stake.

Sincerely,*

Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill Former Ambassador to the IAEA

David Culp, Legislative Representative Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Jenefer Ellingston, Delegate Green Party

Charles D. Ferguson, President Federation of American Scientists

Lt. General (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr. Chair, Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation Jonathan Granoff, President Global Security Institute

Howard L. Hall, Ph.D., Director of Global Security Programs at the Howard Baker Jr Center The University of Tennessee

William D. Hartung, Director, Arms and Security Project Center for International Policy

Katie Heald, Coordinator Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

Paul Ingram, Executive Director British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

John Isaacs, Executive Director Council for a Livable World

William W. Keller, Director Center for International Trade & Security

Marylia Kelley, Executive Director Tri-Valley CAREs. Livermore, CA

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director Arms Control Association

Sarah McGough Student (Notre Dame) and Coordinator, Security Campaign Team Americans for Informed Democracy

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D., M.P.H. Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, American University

Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director Natural Resources Defense Council

Jon Rainwater, Executive Director Peace Action West

Susan Shear, Executive Director Women’s Action for New Directions

Patricia Taft, Senior Associate The Fund for Peace

Paul F. Walker, Ph.D., Director, Security and Sustainability Global Green USA

Dr. Jim Walsh, Research Associate MIT Security Studies Program

Peter Wilk, MD, Executive Director Physicians for Social Responsibility

Michael J. Wilson, National Director Americans For Democratic Action

James E. Winkler, General Secretary General Board of Church and Society The United Methodist Church

Stephen Young, Senior Analyst, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists

*Organization listed for affiliation purposes only

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Revisiting Osirak
Braut-Hegghammer, M., Revisiting Osirak: Preventative attacks and nuclear proliferation risks. International Security. 36:1, Summer 2011.  pp. 101-132.

“I conclude that the attack had mixed effects, but that the most important consequence was a transformation and intensification of Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.” (p. 131)

Braut-Hegghammer uses information gained since 2003 to re-examine the success of the Israeli air strike against the Osiriak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981.  He finds that the attack did force Iraq to be more secretive about its nuclear program, which slowed the pace of the program.  However before the attack Iraq was not organized in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and was not very dedicated in its pursuit.  After Osirak this changed, and Iraq became dedicated to acquiring nuclear weapons.  Braut-Hegghammer cautions that both those that argue that the Osirak attack was a success and those that insist it only made the situation worse are both missing some points.  He also finds that the Iraq situation was unique, and should not be used to predict the impact of a similar attack against another state’s nuclear program.  

Just in Case
Tanter, R., 2011. “Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia. Pacific Focus. 14:1. April 2011. pp.113-136.

“At root, Australians need to ask themselves whether their country needs to be, or should be, defended by nuclear weapons.” (p.132)

In this article, Richard Tanter highlights a number of questions regarding Australia’s reliance on extended nuclear deterrence from the US. Not only does he see problems in the lack of official information on the subject from both countries, but he also questions the actual deterrence model. According to Tanter there are roughly four different models of extended deterrence and the one Australia subscribes to he calls the “Just in case” model. This model differs from the others in a number of ways. For example there is no clear picture of what threats Australia faces and neither country appears to know what the plan of extended nuclear deterrence entails in this case. Tanter concludes his article by calling for substantial research to be done on the matter as well as questioning the inevitability of Australia relying on nuclear weapons for protection.

More Business as Usual?
Spear, J., 2011. More Business as Usual? The Obama Administration and the Nuclear Posture Review. Contemporary Security Policy. 32:1, April 2011. pp.241-263

“President Obama had many advantages in the struggle: popularity, domestic and international support, the backing of elder statesmen, but despite this the changes to United States nuclear posture will be modest. Forget ‘new practices’ of arms control; this is business as usual. (p.259)

Joanna Spear sets out to investigate why the early arms control rhetoric of the Obama Administration has not been realised in practice. She uses the debate over the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to examine what factors play a part in the foreign policy decision making process. As a tool to understanding the process, she uses Allison and Harlepin’s ‘bureaucratic politics’ paradigm which is a model of decision making. This model suggests that the process itself influences the outcome and it rejects the idea that decisions are the result of rational actors making rational choices. Instead the model focuses on bureaucratic aspects such as senior and junior officials as well as outside actors (the press, interest groups, the Congress). It also emphasises the importance of the President, yet highlights his limitations. Spear concludes that the outcome of the NPR can be explained by using the above model and it furthermore explains why President Obama’s ambitious rhetoric has not yet been realised.