Happy International Day Against Nuclear Tests!  For a brilliant reminder of why a permanent legal ban on nuclear testing is vital, check out Daryl Kimball’s moving take over at Armscontrolnow.  

Looking for another nuclear testing-related item to put on your calendar?  
The “2011 Article XIV Conference” on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be held September 23 in New York.

Hosted by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, this will be seventh conference on the ratification and implementation of the CTBT (for background information our  site is chock full of CTBT resources, including a fact sheet here).  

The CTBT calls for an indefinite ban on all nuclear test explosions in all environments, to inhibit the research and development of new nuclear weapons. Since opening for signature in 1996, 182 states have signed the treaty and 154 have ratified it. However, before the treaty can “enter into force” (i.e. be made into international law) the 44 countries that possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at the time the treaty was negotiated have to sign and ratify the pact.  Nine of these countries still need to deposit their articles of ratification: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the United States of America, India and Pakistan.

Representatives from all countries are invited to participate in the conference – whether they have signed or ratified the treaty or not.  Those states that have already ratified the treaty use the conference to promote the treaty’s goals and urge states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty so as soon as possible.  They will also propose concrete measures to hasten entry into force, such as by urging countries with nuclear weapons research programs to refrain from developing new nuclear devices.

At the last conference in 2009, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon underlined that the CTBT is essential to ridding the world of nuclear weapons and urged states to ratify immediately, rather than wait to follow another country’s lead.    

In 2009, the U.S demonstrated renewed commitment to the treaty and the Article XIV meeting.  For instance, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended and spoke at the conference, the first high-level U.S. official to do so in almost ten years.  
The U.S. also secured the Security Council’s unanimous consent for a U.S.-proposed resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament that dedicates the Security Council to actively promote “a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons….”

The U.S. Senate voted against ratification of the CTBT twelve years ago in 1999, but the case for the treaty has only grown stronger. In 1999, the Senate primarily opposed to the treaty because they believed a ban on nuclear testing was unverifiable and worried that the U.S. nuclear arsenal would grow outdated without testing.  Today, verification methods have greatly improved and the U.S. – which has observed a self-imposed ban on U.S. nuclear testing for the last ten years – has demonstrated that it can maintain its nuclear arsenal even without tests.  The Obama administration has urged the Senate to reconsider the treaty as soon as is feasible.

While the onus of signing and ratifying the treaty falls squarely on the individual countries, U.S. ratification is likely a necessary (albeit not sufficient) step to spur the other eight remaining holdouts to ratify the treaty.  China, for instance, has hinted that it would ratify if the U.S. did so.  

U.S. ratification could also help stem Iran and North Korea’s nuclear aspirations because it would give the U.S. added credibility to sustain and expand international cooperation against states that do not comply with their nuclear proliferation obligations.    

U.S. ratification of the CTBT is a painless and effective means to increase national security.  As Ellen Tauscher, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, put it earlier this year, “In short, ratification helps us get more of what we want.”

An August 20 article in the New York Times by William Broad highlights a disturbing advance in the technology to enrich uranium which could have serious proliferation risks.  

The new technology uses lasers to enrich uranium for use in nuclear power plants.  The idea has been around for a long time, but it has proven too difficult to implement – until now.  General Electric (G.E.), in conjunction with Hitachi, has been successfully testing this technology for the past two years, and is now petitioning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a $1 billion dollar plant in Wilmington, N.C.  

Center Advisory Board member Frank N. von Hippel, a nuclear physicist and former advisor to President Clinton, told Broad that we’re “…on the verge of a new route to the bomb.”

Concerns about the proliferation risks of the technology are not new.  The New York Times article refers to a September 30th, 2009 letter spearheaded by the Center and other organizations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission highlighting concerns that the technology could make it easier for other countries to develop clandestine uranium enrichment capabilities that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons (read the letter on our website here).  Earlier this year the American Physical Society petitioned the Commission to urging it to make the completion of a proliferation risk assessments a condition of licensing.

Supporters of the technology believe that it will lower the cost of enriching uranium for use in nuclear power plants.  They argue that this would make it easier and cheaper to produce the fuel for nuclear power plants.  

However, the use of lasers in the enrichment process could also lead to the creation of much smaller and therefore harder to detect enrichment facilities.  Such plants would make it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that states are complying with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.    

For example, Iran has been working on laser enrichment technology since the 1970’s, but it has kept the results secret.  Successful implementation of the technology in the United States would likely encourage Iran, and others, to continue their own research.

This new technology opens the door to increased proliferation.  As Dr. von Hippel pointed out “We should have learned enough by now to do an assessment before we let this kind of thing out.” At the very least, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should call for a careful and thorough assessment of the proliferation risks of the technology to ensure a full understanding of it costs and benefits.  

On August 21, the Libyan opposition forces stormed the capital, Tripoli, and took control of President Ghaddafi’s compound.  The war is not over, as Ghaddafi loyalists continue to battle the rebels, and the Transitional National Council (the organization formed to represent the opposition) will need to begin work to fill the power vacuum. The council has a huge task ahead of it to restore order, rebuild the country, create legitimate national institutions and cobble its different factions into some sort of working government.  More immediately, the opposition and NATO have to secure Ghaddafi’s chemical weapons and low-enriched uranium stockpiles.

In addition to Ghaddafi’s arsenals of conventional weapons, he is rumored to have stockpiled chemical weapons agents.  NATO has pledged to secure the chemical weapons so that Ghaddafi forces cannot use them against the opposition and civilians, but the opposition will also need to be involved.  James Corbett, a member of the Center for Research on Globalization, doesn’t believe the Ghaddafi regime would use these weapons in a last ditch effort to hold on to power, since it hasn’t used them yet.  However, the greater risk is that, amidst the chaos of Ghaddafi’s overthrow, these stockpiles could be susceptible to theft by smugglers or terrorists.  Terrorist organizations, such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, have successfully used chemical weapons against civilians in the past.  

Also potentially of concern are the hundreds of metric tons of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials at Libya’s Tajoura nuclear reactor facility.  Under an agreement between Ghaddafi and the U.S. to dismantle Libya’s nuclear program, all highly-enriched bomb-grade uranium has been removed from Libya, but low-enriched uranium, radioisotopes and spent fuel remain stockpiled at the reactor.  Olli Heinonen, former head of U.N. nuclear safeguards inspections worldwide, warns that the remaining nuclear and radiological materials could be used in a dirty bomb, which consists of conventional explosives used to disperse radiation.  If the Ghaddafi-employed guards securing the facility flee or NATO simply does not have the manpower to protect the plant, it could become a target for looting.

NATO, the U.S. and the IAEA are working to secure the materials and the U.S. has sent specialists to inform the transition council of how to best protect them, but the power vacuum remains a serious concern.  It will take time for a new government in Libya to stabilize the country and the transition process and any future opposition in-fighting could distract the council from providing the necessary security for the chemical agents and nuclear materials.  The U.S. and IAEA should stay vigilant and continue to offer their assistance to protect Libya’s dangerous nuclear materials and chemical weapons at this crucial time.

The first Pyongyang-Moscow summit in nine years – aimed largely at deepening bilateral economic ties – concluded with no news on the nuclear front. Based on the available information reported on the August 24th summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Pyongyang merely reiterated its basic position without clear signs of taking any steps forward toward denuclearization.

However, it is difficult to make a complete and definitive assessment since the summit results were carried by the media, absent official word from North Korea. Closed door deals, if they exist, remain veiled. The other parties to the Six Party Talks have yet to be debriefed on the summit while chief nuclear negotiators from Seoul and Beijing are slated to meet on Thursday, August 25th.

At this point, only an initial and limited assessment can be made based on preliminary information delivered by the media: (Click “Read More”)

1. “(Nuclear) Moratorium… in the course of the Six Party Talks”

The Kremlin reportedly said Kim Jong-il could be prepared to temporarily suspend (moratorium) nuclear production and testing “in the course” of the Six Party Talks process. This position does not go beyond the one it took in March when chief Russian nuclear negotiator visited Pyongyang. During the March meeting, the North indicated that once the Six Party Talks resume, it is willing to – based on the principle of “action-for-action” – discuss the other parties’ demands for a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and for IAEA inspectors to visit its uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon. The key point here is “once the Six Party Talks resume” – in other words, the “Six Party Talks first” – whereas Seoul and Washington are demanding a moratorium first.

Some critical questions need to be answered:

First — in a diplomatic world where diction and subsequent interpretation are perhaps just as important as corresponding policies, global media reports have used varying terminology – is it a “moratorium” or a “suspension” or a “temporary halt” of fissile material production and nuclear testing? All three have different nuances, and must not be confused with a “test ban.”

Second — does Pyongyang mean it will (temporarily) refrain from nuclear activities including testing  before (in the lead up) or after the Six Party Talks resume? Or does it mean Pyongyang will impose a WMD moratorium while the Six Party Talks proceed, or consider a “moratorium” at some undefined time after multilateral negotiations begin? In the past, North Korea has shut down and disabled key nuclear facilities in Yongbyon beginning 2007 as a result of Six Party Talk agreements – hence, “during” the Six Party Talks. This was materialized with the other parties verifying the disablement measures.

Third, and most importantly — diction aside, it is only a matter of time before Pyongyang turns the nuclear switch back on. The key is being able to confirm that all nuclear activities – particularly uranium enrichment – and nuclear testing are halted.

2. “Unconditional Return to the Six Party Talks”

According to the Kremlin, Kim Jong-il told his Russian counterpart that Pyongyang is ready to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions. Such reiteration of its basic position would not fare well on Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. Some observers suspect the regime’s unconditional demand is a sneaky way to propose meeting at the six-way negotiating table as an equal player.

The allies are demanding action and not mere words. Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have made it clear that prior to the resumption of the Six Party Talks, Pyongyang must:

–    Halt all nuclear activities including uranium enrichment;

–    Allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant;

–    Moratorium on nuclear and missile testing;

–    Pledge to implement the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement on denuclearization.

Missing Link: UEP

Initial reports on the summit out of Moscow were mum on North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP) unveiled in November 2010.

The facility was shown to one American scientist, but international nuclear experts must thoroughly confirm first-hand the extent of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment development. In order to verify its uranium capabilities, enrichment activities must end. The biggest question is whether the North will accept IAEA inspectors and under what conditions?

Should Pyongyang accept IAEA inspectors to visit its pilot UEP facility, it will likely request an entrance fee. For an administration that repeatedly vows it “will not buy the same horse twice” or “pay for talks,” Washington may not be so eager to purchase a ticket.

(Source: Andy Wong – Associated Press)

Joe Biden, greeting a Mongolian wrestler, August 22, 2011.    

The Vice President’s stopped in Mongolia Monday as part of his trip around Asia, and was met by a small group of protesters with posters that read: “Yankees keep your hands off Mongolia” and “Hi Joe, No Nuclear Waste, Go Home,” referring to alleged secret negotiations between the U.S., Mongolia, and Japan to build a spent nuclear fuel repository in Mongolia.

NoH is efforting to confirm reports that the Department of Energy encouraged Biden to challenge the Mongolian wrestler to a match for the rights to build the repository.