This morning the Senate plans to vote on invoking cloture on the Defense Authorization Bill.  If the vote is successful, it will ease passage of the bill in the next few days.  About 380 amendments have now been submitted.  Chairman Levin said that a package of 35-40 “non-controversial” amendments is ready to be approved by unanimous consent, but the concerns of a couple of Senators held up passage.  Yesterday the Senate adopted two amendments by voice vote and rejected two amendments by recorded votes.

Below is an update on the list of the key amendments related to nuclear weapons policy that have either been submitted or are still pending, as prepared by Center Executive Director John Isaacs:

Iran sanctions: Kirk (R-IL), Manchin (D-WV), Blunt (R-MO), Tester (D-MT) and others amendment No. 1084 to require the President to impose sanctions  on foreign institutions that conduct transactions with Iran’s central bank. Menendez (D-NJ) amendment No. 1292 is similar. Both these amendments have been withdrawn and there is a new amendment No. 1414 from both Senators.

Nuclear weapons triad: Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1183 to require the maintenance of all three legs of the nuclear weapons triad, those on land, at sea and in the air. Hoeven (R-ND) , Tester (D-MT), Blunt (R-MO, Enzi (R-WY) and Vitter (R-LA) have a similar amendment No. 1279 supporting the triad and endorsing all three legs of the triad.

Missile defense on the East Coast: Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1185 to require a report on stationing missile defense on the East Coast.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Barrasso (R-WY), Enzi (R-WY), Conrad (D-ND), Baucus (D-MT) and Tester (D-MT) amendment No. 1307 requiring the U.S. to maintain all 450 ICBM’s in the force with the New START limit of 800 strategic launchers, including 420 on alert or operationally  deployed status, with any reductions to be taken equally from the three ICBM bases.

Sharing missile defense information with Russia: Kirk (R-IL), Kyl (R-AZ), DeMint (R-SC) and Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1310 barring sharing classified missile defense technology with Russia.

Nuclear weapons complex funding: Corker (R-TN) amendment No. 1380 permitting the Defense Department to transfer funds to the Department of Energy for nuclear weapons activities up to the level authorized if the appropriations level is less than the authorized level. Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) has a similar amendment No. 1386 permitting the Secretary of State to transfer funding to the Department of Energy. Corker and Kyl combined to introduce amendment No. 1401 to permit the Secretary of Defense to transfer the funds.

Support of nuclear weapons triad: Kyl (R-AZ)-Lugar (R-IN) sense of Congress amendment No. 1444 endorsing maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons triad of delivery systems,  maintaining robust nuclear weapons laboratories and providing full funding for these programs.

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this week’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Fatwas for fission: Assessing the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets
Blair, C. P., Fatwas for fission: Assessing the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.  67:6, 2011, pp. 19-33.

“Based on unclassified information, neither the optimists nor the pessimists positions are defensible in fact, both positions only review assumed terrorist capabilities and putative vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.” (2011)

Charles Blair examines the threat that terrorist groups pose to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.  He finds that optimists who think that the warheads are very safe, and pessimists, who think that the warheads are in imminent danger of falling into terrorist’s hands are both wrong.  Blair finds the two sides get it wrong in determining the vulnerability of nuclear weapons and in their interpretations of terrorist’s perception of the value of nuclear weapons.   Pessimists do not consider that the most capable groups in Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, have not demonstrated a desire to acquire nuclear weapons.  Optimists do not consider the high value of nuclear weapons.  

India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb
Kennedy, A. B., India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb. International Security. 36:2, Fall 2011, pp. 120-153.

“In this view, the credibility of an extended deterrence commitment rests foremost on the interests that the protector has at stake in defending its protégé, as opposed to the techniques used to signal the commitment.” (2011)

Andrew Kennedy traces India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons.  He traces India’s the disintegration of India’s confidence that it would be protected from China by the United States or the Soviet Union.  When the United States and Soviet Union began to open diplomatic channels with China in 1971, India was no longer confident that it would be protected by the Soviet Union or United States’ nuclear umbrellas.  Kennedy finds that the inability to convince India that the United States was serious in its commitment to India is a lesson that can be applied to aspiring nuclear states today.

From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire
Mutimer, D. 2011. From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire, Contemporary Security Policy. 32:1, Spring 2011. pp.57-75.

“A 21st century nuclear arms control, therefore, will not be arms control in the sense it was practiced in the 20th century, but rather would involve securing against nuclear weapons – as risky and inconvenient – by the very states which hold them.”(p.72)

David Mutimer explores the relationship between the current practices of bilateral arms control negotiations and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons set by Obama in his Prague speech in April 2009. By drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality and by understanding arms control as a social practice, Mutimer argues that the type of Cold War arms control in which we currently engage will not lead to a world free of nuclear weapons. Instead, he believes we have to delegitimize nuclear weapons by changing our understanding of them. We need to view the weapons not as providers of security, but the opposite. He derives part of his argument from a way of thinking which suggests that the weapons and the strategies with which they come inhibit important global flows of goods and information and as such they should be considered a threat.

An international group of dignitaries called the Eminent Persons Group met with Korean President Lee Myung-bak Tuesday, November 29 in Seoul and adopted a joint statement (full text below) on how to make the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit a success.  The Presidential Office says the group expressed their strong support for the summit and recommended six ways to make it a success:

1.    Achieve progress in the 2010 Washington Summit commitments;

2.    Devise a workable vision and implementation measures for nuclear security via the Seoul Communiqué;

3.    Secure detailed country commitments from summit participants;

4.    Restore confidence in nuclear power wrought by Fukushima and actively seek ways to deal with radiological terrorism;

5.    Strengthen international and regional cooperation to deal with illegal smuggling of nuclear materials;

6.    Maintain momentum by ensuring a 3rd summit.

The Eminent Persons Group is comprised of:

Kang Chang Sun (ROK), Oh Myeong (ROK), Han Sung-joo (ROK), Graham Allison (US), Hans Blix (Sweden), Gareth Evans (Australia), Goh Chok Tong (Singapore), Igor Ivanov (Russia), A.P.J Abdul Kalam (India), Henry Kissinger (US), Shinichi Kitaoka (Japan), Li Zhaoxing (China), Sam Nunn (US), William Perry (US), Hubert Vedrine (France)

Below is the full text of the Joint Statement adopted by the Eminent Persons Group:

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
FOR THE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

We, members of the Eminent Persons Group established to advise the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak, on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, met in Seoul on 29 November, 2011. We, upon the invitation of President Lee, gathered to discuss ways to ensure the success of the Seoul Summit. In sincere and intense discussions today, we agreed on the following statement and express the hope that it will contribute to next year’s Summit.

1.    We recognize and fully support the efforts of many world leaders and intellectuals who have strived to achieve a peaceful and prosperous world free of nuclear weapons, and note that some progress has been made in this regard. However, we at the same time recognize that there is still much to be done to attain this noble cause.

2.    We are of the view that nuclear security, aimed at preventing terrorists, criminals, and other irresponsible actors from using nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium or plutonium for malicious purposes, constitutes an important element in advancing the goal of a nuclear weapon-free, peaceful and prosperous world, together with nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, we acknowledge that a key strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism is to deny terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities.

3.    We emphasize that in order for the global nuclear security architecture to be robust enough to protect humankind and the planet, it needs to be based on the principle of integrated and balanced independence and interdependence between countries with shared responsibility. We support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture. We hope that the Participating States of the Seoul Summit will work towards the Conventions’ universal adherence.

4.    We welcome the fact that the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, held in April 2010, made nuclear security the focus of attention at the summit level and succeeded in achieving consensus among 50 global leaders on the gravity of the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need for common action. We recognize that President Obama’s four-year lock-down initiative, which aims to “secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years,” played a key role in bringing about this consensus, and strongly support this initiative.

5.    We are confident that the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will serve as a catalyst for realizing a world free of nuclear and radiological terrorism by both reaffirming the principles and the spirit of the Washington Summit and reaching agreement on new commitments and measures to enhance nuclear security. In this regard, we strongly support the Seoul Summit.

6.    We expect leaders at the Seoul Summit to enhance public confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also urge them to reduce the threats to nuclear facilities and their operating systems, such as sabotage or cyber attacks, by discussing in a responsible manner the ways in which nuclear security and nuclear safety can be mutually reinforced, bearing in mind the implications and lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. We have every confidence that the Republic of Korea can play a leading role to this end as the Chair Country of the Seoul Summit.

7.    We recognize that there is a critical need to build up national and regional capabilities and resilience to deal with the aftermath of a radiological and nuclear accident, whether as a result of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, in order to mitigate the consequences. In this regard, we also note the need to explain international standards on radioactivity in ways that are understandable to the public.

8.    Noting the risk that radiological materials may be illegally obtained and explosive devices may be assembled, and given the serious consequences that arise from perpetrated acts of radiological terrorism, we believe that there is a need to engage in in-depth discussions on the threat of radiological terrorism, together with that of nuclear terrorism at the Summit, with a view to resolving these threats through mutual cooperation.

9.    Recognizing that the success of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is important to further bolster the global nuclear security regime, we would like to highlight the following for the success of the Summit:

–    First, the Seoul Summit should demonstrate tangible progress in implementing the commitments made at the Washington Summit with all participants reporting specifically on activities they have undertaken and propose to undertake;

–    Second, the Seoul Summit should further advance the Nuclear Security Summit process to the implementation phase by setting out in the ‘Seoul Communiqué’ a practical vision and new concrete measures;

–    Third, each Participating State undertakes to make significant contributions to the objective of strengthening nuclear security regime by announcing voluntary, individual commitments at the Seoul Summit. Furthermore, Participating States need to reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear security and safety framework.

–    Fourth, the Seoul Summit should take into account the new international security circumstances that have taken shape since the Washington Summit.  In particular, in considering the lessons of the Fukushima accident that releases of radioactivity into the environment have grave consequences, the Seoul Summit should recognize that just as insufficient nuclear safety may put nuclear security at risk, insufficient nuclear security may put nuclear safety at risk. In conjunction, it should develop measures for cooperation to reduce the threat of radiological terrorism. The Seoul Summit should also promote the strengthening of international and regional cooperation mechanisms in nuclear safety and security;

–    Fifth, the Seoul Summit should emphasize the importance of preventing the illicit transfer of nuclear materials by, inter alia, strengthening international and regional cooperation through the sharing of information, best practices, and capacity building.

–    Sixth, the Seoul Summit should build upon the momentum generated by the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and should make efforts to hold a third Summit to provide political impetus at the highest level for the nuclear security regime strengthening process and assess progress made on the Washington Summit’s 4-year lock-down target.

10.    We welcome the fact that the Republic of Korea has been steadfast in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by upholding the principles of nuclear nonproliferation, security and safety. We look forward to the leading role of the Republic of Korea in bridging diverse opinions among Participating States and achieving an effective and successful outcome for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The highly successful peaceful nuclear program of the Republic of Korea, operated with full respect for the requirements of safety, security and safeguards provides a solid basis for this leadership. Their contribution will surely serve to a comprehensive approach to nuclear security worldwide and be seen as the Republic of Korea’s unique contribution to a more secure, safe, happy and prosperous world.

A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Former President, Republic of India

Gareth Evans, Former Foreign Minister, Commonwealth of Australia

Han Sung-joo, Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea

Shinichi Kitaoka, Former Ambassador to The United Nations, Japan

Oh Myung, Former Minister of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea

Hans Blix, Former Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Kingdom of Sweden

Goh Chok Tong, Emeritus Senior Minister, Republic of Singapore

Kang Chang Sun, Chairman & Chief Regulatory Officer, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, Republic of Korea

Li Zhaoxing, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, National People’s Congress, Republic of China

The Nautilus Institute ran a piece on November 22, 2011 written by yours truly on the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and can be viewed here or here.

The gist of my piece is:

“There are clear ways in which Seoul can capitalize on its strengths to flavor the 2012 [Nuclear Security Summit] with a “Korean twist” as it maintains depth on key substantive issues that ensure the security of nuclear materials, parts, and facilities…The challenge lies in clearly demonstrating that the benefits outweigh the costs, and that states would have a national interest in further investing their political capital in nuclear security.”

Click here to read more.

Excerpted from Frank Oliveri’s excellent November 21, 2011, Congressional Quarterly article “Pentagon: The Power of Intertia”.  Apologies for not providing a link; the story is subscription only.