Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don’t have to, #8

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this Monday’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack
Brown, G. D., Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack. Joint Forces Quarterly, October 2011, pp. 70-73.

“Iran’s “non-position” on the Stuxnet event has been frustrating to practitioners in the field of cyberspace operations. Finally, there was a well-documented, unambiguous cyber attack to dissect! And yet there was little official discussion of the issue because Iran passed up its opportunity to complain of an unjustified attack.”(p. 71)

Colonel Gary Brown explores the reasons that Iran did not specifically admit that its centrifuges were destroyed by a cyber attack in the form of the Stuxnet virus.  Brown then explores how the refusal resulted in a missed opportunity to further define cyber warfare.  Brown deduces that Iran did not condemn the attack because of embarrassment.  That the computer virus was able to cause so much damage to their nuclear centrifuges was not something Iran wanted to become public.  Other reasons Brown thought might have caused Iran’s silence are: Desire by Iran to use cyber attacks itself, perception that such an announcement would not gain any sympathy from the international community, and inability to prove who the perpetrator was.  Brown finds that whatever the reason for Iran’s silence, that silence resulted in a valuable missed opportunity to define the parameters of cyber warfare.  

Pushing and pulling: The Western system, nuclear weapons and Soviet change
Deudney, D. & Ikenberry, G.J. 2011. Pushing and pulling: The Western system, nuclear weapons and Soviet change. International Politics. 48:4-5, July 2011. pp.496–544.

“Unfortunately, looking to the post-Cold War era, both Reagan and Gorbachev turned out to be anomalies. The particular circumstances that had created the opportunities for extraordinary breakthroughs by the diplomacy of these two men and the small handful of their immediate associates disappeared almost as quickly as they had arisen.” (p.535)

Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry explore the outcome of the Cold War and the underlying reasons for its peaceful conclusion. They take an externalist approach; in other words they focus on what happened outside of the Soviet Union, whilst admitting that the failure of socialism played a major part. The authors argue that incentives from the western system as well as the existence of nuclear weapons where the key external factors which lead to the peaceful ending of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons made the Soviet Union feel secure and the weapon’s unprecedented destructive force also encouraged international cooperation. Lastly the authors argue that the individual character and experiences of Reagan and Gorbachev were important for the final outcome. However, they conclude by stating that the immediate post Cold War atmosphere, where arms control deals were struck and where cooperation seemed possible, has quickly vanished.

Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms in the 21st Century
Dalby, S. 2011. Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms in the 21st Century, Contemporary Security Policy. 32:1, May 2011. pp.40-56.

“The rise of Asian powers makes it especially clear that there are limits to American capabilities, and that arms control will have to recognize the geopolitical circumstances of globalization and imminent problems of climate change, urbanization, energy shortages, and numerous related issues.” (p.53)

Simon Dalby challenges the conceptual foundations on which current arms control debates are founded. He does so by highlighting the importance of geopolitics and the global changes caused by globalisation. Dalby argues that although the arms control rhetoric has changed considerably from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration, there is still an unrealistic state focus and an assumption of American superiority. He moreover claims that the issue of nuclear states operating outside of international nonproliferation regime, such as Israel, Pakistan and India, fails to be addressed. Dalby concludes by arguing that in order to deal with arms control issues in light of the challenges posed by globalisation, America needs to tackle the legacy of the War on Terror, and seek solutions more in tune with the current global situation. “Facing challengers may be much less important in the coming decades than facing challenges”. (p.54)

“The amount of money we’re spending on maintaining nuclear weapons, modernizing nuclear weapons, is not in keeping with the modern world,” Levin said. “It’s much more a Cold War remnant.”

So said Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) during a November 11 interview on Bloomberg Television to air this weekend.  

Sen. Levin is right: Current and planned U.S. spending on nuclear weapons is totally out of whack with the 21st century security environment and poses financial and opportunity costs that can’t be justified given the current economic climate. Following through with current plans to replace all three legs of the triad could saddle the U.S. with an excessively large nuclear arsenal for the next half century. Check out our resource center on nuclear weapons spending for more information!

REP. [MICHAEL] TURNER: The next issue goes to the issue of reducing without the hedge. You know, our provision [in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act] is the chemistry military research facility in New Mexico, the uranium processing facilit…

A new report on Iran’s nuclear capability from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not contain any startling new developments, but already it has some conservatives in the U.S. and Israel beating the drums for war.

While the report contains a level of detail not seen before, it does not contain a “smoking gun.”  Details of Iran’s likely weaponization activities prior to 2003 are laid out clearly and include:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

It is clear from the IAEA’s report that these activities took place under a highly structured nuclear program.  Iran’s major nuclear effort, identified as the AMAD plan,was stopped “rather abruptly” by Tehran in late 2003, but some staff may have “remained in place to record and document the achievements of their respective projects.”

Unfortunately, more recent activities receive a far lower level of clarity from the IAEA.  According to the report, there are, “indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing,” but “the Agency’s ability to construct an equally good understanding of activities in Iran after the end of 2003 is reduced, due to the more limited information available to the Agency.”

While the Agency continues to express concern with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the level of activity associated with that program post-2003 remains unclear.  While Iran’s nuclear program continues to make progress, an Iranian nuclear weapon is not imminent and the U.S. intelligence community continues to believe that Iran has yet to make the political decision to build and test a nuclear weapon.

See here for the full analysis of the IAEA’s new report and what it means.

After the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted on October 31 to admit Palestine as a full member-state to the organization, the U.S. defunded UNESCO in accordance with a U.S. law from 1990.  

The law restricts funding to any United Nations organization that accepts Palestine as a full member before an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.  With the Palestinian Authority (PA) actively seeking membership in U.N. organizations, the UNESCO rebuff could mark a U.S. trend in defunding other U.N. organizations.  Blanket application of the law is of particular concern because it could lead the U.S. to defund organizations that directly contribute to U.S. and global security, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

After failing to secure an expedient vote in the U.N. Security Council on Palestinian statehood, the PA applied for membership at UNESCO.  Ibrahim Khraishi, a Palestinian official at the U.N. in Geneva, told the Associated Press, “[w]e are working on [membership], one by one” to gain greater recognition for an internationally recognized Palestinian state at the U.N.

White House spokesperson Jay Carney said of the move: “Today’s vote at UNESCO to admit the Palestinian Authority is premature and undermines the international community’s shared goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”  

The next international organizations to vote on whether to admit Palestine as a full member could be the World Health Organization and IAEA.  

If Palestine receives membership in the IAEA and the U.S. defunds the organization, the IAEA would be severely weakened.  U.S. contributions account for a substantial portion of the IAEA’s funding, without which the IAEA would be forced to reduce the number of inspectors it sends worldwide to ensure that nuclear technology is not used for nuclear weapons.  It would have to scale back efforts to improve the safety and security of nuclear energy plants after the crisis at Fukushima.  Moreover, the U.S. would be diminishing the potency of a long-time bulwark against Iranian nuclear aspirations and depriving itself of information on Iran that is vital to national security.

Troubled, the National Security Network’s Heather Hurlburt wrote: “The IAEA is days away from presenting its latest report on Iran’s nuclear activities, and it would seem that Washington’s real priority ought to be garnering global support for a unified response [against Iran’s nuclear program]…”  

Instead, the U.S. is weakening its global influence, jeopardizing its national security and guaranteeing its dismissal from the IAEA if it does not reverse the decision within two years.  As Hurlburt wrote, “[it] makes you wonder whether Iran’s hard-liners aren’t secretly cheering every shadowboxing move we make.”

Though many Congressional supporters of the law admit that it could severely weaken U.N. organizations and U.S. national interests, they argue that organizations that grant membership to Palestine must be punished.  Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a leading Republican Senator, affirmed that “[t]his could be catastrophic for the U.S.-UN relationship…What you are going to do is eventually lose congressional support for our participation in the United Nations…That would be a great loss.”  Yet Sen. Graham is currently introducing legislation that would require the U.S. to withdraw from – not just defund –UNESCO and any international organization that recognizes Palestine as a member.

Republican and Democratic members of Congress seem unlikely to repeal or attempt to revise this law despite its failings.  Congress can and should attempt to create a waiver, at the very least, that would allow the President to make exceptions for organizations such as the IAEA.

Otherwise, Congress seems to be cutting off its proverbial nose to spite U.S. national security.